Policies for climate change by Slechten, Aurelie
UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES
Faculte Solvay Brussels School of Economics
and Management
ECARES
Policies for Climate Change
The`se de doctorat pre´sente´e en vue de l’obtention du titre de
Docteur en sciences e´conomiques et de gestion
Aure´lie Slechten
Anne´e acade´mique 2012-2013
Doctoral Committee
Advisor :
Professor Estelle CANTILLON - Universite´ libre de Bruxelles
Jury Members
Professor Paola CONCONI - Universite´ libre de Bruxelles
Professor Andreas LANGE - University of Hamburg
Professor Patrick LEGROS - Universite´ libre de Bruxelles
Professor David MARTIMORT - Paris School of Economics
ii
To Elisa
iii
Remerciements
Une the`se, c’est un travail long, difficile, et parfois de´moralisant. Mais c’est
avant tout une chance. La chance de travailler en toute liberte´, d’apprendre a`
faire des erreurs et a` recommencer encore et toujours. C’est surtout la chance de
rencontrer de nombreuses personnes qui m’ont non seulement permis de mener a`
bien cette the`se de doctorat, mais aussi qui ont fait de cette pe´riode un moment
qui restera grave´ dans ma me´moire. C’est pourquoi aux sentiments de bonheur et
de fierte´ d’avoir mene´ cette the`se a` son terme se meˆle un sentiment de profonde
reconnaissance envers toutes les personnes qui de manie`re directe ou indirecte ont
contribue´ a` son aboutissement.
Tout d’abord, je voudrais exprimer ma plus profonde reconnaissance a` ma pro-
motrice, Estelle Cantillon. Elle a e´te´, j’en suis persuade´e, la meilleure promotrice que
j’aurais pu avoir. Je voudrais la remercier, en premier lieu pour m’avoir donne´ l’envie
et l’opportunite´ d’entamer une the`se, mais aussi et surtout pour tout son travail de
coaching durant mes cinq anne´es de doctorat. A chacune de nos re´unions, j’ai pu
be´ne´ficier de ses commentaires constructifs et perspicaces. Chacune de nos discus-
sions me motivait a` toujours aller plus loin. Je voudrais aussi lui exprimer toute ma
gratitude pour son aide inestimable pour la publication du premier chapitre de ma
the`se. Merci aussi de m’avoir donne´ l’opportunite´ de passer six mois a` l’Universite´
de Toulouse I.
Merci e´galement aux autres membres de mon jury – Paola Conconi, Andreas
Lange, Patrick Legros et David Martimort – pour le temps qu’ils ont consacre´ a` lire
ce travail et pour leurs judicieux conseils durant la de´fense prive´e.
Merci au Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique (FRS - FNRS) qui a finance´
la recherche mene´e dans le cadre de cette the`se.
Je tiens tout particulie`rement a` remercier Marjorie pour tout ce qu’elle a fait
pour moi depuis des anne´es: mon premier poste d’e´tudiante-assistante, le temps
consacre´ a` relire les chapitres de ma the`se et a` ame´liorer mon anglais... Merci aussi
pour son soutien et ses encouragements et pour tous les moments que nous avons
partage´s que ce soit au Kaf Kaf, dans son bureau, a` l’Atelier,...
Merci a` Vincenzo pour son aide pre´cieuse pour le troisie`me chapitre de ma the`se,
mais aussi pour tous les bons moments passe´s ensemble. Travailler avec lui sur ce
dernier chapitre a e´te´ un vrai plaisir.
Ecrire cette the`se m’a fait re´aliser combien la famille et les amis sont importants
dans les moments difficiles. Je tiens donc a` remercier tous mes colle`gues et amis
iv
d’avoir fait de ces cinq anne´es de the`se un moment inoubliable. Ceux avec qui j’ai
fait mes e´tudes : Alice M, Sophie, Alice D et Loic. Ceux que j’ai rencontre´s par la
suite: Catherine, Goeffrey, Ben, Yves, Renaud, Florence, Nicky, Je´rome, Gre´goire,
Lorenzo, Marco, Julien, Olivier, Luisa, Elisabetta, Olivia, Barnabe´...
Merci e´galement a` tous les membres de ma famille pour leur soutien. En parti-
culier, merci a` Karim pour m’avoir supporte´e et soutenue pendant ces cinq anne´es.
Merci de m’avoir aide´e a` me changer les ide´es dans les moments difficiles. Merci
pour tout ce qu’on a ve´cu ensemble.
Pour terminer, je voudrais remercier mes parents du fond du coeur pour avoir
toujours cru en moi (et pour m’avoir encourage´e a` faire des e´tudes universitaires).
Je n’en serais pas la` aujourdhui sans leur amour et leur soutien inconditionnel dans
tous les moments heureux ou malheureux.
v
Contents
Introduction 3
1 Intertemporal links in cap-and-trade schemes 11
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 Equilibrium of the cap-and-trade scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.1 The intertemporal trading scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.2 The scheme without intertemporal trading . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3.3 Further considerations on long-term investments . . . . . . . . 26
1.4 Welfare analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5 Application to the EU ETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2 Environmental agreements under asymmetric information 46
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2.1 The setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3 A model without pre-play communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3.1 Complete information benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3.2 Two-sided asymmetric information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3.3 One-sided asymmetric information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4 A model with pre-play communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.1 Stage 2: abatement game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.4.2 Stage 1: pre-play communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4.3 Solution of the two-stage game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
1
3 Measuring the impact of international agreements on global CO2
emissions 79
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2 Data and identification strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2.1 CO2 data and air-pollution agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2.2 Identification strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3.1 OLS estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3.2 IV estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3.3 Dynamic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.3.4 Dealing with carbon leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.4 Interpretation of the results and policy implications . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2
General Introduction
Anthropogenic climate change is defined as a significant and lasting change in the
statistical distribution of weather patterns caused mainly by increasing atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases (e.g. CO2, CH4 and N2O). The scientific commu-
nity now fully agrees that the Earth is experiencing climate change. This consensus is
clearly expressed in the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from
observations of increases global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread
melting of snow and ice and rising in global average of sea level” (IPCC, 2007b, p.
30). There is also a scientific consensus on the anthropogenic nature of this change
in the climate: “Global atmospheric concentrations of CO2, CH4 and N2O have
increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed
pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning many thousands of years”
(IPCC, 2007b, p. 37).
Even if the annual flow of emissions did not increase beyond today’s rate, the
stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere would reach double pre-industrial levels
by 2050 – that is 550ppm CO2e. At a level of 550ppm CO2e, it is nearly certain
that the global average temperature will rise by more than 2◦C inducing losses of
biodiversity, an increase of the sea level and severe adverse consequences for human
health and food security.
A natural question arises: why should economists be concerned about and study
climate change? The most comprehensive research into the economics of climate
change has been carried out by Sir Nicholas Stern, commissioned by the United
Kingdom Treasury: “The Stern Review: The economics of Climate Change”. In his
review, Stern emphasizes that “Climate change presents a unique challenge for eco-
nomics: it is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen” (Stern, 2006).
The global climate can be considered as a public good or a global resource that is
over-exploited. The reason is simple: those who create greenhouse gas emissions
through electricity production, transports or deforestation do not pay the entire
cost of the climate change resulting from their contribution to the accumulation of
those gases in the atmosphere. They thus emit more greenhouse gases than what is
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optimal from the perspective of society as a whole. This is the well-known free-rider
problem, the classic problem of the provision of a global public good.
The Stern Review calls for an urgent and effective policy to address climate
change and examines what should be the appropriate forms of this policy. “The
scientific evidence is now overwhelming: climate change presents very serious global
risks, and it demands an urgent global response” (Stern, 2006). Moreover, this
global response “will require deeper international cooperation in many areas – most
notably in creating price signals and markets for carbon” (Stern, 2006).
In my thesis, I address these two important points mentioned in the Stern Re-
view: (i) the creation of a price signal through the use of carbon markets (or cap-
and-trade schemes) and (ii) the necessity to reach a global agreement on greenhouse
gas emission reduction policies. During the last decade, these issues of international
cooperation in climate protection and of carbon markets have received increasing
attention in economic research. My thesis is inspired from this economic literature
and attempts to contribute to the discussion on public policies designed to address
climate change. It consists of three separate papers. While each of them is self-
contained, the papers share a unifying objective, which is the provision of climate
policy recommendations.
Chapter 1: “Intertemporal links in cap-and-trade schemes”
According to Stern (2006), the future international framework to tackle climate
change should include a global carbon market, since with a common global carbon
price, emission reductions will take place wherever they are the cheapest (this is the
equi-marginal principle). Nevertheless, the efficiency of such economic instruments
in reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions heavily depends on their design.
The first chapter of this thesis concentrates on one particular aspect of carbon
market design: intertemporal permit trading, i.e. the ability to bank permits for
future use or to borrow permits from future allocations. The motivation behind
the use of intertemporal permit trading is that it constitutes another source of
cost savings: if firms covered by the cap-and-trade scheme can trade their permits
intertemporally, they will be able to equalize their marginal costs of abatement
across periods as well as across firms, thereby further decreasing the cost of emission
reductions (Rubin, 1996).
Investments in abatement may have long-term effects. For example, in most
industrial sectors covered by the EU Emission Trading Scheme (the largest existing
cap-and-trade scheme), abatement tends to take the form of efficiency improvements
or changes in production processes (e.g. heat recovery and thermal insulation) that
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are not easy to reverse (Ellerman et al., 2010) and can be considered as “long-term”
investments in abatement. This first chapter explores how the additional intertem-
poral link resulting from investments in abatement interacts with intertemporal
permit trading. To this end, a theoretical model encompassing the main features of
cap-and-trade schemes is built. In this model, long-term effects of investments are
twofold: (i) investments in abatement remain useful beyond the period during which
they occur and (ii) to account for learning-by-doing and the possibility of decreasing
abatement opportunities in future periods, investment costs are allowed to depend
on investment levels of previous periods.
Considering long-term investments changes the optimal investment and trading
decisions of firms covered by a cap-and-trade scheme. This is due to the fact that
investments now have an additional benefit (the reduction of emissions in future
periods) and an additional cost (reduction of abatement opportunities in future pe-
riods). If carbon markets must be part of the future international framework to
tackle climate change, policy-makers must be careful when designing the intertem-
poral permit trading rules. More specifically, they have to take into account two
features that the results of the theoretical model have put forward.
First, allowing intertemporal trading may delay long-term investments in abate-
ment. In the absence of intertemporal trading, long-term investments in abatement
provide firms with some intertemporal flexibility. Indeed, when the next period is
very demanding in terms of abatement, long-term investments are used as a means
to reduce future compliance costs. Firms “over-invest” in the current period: they
invest in abatement in such a way that the total abatement exceeds the current
abatement needs. This over-investment is entirely driven by future-period abate-
ment needs and generates a surplus of permits at the end of the current period.
This surplus is “useless” since it cannot be banked for future use. Once intertempo-
ral trading is allowed, the model shows that firms still over-invest (in order to bank
the surplus of permits) but to a smaller extent. Consequently, firms delay their
long-term investments because over-investment in long-term abatement and permit
banking are substitute means to reduce future abatement costs.
Second, allowing intertemporal trading may reduce the total level of abatement
undertaken over the planning horizon of the cap-and-trade scheme. The “useless”
surplus generated by over-investment can now be banked for future periods, reducing
total abatement needs. This has a direct impact on the design of cap-and-trade
schemes. If, due to international negotiations, the number of permits issued does not
correspond to the socially optimal level of emissions, a scheme banning intertemporal
trading may achieve this socially optimal level through over-investment in long-
term abatements, thereby reducing the damages from emissions. However, banning
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intertemporal trading has a cost in terms of firms’ efficiency in meeting their emission
cap (the useless surplus of permits generated by over-investment). Governments thus
have to balance the cost of over-investment with the cost of over-emissions (emissions
higher than the socially optimal level).
Chapter 2: “Environmental agreements under asymmetric informa-
tion”
The second chapter concerns the necessity to shape a global solution to climate
change. Until now, no global efficient solution to climate change has been imple-
mented. For example, in chapter 3 of this thesis, I estimate that the effect of the
Kyoto Protocol on carbon dioxide emissions is not statistically significant. Addi-
tionally, the recent United Nations Conference in Rio (June 2012) seems to confirm
that there is little prospect for a global climate change agreement to emerge in the
near future. Climate change mitigation raises the classic problem of the provision
of a global public good (Bergstro¨m et al., 1986) but it also entails other market fail-
ures, such as uncertainty on future effects of climate change (Bramoulle´ and Treich,
2009) or asymmetric information about costs and benefits of emission abatements
between negotiating countries (Afionis, 2011).
In this chapter, I concentrate exclusively on the provision of a global public good
under asymmetric information. In this context, the problem of free-riding is double.
First, as previously explained, countries do not pay the entire cost of their greenhouse
gas emissions and they thus pollute more than what is socially optimal. Achieving
efficient cooperation requires monetary transfers between countries such that all
of them are willing to participate to a global agreement implementing the socially
optimal level of pollution abatement. Second, due to asymmetric information about
abatement costs for example, countries have an incentive to exaggerate their emission
abatement cost during the negotiations of this efficient agreement. By doing so,
countries reduce the effort they have to provide and leave most of the burden of
abatement on other countries. In this case, reaching an efficient agreement requires
transfers for which all countries reveal their abatement cost truthfully.
The mechanism design theory is particularly pertinent to deal with this type of
problem. Applying mechanisms with appropriate transfer schemes might help to
solve problems linked to the provision of a public good under asymmetric informa-
tion. I develop a theoretical model in line with environmental applications of this
mechanism design theory. It is a two-country model in which countries have private
information about their abatement cost. The efficient agreement is the agreement
requiring abatement levels that maximize total welfare. If countries refuse this agree-
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ment, each of them chooses an abatement level that maximizes its own welfare (it
is the non-cooperative equilibrium). I analyze under what conditions the socially
efficient agreement is feasible. In other words, I analyze whether there exist transfer
schemes for which both countries are willing to participate to this efficient agreement
and are willing to reveal their abatement cost truthfully.
A first insight of the theoretical model is that there exist transfer schemes satis-
fying participation and truthtelling constraints as long as the level of asymmetry of
information is not too high. As the asymmetry of information may prevent countries
from reaching an efficient agreement on the provision of a public good, the objective
of the chapter is to propose a channel to reduce this asymmetry of information and
to restore the feasibility of an efficient agreement: pre-play communication.
The argument is the following. International cooperation develops overtime and
this development follows a particular pattern: countries first agree on an initial
agreement, i.e. an umbrella convention, that generally does not impose binding
limits on countries’ emissions. For example, the United Nation Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change provides for the establishment of institutions such as
the Conference of Parties as a supreme body entitled to negotiate all subsequent
protocols and amendments, a secretariat that is in charge of the administration,
and subsidiary bodies for scientific advice and implementation. In a second stage,
countries negotiate an agreement with emission reduction targets and financial or
technology transfers, such as the Kyoto Protocol. Article 11 of the Kyoto Proto-
col allows for the possibility of monetary transfers from developed to developing
countries through the International Green Fund. Moreover, the flexible mechanisms
(Joint Implementations – JI – or Clean Development Mechanisms – CDM) foreseen
in this Protocol are expected to generate important technology transfers and flows
of financial resources among the Protocol member states.
Climate change negotiations are thus an example of a public good game pre-
ceded by a pre-play communication. By signing the UNFCCC, countries committed
themselves to provide the Conference of the Parties with clear data about their
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and about regional programmes containing mea-
sures to mitigate climate change and with information related to implementation.
However, this obligation only concerns industrialized countries.
One important result of the theoretical model with pre-play communication is to
show that there exist transfer schemes such that either one or two countries share
their private information during the pre-play communication stage and allow the
institutions created by the umbrella convention to monitor and certify this infor-
mation. Consequently, information asymmetry in the public good game is reduced.
Compared to a model without pre-play communication, the feasibility of the first-
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best agreement is restored in most of the cases.
A policy implication of this chapter is that before negotiating a new climate
change agreement, it could be useful to reinforce the UNFCCC by requiring, for
example, that all countries report their GHG emissions and their technologies to
reduce these GHG to the secretariat of the UNFCCC that should have the possibility
to verify, at least partially, this information. To reach this goal, the model shows
that transfers between industrialized and developing countries will play a crucial
role.
Chapter 3: “Measuring the impact of international agreements on global
CO2 emissions”
This chapter is a joint work with Vincenzo Verardi. The starting point of this
chapter is the observation that many countries are part of multiple agreements,
which may interact with each others because they concern pollutants that are either
released together or are substitutes for each others. In order to build an optimal cli-
mate change policy, it is therefore important to understand the interactions between
these other air-pollutants treaties and the level of CO2 emissions.
The objective of this chapter is to identify the effect of these multiple air-pollution
agreements on the level of CO2 emissions. Dealing with multiple agreements raises
some identification issues that we try to address: (1) reverse causality (i.e. the fact
that countries expecting a downward trend on their emissions may be particularly
willing to participate to environmental agreements), (2)timing effects (i.e. the fact
that the effects of agreements may be bunched at a future date for which we do not
have the data) and (3) time and membership overlap between agreements.
Surprisingly, we find that agreements that are the most effective in reducing
CO2 emissions are treaties focusing on acid rains. We provide two interpretations
for this result. First, pollutants covered by acid rain agreements (sulfur dioxide and
nitrous oxide) are more local pollutants than greenhouse gases, such as CO2 or CFCs.
Agreements on local pollutants are easier to reach because they imply less countries
and the environmental effects of these pollutants are more visible. Second, SO2
and NOx can be more easily controlled than CO2 emissions because the instruments
available to limit those emissions are well-identified and easier to implement. Since
carbon reduction is a byproduct of the standard measures to reduce acid rains,
these two interpretations allow to understand why acid rain treaties are effective in
reducing carbon emissions.
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Conclusion
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis emphasize theoretically and empirically the fact
that achieving international cooperation on climate change is very difficult. Chapter
3 suggests that the global nature of the climate change problem and the design of
climate agreements (i.e. the means available to reduce CO2 emissions) may explain
this failure. Chapter 2 shows theoretically that asymmetric information between
countries may exacerbate the free-rider problem.
These two chapters also provide some possible solutions to the lack of inter-
national cooperation. To address the issue of information asymmetry, chapter 2
proposes the creation of institutions in charge of gathering and certifying countries’
private information before environmental negotiations. If achieving international
cooperation is still not possible, chapter 3 suggests that regional cooperation may
supplement global treaties. It has been shown theoretically by Asheim et al. (2006)
that a regime with two agreements can Pareto dominate a regime based on a single
global treaty.
Chapter 1 presents an example of such a regional agreement to reduce CO2 emis-
sions. The EU emissions trading system is a cornerstone of the European Union’s
policy to combat climate change. Other regional cap-and-trade schemes for carbon
emissions exist but they are very small in terms of volumes exchanged (e.g. the
Chicago Climate Exchange or the New South Wales Certificates). Based on the
empirical findings of chapter 3 and on the theoretical result of Asheim et al. (2006),
we could imagine the existence of several related regional cap-and-trade systems as
an effective alternative to a global treaty on CO2 emissions. However, as it is high-
lighted in chapter 1, the design of such regional carbon markets really matters for
their success in reducing carbon emissions and in encouraging agents to undertake
long-term investments in abatement technologies.
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Chapter 1
Intertemporal links in
cap-and-trade schemes
In a two-period general equilibrium model, I study the effects of intertemporal emis-
sion permit trading in a cap-and-trade scheme when firms’ investments in abatement
have long-term effects. To meet their caps, firms optimally choose levels of trading
and investment in each period by equalizing the marginal benefit of abatement to the
marginal cost of abatement in each period. The fact that investments have long-term
effects introduces new effects: investments in period 1 have both an additional ben-
efit (the reduction of emissions in period 2) and an additional cost (the decrease in
abatement opportunities in period 2). This changes the standard condition of equal-
ization of marginal costs across periods for cost-effectiveness. Without intertemporal
trading, some investments in period 1 are entirely driven by second-period abatement
needs. In that case, allowing intertemporal trading may reduce investment in period
1 as some long-term investments are substituted by intertemporal permit trading.
Descriptive evidence from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) illustrates this
potential effect. 1
1Part of the research for this paper was done during a research stay at the Toulouse School
of Economics, for which the author benefitted from financial support from ERC grant MaDEM
and the FRS-FNRS. I am especially grateful to Estelle Cantillon, for her very helpful comments
and discussions. I am also indebted to Marjorie Gassner, Nicolas Gothelf, Alice McCathie, Brigit
Bednar-Friedl, Sonia Schwartz, Paola Conconi, Andreas Lange, Patrick Legros, David Martimort,
the participants of the Micro workshop at ECARES and the participants of the ENTER Jamboree
2010 in Toulouse for their comments.
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1.1 Introduction
In recent years, governments have shown increasing interest in the use of cap-and-
trade schemes for pollution control. Such schemes are considered to be a cost
effective strategy for controlling environmental pollutants compared to the usual
command-and-control policies. The essence of the argument, as laid out by Mont-
gomery (1972) in a static framework, is that overall pollution abatement costs are
minimized in a cap-and-trade scheme because firms with high abatement costs pur-
chase permits from companies with low abatement costs so that all participants face
the same marginal costs.2
Intertemporal permit trading, i.e. the ability to bank permits for future use or
to borrow permits from future allocations, is another source of cost savings. If firms
can trade their permits intertemporally, they will be able to equalize their marginal
costs of abatement across periods, as well as across firms, thereby further decreasing
the cost of emission reductions (Rubin, 1996).
In practice, regulators often set limits on intertemporal trading. Intertemporal
trading was indeed not allowed between the first two phases of the European Emis-
sion Trading System (EU ETS). The European Commission chose generous permit
allocations in the first phase in order to allow firms to achieve their emission cap
at a reasonable cost. Nevertheless, they feared that permit banking would prevent
the EU from meeting its Kyoto targets by 2012. In addition, by allowing firms to
borrow permits, the EU ran the risk that firms would default on their permits, com-
promising their emission reduction goal. There is thus a priori a tension between
flexibility and political constraints. Another reason for limiting intertemporal trad-
ing concerns stock pollutants for which a regulator would not be indifferent about
the time at which emissions are released (Leiby and Rubin, 2001).
In this paper, I first explore how the additional intertemporal link resulting from
investments in abatement partially helps to ease this tension between flexibility
and political constraints. Investments in abatement often have long-term effects
and can provide some intertemporal flexibility in terms of emission reductions when
intertemporal trading is not allowed. For example, in most industrial sectors covered
by the EU ETS, abatement tends to take the form of efficiency improvements or
changes in production processes (e.g. heat recovery and thermal insulation) that are
2This cost-effectiveness result relies on many simplifying assumptions. Relaxing one of these
assumptions may prevent permit markets from achieving cost-effectiveness. Extensions consider
regulation of firms that trade permits (Bohi and Burtraw, 1992), market power (Hahn, 1985 and
Eshel, 2005) or technological linkages between permit and output markets (Misiolek and Elder,
1989).
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not easy to reverse (Ellerman et al, 2010).3 These investments can be considered as
“long-term” investments in abatement.
The second objective of the paper is to study the interactions between these
two intertemporal links (abatements with long-term effects and intertemporal trad-
ing). I analyze how firms use these long-term abatements depending on whether the
intertemporal trading of permits is allowed or not.
I build a two-period general equilibrium model of a perfectly competitive emission
permit market in which a continuum of firms emit some pollutant. The emission
cap, the supply of permits, is set exogenously by a regulator and is known before the
opening of the market. The amount of pollutant that is emitted determines firms’
demand for permits. I solve the model with and without intertemporal permit
trading. In both cases, firms have to choose their optimal compliance strategy: the
optimal purchase of permits and the optimal level of investment in abatement.4 The
permit price is determined endogenously by market clearing conditions. The long-
term effects of investments are twofold. First, investments in abatement remain
useful beyond the period during which they occur. Second, to account for learning-
by-doing and the possibility of decreasing abatement opportunities in future periods,
I allow investment costs in period 2 to depend on period 1 investment levels.
I first show that the standard intuition that firms choose their optimal compliance
strategy by equalizing the marginal benefit of abatement to the marginal cost of
abatement in each period is recovered. However, the fact that investments have long-
term effects introduces new effects because investments in period 1 have both an
additional marginal benefit (the reduction of emissions in period 2) and an additional
marginal cost (the decrease in abatement opportunities in period 2). Due to these
long-term effects, the standard condition of equalization of marginal costs across
periods for cost-effectiveness is modified when intertemporal trading is allowed.
I next show that if the regulator does not allow firms to trade permits intertem-
porally, long-term investments in abatement provide firms with some intertemporal
flexibility: when abatement needs in period 2 are high compared to period 1 needs,
the firms’ optimal investment strategy entails that the aggregate abatement in pe-
riod 1 exceeds abatement needs in that period, i.e. firms “over-invest” in period
1. This over-investment is entirely driven by second-period abatement needs and
generates a surplus of permits at the end of period 1. This surplus is “useless” since
3The main exception is the power sector that can use fuel-switching as a short-term abatement
technique.
4In this model, I ignore the output market. As in Chao and Wilson (1993), I consider only
the net demand for emissions after the permits for fuel substitution or for output reduction have
already been accounted for.
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it cannot be banked for period 2.
As a consequence of this over-investment, allowing intertemporal permit trading
may reduce the total level of abatement over the scheme. By allowing intertemporal
trading, any excess of permits in period 1 (that was due to over-investment) can
now be banked and used for compliance in period 2, thereby reducing abatement
needs.
Finally, I show that over-investment in period 1 and permit banking are substi-
tutes when abatement needs in period 2 are very high compared to period 1 needs.
For these values of abatement needs, the level of over-investment in period 1 without
intertemporal trading is substantial because this is the only means to reduce future
compliance costs. Once intertemporal trading is allowed, firms will still over-invest
in period 1(in order to bank permits) but to a smaller extent: permit banking acts
as a cheaper substitute to over-investment in period 1.
In a short welfare analysis, I show that the long-term nature of investments
in abatement provides a new reason for limiting intertemporal trading. If, due
to political constraints, the number of permits issued by the regulator does not
correspond to the socially optimal level of emissions, banning intertemporal trading
may increase social welfare.
Investments in abatement and intertemporal trading have largely been studied
separately in the literature. Models of intertemporal trading (Rubin, 1996 ; Kling
and Rubin, 1997 ; Schennach, 2000; Yates and Cronshaw, 2001 or Seifert et al.,
2008) have assumed that the effects of investments last for only one period. If
intertemporal trading is not allowed, firms never invest beyond the required level in
period 1. Such investments would be useless for period 1 and would not allow firms
to meet their future emission caps. In such models, over-investment and banking can
thus never be substitutes. By contrast, in my model, investments have long-term
effects. As a result, even if intertemporal trading is not allowed, investments are
not only for immediate compliance but also for minimization of future compliance
costs.
Investments in abatement technologies have been studied by Insley (2003), Xepa-
padeas (1999) as well as by Chao and Wilson (1993) in partial equilibrium models.
Although these papers are motivated by cap-and-trade schemes, prices or demand
functions in these models are exogenous, so it is impossible to study the interac-
tions between the permit market and investment decisions. Zhao (2003) studies
long-term investments in abatement in a general equilibrium model. His focus is on
the effect of the level of cost uncertainty on investment (see also Baldursson and
von der Fehr, 2004). However, in his model, firms are not allowed to trade permits
intertemporally, so there is no consideration of the role of investment as a substitute
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to intertemporal trading.
One of the few papers analyzing simultaneously permit banking and long-term
investments is Phaneuf and Requate (2002). Compared to the present paper that
considers abatements with long-run effects, they examine the incentives to invest in
improved abatement technologies: the effects of abatement last only one period, but
firms have the possibility to invest in a technology that reduces their future total and
marginal abatement costs. As in previous models about intertemporal trading, firms
never abate beyond the required level in period 1, i.e. over-investment in abatement
is never optimal. However, they find that in some cases, permit banking can act
as a substitute for investment in improved abatement technologies. The intuition is
the same as in this paper: without permit banking, firms have only the investment
option to attempt to smooth their abatement expenditures through time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 lays out the
main assumptions of the two-period model. Section 1.3 compares the equilibrium
solutions of the model with and without intertemporal trading. In section 1.4, I
present a short welfare analysis of intertemporal trading. Section 1.5 illustrates the
results of the model using descriptive evidence from the EU ETS. I conclude in
section 1.6.
1.2 The model
Consider a two-period model (t = 1, 2) with a continuum of firms emitting some
pollutant. Firms are heterogenous in terms of their emissions. For each firm, indexed
by k ∈ [0, 1], the business-as-usual emission levels in periods 1 and 2 are noted e1k
and e2k. For future reference, I define the aggregate (or average) emissions as:
et ≡
∫ 1
0
etkdk t = 1, 2
The regulator limits these emissions by implementing a cap-and-trade scheme:
in each period t = 1, 2, each firm k is allocated ntk permits. A permit allows the
firm to emit one unit of the pollutant. The aggregate cap is the sum of allocations
over all firms: nt ≡
∫ 1
0
ntkdk for all t.
To satisfy the cap on their emissions, firms have three compliance options. First,
they can buy permits from other firms: ytk represents a purchase of permits by firm
k at period t (if ytk < 0, it is a sale of permits). The permit price pt is endogenously
determined through market-clearing. The second compliance option is intertemporal
permit trading: firms can borrow permits from their allocation in period 2 or can
bank permits to use them in period 2. Third, firms can invest in an abatement
technology that has long-term effects.
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Investment costs are the same for all firms and are given by continuously dif-
ferentiable functions: C1(i1k) for period 1 and C2(i2k, i1k) for period 2, where i1k
and i2k denote the abatement levels in periods 1 and 2, respectively.
5 The long-term
effects of investments in abatement are twofold. On the one hand, investments made
in period 1, at a cost C(i1k), reduce emissions by an amount i1k in periods 1 and
2.6 On the other hand, investment opportunities in period 2 depend on the level of
investment made in period 1. To account for this fact, the investment cost in period
2, C2(i2k, i1k), depends on the level of investment in period 1. I make the following
assumptions on the investment cost functions:
Assumption 1 (Convex Costs) Functions C1(.) and C2(., i1k) are strictly increasing
and strictly convex on (0,∞):
∂C1(.)
∂i1k
> 0,
∂2C1(.)
∂i21k
> 0
∂C2(., i1k)
∂i2k
> 0,
∂2C2(., i1k)
∂i22k
> 0 ∀i1k ≥ 0
with C1(0) = 0,
∂C1(0)
∂i1k
= 0, C2(0, i1k) = 0 for all i1k ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 is the standard assumption of convex costs with no fixed cost. I next
assume that the marginal cost in period 2 is increasing in the level of investment
in period 1. Intuitively, it becomes more expensive to invest in abatement the
higher the stock of abatement capital the firm already has because firms’ abatement
opportunities decrease with this stock of abatement (Dixit and Pindyck, 1999).
Assumption 2 (Decreasing abatement opportunities)
∂2C2(i2k, i1k)
∂i1ki2k
≥ 0 ∀i1k, i2k ≥ 0
Learning-by-doing is the process through which marginal abatement costs decline
as firms gain experience utilizing a technology (Bramoulle´ and Olson, 2005). In my
model, the level of investment in period 1, i1k, measures the experience in the
abatement technology: increasing the level of investment in period 1 improves the
experience of the firm in the abatement technology. To capture learning-by-doing,
I impose the following restrictions on the cost functions:
5Introducing some heterogeneity in the investment cost functions does not change the main
results of the model.
6As in Zhao (2003), I set the depreciation rate of capital equal to zero.
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Assumption 3 (Learning-by-doing spillovers)
∂
∂i1k
(
∂C1(i1k)+∂C2(i2k,i1k)
∂i1k
)
≥ ∂
∂i1k
(
∂C2(i2k,i1k)
∂i2k
)
∀i1k, i2k ≥ 0 (3A)
∂
∂i2k
(
∂C2(i2k,i1k)
∂i2k
)
≥ ∂
∂i1k
(
∂C2(i2k,i1k)
∂i2k
)
∀i1k, i2k ≥ 0 (3B)
with ∂C2(i2k,0)
∂i1k
≤ ∂C2(i2k,0)
∂i2k
for all i2k ≥ 0
Due to assumption 2, the marginal cost in period 2 is increasing in the level
of investment in period 1 (decreasing abatement opportunities). By assumption 3,
learning-by-doing reduces the effect of these decreasing abatement opportunities on
the marginal cost in period 2 in two different ways. On the one hand, in equation
(3A), the reduction of abatement opportunities due to a higher investment level
in period 1 has a smaller effect on the marginal cost in period 2 than on the total
marginal cost in period 1 (Note that, due to the long-term nature of investments, the
marginal cost in period 1,∂C1+∂C2
∂i1k
, has to take into account the impact of first-period
investments on costs in both periods). On the other hand, in equation (3B), the
reduction of abatement opportunities in period 2 due to an increase of investments
in period 1 is lower than the reduction due to an increase of investments in period
2. The last part of assumption 3 is necessary to guarantee an interior solution for
i1k: when i1k = 0, it is cheaper to invest in period 1 than in period 2 (by investing
in period 1 rather than in period 2, the firm gains experience in the technology).
For greater readability, I define the individually required abatement, atk ≡ etk −
ntk, as the difference between the business-as-usual level of emissions and the initial
allocation for each firm k. It represents the effort imposed upon each individual firm
by the regulator. Aggregating over all firms, the required abatement in each period
is given by:
at = et − nt ≡
∫ 1
0
atkdk
Thereafter, I assume that the total aggregate required abatement (a1 + a2) is
strictly positive. To simplify the analysis, I also assume, as it is generally the case in
practice, that the second-period is more demanding in terms of abatement than the
first one: a1 ≤ a2.7 Combining both conditions on aggregate required abatements
yields:
Assumption 4 (Aggregate required abatements become stricter over time): a2 > 0
and a1 ∈ (−a2, a2] for a given a2 > 0
7This was indeed the case for the main emission trading schemes, such as the EU ETS and the
US Acid Rain Program.
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1.3 Equilibrium of the cap-and-trade scheme
In this section, I solve for the equilibrium in the cap-and-trade schemes with and
without intertemporal trading. To solve for the equilibrium compliance strategies
of firms and for the equilibrium price, I proceed in two steps. First, I derive the
first-order conditions of the optimization problem of firm k, i.e. the minimization
of compliance costs, taking permit price as exogenous. Second, I combine these
first-order conditions with a market clearing condition to solve for the equilibrium
investment and trading strategies and the equilibrium price. For expositional sim-
plicity, I ignore discounting.8
1.3.1 The intertemporal trading scheme
When intertemporal trading is allowed, firms are able to both bank and borrow
permits across periods. Formally, the optimization problem of firm k under in-
tertemporal trading is:
min
i1k,y1k,i2k,y2k
p1y1k + C1(i1k) + p2y2k + C2(i2k, i1k) (1.1)
s.t. a1k ≤ i1k + y1k + n2k (1.2)
a1k + a2k = y1k + y2k + 2i1k + i2k (1.3)
i2k ≥ 0 (1.4)
The optimization problem (1.1) says that firm k chooses its abatement level and
purchase of permits to minimize its compliance costs over the planning horizon.
Equations (1.2) and (1.3) are the constraints on firm k’s emissions imposed by the
cap-and-trade scheme. In period 1, the required abatement can be covered using
purchases (y1k), abatement (i1k) or second-period permit borrowing (up to its period
2 allocation of permits n2k). At the end of period 2, the total required abatement
must have been covered.9 First-period investment levels, i1k, are counted twice since
they reduce emissions in both periods. Equation (1.4) is the positivity constraint
on the level of investment in period 2.10 We cannot a priori rule out that constraint
8This simplifying assumption does not qualitatively affect any of the results. Indeed, a discount
factor can be introduced and a modified investment cost function C˜2(., .) can be defined for period
2 , which incorporates the discount factor. In this case, p2 must be interpreted as the discounted
price in period 2.
9At the end of period 2, permits become completely useless and since period 1 and 2 investments
in abatement are costly (assumptions 1 and 2), firms will never keep more permits than what is
necessary to cover their required abatement.
10Under assumptions 1-4, the positivity constraint for i1k is automatically satisfied.
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(1.4) is binding because the marginal cost of investment in period 2 at i2k = 0,
∂C2
∂i2k
(0, i1k), is positive for positive first-period investments.
Because the purpose of allowing intertemporal trading is to relax within-period
abatement constraints (i.e. constraint (1.2) in our case), I focus on the case where
constraint (1.2) is not binding. I show in appendix B that this will be satisfied
for sufficiently low required abatements in period 1 relative to period 2 and/or
sufficiently low first-period marginal costs of investment relative to second-period
costs.
Defining λ2k as the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (1.3), the
first-order necessary conditions are given by:11
pt − λ2k = 0 for t = 1, 2 (1.5)
∂C1
∂i1k
(i1k) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i2k, i1k)− 2λ2k = 0 (1.6)
i2k
(
∂C2
∂i2k
(i2k, i1k)− λ2k
)
= 0, i2k ≥ 0, ∂C2
∂i2k
(i2k, i1k)− λ2k ≥ 0 (1.7)
a1k + a2k − y1k − y2k − 2i1k − i2k = 0 (1.8)
Interpretation of the first-order conditions of firm k
Equation (1.8) simply restates constraint (1.3). Equation (1.5) implies that prices
are equal across periods: p1 = p2 = p. This follows from intertemporal trading: if
firms face different prices in different periods, they transfer their permits from one
period to another until no more arbitrage is possible. Because there is a single
clearing price p in each period, λ2k = λ2 for all k.
Since firms have the same investment cost functions and λ2k = λ2 for all k,
equations (1.6) and (1.7) imply that firms invest equally: itk = it for all k. As there
is a continuum of firms, it is also the aggregate (or average) investment in period t.
Replacing λ2k by p in equations (1.6) and (1.7) yields:
∂C1
∂i1k
(i1) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i2, i1) = 2p (1.9)
i2
(
∂C2
∂i2k
(i2, i1)− p
)
= 0, i2 ≥ 0, ∂C2
∂i2k
(i2, i1) ≥ p (1.10)
With equation (1.9), we recover the standard intuition that, in period 1, firms
equalize the marginal benefit of abatement to the marginal cost of abatement. There
are two differences with respect to the standard result. On the one hand, investments
in period 1 now have an additional marginal benefit (the reduction of emissions in
period 2), which is captured by the fact that the marginal benefit is 2p and not p.
On the other hand, investments in period 1 also have an additional marginal cost
11Given assumptions 1-3, these conditions are also sufficient (see Appendix A).
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(the increase in abatement cost in period 2), which is captured by the fact that the
total marginal cost in period 1 is now ∂C1
∂i1k
(i1) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i2, i1).
Equation (1.10) states that there is either an interior solution (i2 > 0) or a corner
solution (i2 = 0) for investment levels in period 2. If the firm invests in period 2
(i2 > 0), then
∂C2
∂i2k
(i2, i1) = p: the marginal benefit of abatement is simply equal
to the marginal cost of abatement (investments in period 2 do not have the same
long-term properties as investments in period 1). If ∂C2
∂i2k
(0, i1) > p, the marginal
cost evaluated at i2 = 0 is higher than the permit price. The firm does not invest
in period 2 (i2 = 0). Using assumption 1, equation (1.9) reduces to 2p =
∂C1
∂i1k
(i1)
when i2 = 0.
12 Therefore, a condition for an interior solution for i2 is that the cost
functions satisfy:
∂C1
∂i1k
(i1) ≥ 2∂C2
∂i2k
(0, i1) (1.11)
Intuitively, given that investments in period 1 deliver a benefit over both periods,
a firm will optimally choose to invest a positive amount in period 2 only if the second-
period marginal cost of investment is sufficiently low compared to the first-period
marginal cost. This condition for an interior solution can be interpreted in terms
of learning-by-doing (assumption 3). Integrating equation (3A) over i1 (at i2 = 0)
yields ∂C1
∂i1k
(i1) ≥ ∂C2∂i2k (0, i1) for all i1 ≥ 0. This is not sufficient to satisfy the condition
for a strictly positive investment in period 2 (1.11). Instead, a firm invests in period
2 if the level of learning-by-doing satisfies a stronger condition than assumption 3,
namely:
∂
∂i1k
(
∂C1(i1) + ∂C2(0, i1)
∂i1k
)
> 2
∂
∂i1k
(
∂C2
∂i2k
(0, i1)
)
∀i1 > 0 (3A’)
with ∂C2(0,i1)
∂i1k
= 0 by assumption 1.
Equilibrium in the intertemporal trading scheme
Having described the firms’ optimal behavior, the equilibrium in the intertempo-
ral trading scheme can now be characterized. An equilibrium in the intertemporal
trading scheme consists of vectors (i∗1, i
∗
2) and (y
∗
1k, y
∗
2k) for each k and scalar p
∗ ≥ 0
such that first-order conditions (1.5)-(1.8) are satisfied and the following market
clearing conditions on permits are satisfied in each period:∫ 1
0
ytkdk = 0, t = 1, 2 (1.12)
First, I derive the optimal investment strategy (i∗1, i
∗
2) for each k. Depending on
the level of learning-by-doing at i2 = 0 (see equation (3A’)), this optimal strategy
12Indeed, under assumption 1, C2(0, i1k) = 0 for all i1k ≥ 0, which implies that ∂C2∂i1k (0, i1) = 0
for all i1k ≥ 0.
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is characterized either by an interior or by a corner solution for i2. For the case in
which learning-by-doing is sufficiently high (i.e. equation (3A’) is satisfied), firms
invest a positive amount in both periods and the optimal investment strategy is
implicitly defined by two conditions:
∂C1
∂i1k
(i∗1) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i∗2, i
∗
1) = 2
∂C2
∂i2k
(i∗2, i
∗
1) (1.13)
a1 + a2 = 2i
∗
1 + i
∗
2 (1.14)
The first condition (1.13) is obtained by combining equations (1.9) and (1.10).
This is the intertemporal cost-effectiveness condition and it describes the way
firms optimize the total aggregate required abatement across periods: the total
marginal cost in period 1 must be equal to twice the marginal cost in period 2.
The second equation (1.14) is a condition on the total investment over the planning
horizon. It is obtained by aggregating the first-order condition (1.8) over all firms
and by using the market clearing conditions (1.12).
Under assumptions 1-3, the implicit function theorem implies that
di∗2
di∗1
> 0 in
equation (1.13). By equation (1.14), both investment levels i∗1 and i
∗
2 are thus in-
creasing in the total required abatement (a1 + a2). Investment levels depend on the
total aggregate required abatement and not on how this total requirement is shared
between periods.
If learning-by-doing is not sufficiently high (i.e. equation (3A’) is not satisfied),
firms do not invest in period 2 and optimal investment levels are simply obtained
using the condition on the total investment (1.14): i∗1 = (1/2)(a1 + a2) and i
∗
2 = 0.
Equation (1.8) and the condition on the total investment (1.14) yield the optimal
trading strategy (y∗1k, y
∗
2k) for each k. Trading in period 1 is indeterminate because
constraint (1.2) was assumed to be non binding. The optimal total trading is given
by:
y∗1k + y
∗
2k = a1k + a2k − (a1 + a2) (1.15)
Total trading of firm k is given by the difference between the individual required
abatements, atk, and the average required abatements, at. We can define the differ-
ence (atk − at) as the idiosyncratic component of the individual required abatement
atk. The intuition behind equation (1.15) is that permit trading is used to cover the
idiosyncratic component of atk, while investments, which only depend on aggregate
variables (a1 and a2), are used to cover the common component of atk.
To find the equilibrium price p∗, I replace (i1, i2) by the optimal investment
strategy (i∗1, i
∗
2) in the first-order condition (1.9). This yields:
∂C1
∂i1k
(i∗1) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i∗2, i
∗
1) = 2p
∗
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Assumptions 1-3 together with the fact that i∗1 and i
∗
2 are increasing in (a1 + a2)
imply that this equilibrium price p∗ is increasing in (a1 + a2).
The main insight for the intertemporal trading scheme equilibrium is summarized
in the next proposition:
Proposition 1.1 The equilibrium of the intertemporal trading scheme is given by
p∗1 = p
∗
2 = p
∗ with (y∗1k, y
∗
2k) that satisfies (1.15) and (i
∗
1, i
∗
2) that solves (1.13) and
(1.14) for each k. Prices and investment levels are increasing in the total required
abatement. If learning-by-doing is sufficiently high, firms invest a positive amount
in both periods and the cost-effectiveness condition is satisfied:
∂C1
∂i1k
(i∗1) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i∗2, i
∗
1) = 2
∂C2
∂i2k
(i∗2, i
∗
1)
If learning-by-doing is low, firms realize all their investments in period 1 and the
cost-effectiveness condition is not satisfied.
For future reference, the next lemma determines whether firms bank or borrow
permits at the equilibrium. If i∗1 > a1, firms over-invest in abatement, i.e. they invest
more in period 1 than the total required abatement in that period. They bank the
surplus of permits generated by this over-investment. If i∗1 < a1, firms under-invest
in abatement and borrow the missing permits from their second-period allocation.
Banking is more likely when abatement needs are relatively high in period 2, i.e. if
the ratio of aggregate required abatements a1/a2 is low.
Lemma 1.1 There exists α ≤ 1, such that:
• when a1/a2 < α firms over-invest in period 1 and bank permits in the equilib-
rium of the intertemporal trading scheme,
• when a1/a2 > α firms under-invest in period 1 and borrow permits in the
equilibrium of the intertemporal trading scheme.
Proof See appendix C. 
α is the ratio of aggregate required abatements a1/a2 such that the intertemporal
cost-effectiveness condition (1.13) is satisfied without intertemporal trading, i.e. i∗1 =
a1 and i
∗
2 = a2−a1: optimal investment levels cover exactly the required abatements
in each period.
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1.3.2 The scheme without intertemporal trading
When intertemporal trading is not allowed, firms must meet their required abate-
ments in each period using only trading and investment. Formally, the optimization
problem of firm k becomes:
min
i1k,y1k,i2k,y2k
p1y1k + C1(i1k) + p2y2k + C2(i2k, i1k) (1.16)
s.t. a1k ≤ y1k + i1k (1.17)
a2k = y2k + i2k + i1k (1.18)
where the differences with respect to the intertemporal trading scheme lie in con-
straints (1.17) and (1.18): abatement needs in period 1 must be entirely covered
by trading or investment in abatement in period 1; and abatement needs in period
2 must be covered by trading in period 2 or investment in abatement (past and
present).13 In contrast to the previous section, it is shown in the resolution of the
equilibrium that, given assumptions 1-4, there is always an interior solution for i2k.
The positivity constraint on i2k is therefore omitted.
Defining λ1k and λ2k as the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (1.17) and (1.18),
the first-order necessary conditions are given by:14
pt = λtk, t = 1, 2 (1.19)
∂C1
∂i1k
(i1k) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i2k, i1k)− λ1k − λ2k = 0 (1.20)
∂C2
∂i2k
(i2k, i1k)− λ2k = 0 (1.21)
λ1k(a1k − i1k − y1k) = 0; (1.22)
λ1k ≥ 0; a1k − i1k − y1k ≤ 0
a2k − i2k − i1k − y2k = 0 (1.23)
Interpretation of the first-order conditions of firm k
By equation (1.19), prices p1 and p2 are no longer necessarily equal. Since all
firms face the same prices, λtk = λt = pt for all k. As before, this implies that firms
invest equally (itk = it for all k). Replacing λtk by pt in equations (1.20) and (1.21)
yields:
∂C1
∂i1k
(i1) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i2, i1) = p1 + p2 (1.24)
∂C2
∂i2k
(i2, i1) = p2 (1.25)
13Because investments are costly (assumptions 1 and 2) and a1 ≤ a2 (the abatements undertaken
in period 1 to cover aggregate required abatement a1 are never sufficient to cover period 2 abatement
needs), the constraint for period 2 (1.18) is an equality constraint.
14Given assumptions 1-3, these conditions are also sufficient (see appendix A).
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Equations (1.24) and (1.25) have the same interpretation as in the intertemporal
trading scheme (i.e. firms equalize marginal cost and marginal benefit of abatement
in each period). Because there is a single clearing price p1, equation (1.22) implies
that the first-period constraint (1.17) is binding either for all firms or for none. At
the end of period 1, either each firm is left with an excess of permits (a1k < i1k +y1k
for all k) in which case p1 is equal to zero (case 1) or p1 is positive and each firm
covers its required abatement exactly (a1k = i1k + y1k for all k) using purchases and
abatements (case 2).
Equilibrium in the scheme without intertemporal trading
An equilibrium in the scheme without intertemporal trading consists of the vec-
tors (i∗∗1 , i
∗∗
2 ) and (y
∗∗
1k, y
∗∗
2k) for all k and the vector (p
∗∗
1 , p
∗∗
2 ) such that first-order
conditions (1.19)-(1.23) are satisfied and the market clearing conditions on permits
(1.12) are satisfied in each period. Two cases must be considered:
Case 1: a1k < i1k + y1k for all k and p1 is equal to zero.
The optimal investment strategy (i∗∗1 , i
∗∗
2 ) for all k is implicitly defined by the two
following conditions:
∂C1
∂i1k
(i∗∗1 ) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i∗∗2 , i
∗∗
1 ) =
∂C2
∂i2k
(i∗∗2 , i
∗∗
1 ) (1.26)
0 = a2 − i∗∗1 − i∗∗2 (1.27)
The first equation (1.26) is obtained by combining equations (1.24) and (1.25). It
describes the way firms optimize their investments across periods. It differs from
the intertemporal cost-effectiveness condition (1.13) because, compared to a scheme
with intertemporal trading, investment in period 1 has lost one of its benefits: the
possibility to transfer permits saved through abatement from one period to another.
The second equation is a condition on the total investment in period 2 and is ob-
tained by aggregating first-order condition (1.23) over all firms, using the market
clearing conditions (1.12).
Under assumptions 1-3, calling on the implicit function theorem, equation (1.26)
yields
di∗∗2
di∗∗1
> 0. By equation (1.27), both investment levels are thus increasing in
the aggregate required abatement in period 2, a2. Moreover, aggregating first-order
condition (1.22) over all firms and using the market clearing conditions (1.12) yields
i∗∗1 > a1: despite the absence of intertemporal trading, the aggregate first-period
investment exceeds the required abatement in period 1, i.e. firms over-invest in
period 1. The positivity constraint on the investment level in period 2 is always
satisfied because ∂C1
∂i1k
(i1) ≥ ∂C2∂i2k (0, i1) for all i1 ≥ 0 by assumptions 1-3 (see section
1.3.1 for details).
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From (1.22) and (1.23), the optimal trading strategy (y∗∗1k, y
∗∗
2k) for each k satisfies:
y∗∗1k > a1k − i∗∗1 and y∗∗2k = a2k − a2 (1.28)
y∗∗1k is indeterminate. As before, firms trade permits to cover the idiosyncratic com-
ponent of their required abatement.
By equation (1.22), the equilibrium price in period 1 is p∗∗1 = 0. To find the
equilibrium price p∗∗2 , the optimal investment strategy (i
∗∗
1 , i
∗∗
2 ) is substituted to
(i1, i2) in the first-order condition (1.24). This yields:
∂C1
∂i1k
(i∗∗1 ) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i∗∗2 , i
∗∗
1 ) = p
∗∗
2
where i∗∗1 and i
∗∗
2 are both increasing functions of the required abatement in period
2, a2. As a result, under assumptions 1-3, the equilibrium price p
∗∗
2 is increasing in
a2.
Case 2: a1k = i1k + y1k for all k and p1 is strictly positive.
Aggregating equations (1.22) and (1.23) over all firms and using the market clearing
conditions (1.12) yields the optimal investment strategy (i∗∗1 , i
∗∗
2 ):
i∗∗1 = a1 (1.29)
i∗∗2 = a2 − a1 (1.30)
In this case, the optimal investment levels cover the required abatements in each
period exactly. By the assumption that a1 ≤ a2, the optimal investment level in
period 2 is always positive.
Combining equations (1.24) and (1.25) shows that marginal costs are no longer
equalized across periods:
∂C1
∂i1k
(i∗∗1 ) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i∗∗2 , i
∗∗
1 ) = p1 +
∂C2
∂i2k
(i∗∗2 , i
∗∗
1 )
Because price p1 is positive, the total marginal cost in period 1 is higher than the
marginal cost in period 2: firms would like to reduce their level of investment in
period 1, but they have to satisfy the within-period constraint (1.17).
Replacing i∗∗1 and i
∗∗
2 in equations (1.22) and (1.23) yields the optimal trading
strategy for each k:
y∗∗1k = a1k − a1 and y∗∗2k = a2k − a2 (1.31)
Finally, substituting the optimal investment strategy (i∗∗1 , i
∗∗
2 ) to (i1, i2) in the
first-order conditions (1.24) and (1.25) yields equilibrium prices p∗∗1 and p
∗∗
2 :
p∗∗1 =
∂C1
∂i1k
(a1) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(a2 − a1, a1)− ∂C2
∂i2k
(a2 − a1, a1)
p∗∗2 =
∂C2
∂i2k
(a2 − a1, a1)
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Using assumption 2 and equations (3A) and (3B) in assumption 3, for a given total
required abatement (a1 + a2), p
∗∗
1 is increasing in the ratio of aggregate required
abatements a1/a2 while p
∗∗
2 is decreasing in this ratio a1/a2.
Having detailed the equilibrium in each case, it is now necessary to determine
under what condition each case arises. Over-investment in period 1 (case 1) is more
likely to arise when the required abatement in period 1 is low relative to period
2. The next lemma identifies the ratio a1/a2 for which condition (1.26) is satisfied
without over-investment in period 1, i.e. i∗∗1 = a1 and i
∗∗
2 = a2 − a1 and p∗∗1 = 0.
Lemma 1.2 There exists β ∈ [0, α) such that when a1/a2 < β, firms over-invest in
period 1 and marginal costs are equalized across periods (case 1) and when a1/a2 > β,
optimal investment levels cover exactly the required abatements in each period and
the marginal costs are not equalized across periods (case 2).
Proof See appendix D. 
Compared to the intertemporal trading scheme, over-investment occurs for a
smaller set of values of the ratio a1/a2 (β < α). The intuition is simple: without
intertemporal trading, any period 1 investment beyond the required level of abate-
ment generates a surplus of permits that is “useless” (firms do not get any credit
from abating emissions beyond their target).
The following proposition summarizes the main insight for the scheme without
intertemporal trading:
Proposition 1.2 Depending on the ratio of aggregate required abatements, the equi-
librium in the scheme without intertemporal trading is given (p∗∗1 , p
∗∗
2 ) with (y
∗∗
1k, y
∗∗
2k)
that satisfies (1.28) or (1.31) and (i∗∗1 , i
∗∗
2 ) that solves (1.26) and (1.27) or (1.29)
and (1.30) for each k. For a1/a2 < β, firms over-invest in abatement in period
1 and the price in period 1 is zero. Investment levels and the price in period 2
are increasing in a2. Because investments have lost one of their benefits, i.e. the
possibility to transfer permits from one period to another, firms equalize marginal
costs across periods instead of satisfying the intertemporal cost-effectiveness condi-
tion (1.13). For a1/a2 > β, firms cover the aggregate required abatement exactly
in each period and prices are positive in both periods. Then, marginal costs are no
longer equalized across periods.
1.3.3 Further considerations on long-term investments
In this section, two additional results are discussed that follow from the fact that
investments in abatement have long-term effects: the effect of allowing intertemporal
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trading (i) on the level of total emission reductions and, (ii) on the equilibrium level
of investment in period 1.
Total aggregate emission reductions
Total aggregate emission reductions over both periods are given by (2i1 + i2). Due
to the long-term effects of investments in abatement, these emission reductions are
different with and without intertemporal trading, as shown by the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1.3 Total aggregate emission reductions are strictly higher without in-
tertemporal trading than with intertemporal trading for all aggregate required abate-
ments ratios satisfying a1/a2 < β. They are the same otherwise.
Proof When intertemporal trading is allowed, the aggregate emission reductions
are given by: 2i∗1 + i
∗
2 = a1 + a2 for all a1/a2 (see condition (1.14)). In the scheme
without intertemporal trading, the aggregate emission reductions are given by:
• for a1/a2 < β, i∗∗1 > a1 and i∗∗1 + i∗∗2 = a2 ⇒ 2i∗∗1 + i∗∗2 > a1 + a2;
• otherwise, i∗∗1 = a1 and i∗∗2 = a2 − a1 ⇒ 2i∗∗1 + i∗∗2 = a1 + a2. 
For ratios of required abatements a1/a2 that are strictly below β, firms over-
invest both with and without intertemporal trading. The difference is that, in the
intertemporal trading case, this over-investment generates a surplus of permits that
can be banked for the next period, reducing total abatement needs compared to the
scheme without intertemporal trading.
The effect of allowing intertemporal trading on the level of over-investment
in period 1
When a1/a2 < β, firms over-invest in period 1 despite the absence of intertemporal
trading. Allowing intertemporal trading provides first-period investments with an
additional benefit, which is the bankability of the surplus generated by the over-
investment. The first-period investments now have a double effect on the amount of
abatement required in period 2: the reduction of emissions and the increase of the
number of available permits through banking. The question is whether firms will
use this additional benefit as a complement (by increasing investment in period 1)
or a substitute (by reducing investment in period 1) to over-investment in period 1.
Define γ as the ratio of required abatements such that over-investment remains
unchanged when intertemporal trading is allowed, i.e. i∗1 = i
∗∗
1 and i
∗
2 = i
∗∗
2 − (i∗∗1 −
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a1), where (i
∗∗
1 − a1) is the surplus of permits created by over-investment and that
can be banked once intertemporal trading is allowed.
Proposition 1.4 There exists a ratio of aggregate required abatements γ (with γ <
β) such that:
• if a1/a2 < γ, firms reduce their over-investment in period 1 once intertemporal
trading is allowed, i.e. over-investment and banking are substitutes.
• if γ < a1/a2 < β, firms increase their over-investment in period 1 once in-
tertemporal trading is allowed, i.e. over-investment and banking are comple-
ments.
Proof See appendix E. 
Without intertemporal trading, if a1/a2 < β, over-investment in period 1 is
the only means to minimize intertemporal compliance costs. Firms over-invest in
period 1 until marginal costs equalize across periods (condition (1.26)). Once in-
tertemporal trading is allowed, if firms continue the same investment strategy as in
the scheme without intertemporal trading, the surplus of permits generated by the
over-investment, i∗∗1 − a1, reduces the abatement needs in period 2. Under assump-
tions 1-3, this reduction of abatement needs implies that the marginal cost in period
2 is now lower than the total marginal cost in period 1:
∂C1
∂i1k
(i∗∗1 ) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i∗∗2 − (i∗∗1 − a1), i∗∗1 ) >
∂C2
∂i2k
(i∗∗2 − (i∗∗1 − a1), i∗∗1 )
The fact that this investment strategy (i∗1 = i
∗∗
1 and i
∗
2 = i
∗∗
2 − (i∗∗1 −a1)) satisfies
the intertemporal cost-effectiveness condition (1.13) depends on the size of the over-
investment (i∗∗1 − a1), which is decreasing in the ratio a1/a2.
For a1/a2 < γ, second-period abatement needs are very high compared to first-
period needs, so in the scheme without intertemporal trading, the level of over-
investment is very large. Once intertemporal trading is allowed, the reduction of
the marginal cost in period 2 is too high to achieve cost-effectiveness: the marginal
cost in period 1 is now higher than twice the marginal cost in period 2. Firms
achieve cost-effectiveness by reducing their first-period investment and increasing
their second-period investment. Thanks to the additional benefit of first-period
investment provided by intertemporal trading, firms are able to substitute a part of
their very large over-investment by banked permits.
In Phaneuf and Requate (2002), permit banking can also act as a substitute
for investment in improved abatement technologies. Even if the type of long-term
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investment considered is different, the intuition is similar. Firms have an incentive
to smooth their abatement expenditures through time. Without banking, they have
only the investment in new technologies option to attempt this smoothing. Once
banking is allowed, firms have another means to reduce future compliance costs.
For a1/a2 > γ, in the scheme without intertemporal trading, the level of over-
investment is relatively low. Once intertemporal trading is allowed, the reduction of
the marginal cost in period 2 is not sufficient to achieve the cost-effectiveness condi-
tion: firms must increase their over-investment in period 1 compared to the scheme
without intertemporal trading. Over-investment and banking are complementary
means to minimize compliance costs.
1.4 Welfare analysis
The received wisdom regarding intertemporal trading is that it reduces the cost
of meeting a quantity target (see Rubin, 1996). However, intertemporal trading
may not be optimal from the point of view of society (see for example, Kling and
Rubin,1997; Leiby and Rubin, 2001; Feng and Zhao, 2006) since firms transfer
permits from one period to another without taking into account social damages
from emissions. These results have been derived in settings where investments in
abatement have only short-term effects. In this section, I show that the long-term
nature of investments in abatement provides another reason to limit intertemporal
trading.
The social cost S of the two-period cap-and-trade scheme is given by:
S = C1(i1) + C2(i2, i1) +D(e˜) (1.32)
where C1(i1) + C2(i2, i1) is the firms’ aggregate compliance costs (i1 and i2 are the
firms’ investments in abatement in each period given in sections 1.3.1. and 1.3.2)
and D(e˜) is the environmental damages from emissions (e˜ = (e1− i1) + (e2− i1− i2)
is the sum of period 1 and period 2 emissions).15
For simplicity, I will carry out the analysis imposing the following functional
forms for the cost and damage functions: C1(i1) =
1
2
i21, C2(i2, i1) =
1
2
i2(i2 + 2θi1)
with θ ∈ [0, 1) and D(e˜) = d
2
e˜2 with d > 0. These cost functions satisfy assumptions
1-3 and there is over-investment in period 1 without intertemporal trading if a1/a2 <
β = 1/2.
15Here, I ignore the fact that the pollutant may be a stock pollutant. Stock pollutants provide
another rationale for restricting intertemporal trading (see Leiby and Rubin, 2001). Here, I focus
on the impact of long-term investments.
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The social cost of the cap-and-trade scheme depends on the caps chosen by the
regulator (n1 and n2), or equivalently on the chosen required abatements (a1 and
a2, with at = et − nt). If the regulator chooses the required abatements (a1, a2) to
minimize the social cost (1.32) taking into account the firms’ behavior (sections 1.3.1.
and 1.3.2), allowing intertemporal trading is neither welfare improving nor welfare
decreasing compared to a scheme without intertemporal trading (see appendix F
for details). The intuition is the following. Denote aopt(= a1 + a2), the socially
optimal total required abatement over the scheme. By sharing this total required
abatement between periods 1 and 2 such that a1/a2 = α = min{(2− θ)/(3−3θ); 1},
the regulator can achieve firms’ cost-effectiveness without intertemporal trading (see
lemma 1.1). Moreover, since damages only depend on the sum of emissions, the way
these emissions are shared between periods does not matter for social efficiency.
In practice however, the regulator does not generally implement the socially
optimal required abatement, aopt, for several reasons: firms’ lobbying or the necessity
to buy the participation of industries to the new cap-and-trade scheme, for example.
In most cases, this is a second-best world: the regulator issues more permits than
the socially optimal level of emission. In such a case, banning intertemporal trading
might allow the regulator to reach a higher level of emission reductions and a higher
social welfare.
Proposition 1.5 Assume that the total required abatement chosen by the regulator
is aˆ, with aˆ < aopt. Then, if the regulator allocates permits in such a way that aˆ1 =
aˆ−(2/3)aopt and aˆ2 = (2/3)aopt, a scheme without intertemporal trading implements
the socially optimal level of required abatement, aopt. For this permit allocation, firms
over-invest in period 1 and there exists a non empty set of parameters (d, θ, aˆ, e1, e2)
such that banning intertemporal trading reduces the social cost compared to a scheme
with intertemporal trading.
Proof See Appendix G. 
With permit allocation (aˆ1, aˆ2), the ratio of required abatements is such that
aˆ1/aˆ2 < 1/2: without intertemporal trading firms over-invest in period 1 to cover
high future abatement needs (see proposition 1.2). By banning intertemporal trad-
ing, the regulator uses the long-term properties of investments to achieve higher
total emission reductions (see proposition 1.3) and then lower environmental dam-
ages, compared to a scheme with intertemporal trading. However, these higher
emission reductions have a cost: the over-investment in period 1 generates a surplus
of permits that is useless and that increases the firms’ compliance costs compared
to a scheme in which this surplus can be banked for period 2.
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There is a trade-off between costly over-investments and damaging over-emissions
(i.e. emissions higher than the socially optimal level). The solution to this trade-off
depends on the parameters of the model: d, θ, aˆ, e1, e2. If the marginal damage d
and/or the total aggregate emissions (e1 +e2) are high and/or if the chosen required
abatement aˆ and/or the cost parameter θ are low, then banning intertemporal trad-
ing is welfare improving.
1.5 Application to the EU ETS
So far, it has been shown that when the second-period abatement needs are high
relatively to first-period needs, there is over-investment in period 1. This over-
investment is entirely driven by these high second-period abatement needs. I illus-
trate these predictions using descriptive evidence from the EU ETS.
Intertemporal trading was not allowed between the first and second phases of
the EU ETS. Though any unused permit at the end of this first phase could not be
banked and was completely useless, one observed over-compliance at the end of the
first phase: verified emissions were 2.3% lower than the total allocation of permits.
Due to concerns about international competitiveness, the criteria for setting
the cap in the first phase of the EU ETS were closely tied to expected business-
as-usual (BAU) emissions. Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that Member
States over-estimated business-as-usual emissions. Already in 2004, Ecofys had es-
timated that some countries (such as the Netherlands) gave more allowances than
Ecofys-estimated business-as-usual emissions. Their conclusion was that no real
abatement efforts would be required in the first phase.16 Following this reasoning,
over-allocation is the reason for the over-compliance in 2007 (end of the first phase).
However, according to Ellerman and Buchner (2008), over-allocation is only part
of the explanation for the observed over-compliance. They find that abatement
represents 4% of the BAU estimates.17 To estimate abatement occuring during the
first phase of the EU ETS, I reproduce the results of Ellerman et al. (2010). For
the three years of the first phase, BAU emissions are constructed by assuming that
the observed pre-policy trend in emissions intensity would have continued and by
multiplying the predicted values for intensity by observed levels of economic activity
(measured by the growth rate of GDP). The abatement that can be attributed to the
EU ETS is the difference between these BAU estimates and the verified emissions.
Figure 1.1 shows emissions for the EU25 from 1990 to 2007 and the estimated
16Analysis of NAPs for the EU ETS, Ecofys, August 2004.
17Anderson and Di Maria (2011) also find that both abatement and over-allocation occured
during the first phase, but their estimate for abatement is lower: 2.77% of their BAU estimates.
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abatement for the first phase of the EU ETS. The estimated abatement is 215
million tonnes CO2 over the three years of the first phase, or 3.5% of the total BAU
emissions for that period.
The estimated abatement is higher in 2007 than in 2005 and 2006 despite the
fact that short-term investment incentives were lower in 2007 than in previous years
(prices in 2007 fell to zero temporarily). This cumulative pattern suggests that at
least some of these abatements have long-term effects.
Figure 1.1: Emissions in the EU25 from 1990 to 2007(Source: Derived from EEA green-
house gas data viewer, CITL and Eurostat)
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Finally, further insights can be found if abatements are disaggregated by country.
Figure 1.2 shows the net required abatement for the year 2007 by country: it is the
BAU estimate for 2007 minus the allocation for 2007 and the surplus of permits from
the previous years. Table 1.1 details allocations in both phases by country.18 The
last National Allocation Plan for 2008-2012 was notified to the Commission in March
2007 and at the end of January 2007, thirteen NAP had already been approved by
the Commission. Uncertainty about future required emission abatements is thus
quite small in 2007.
Only five countries have a positive net required abatement for 2007. Nine out of
ten countries, despite their negative required abatement in 2007, have reduced their
emissions. Therefore, despite a clear over-allocation, abatement occurred and this
18I exclude the ten New Member States because all of them were over-allocated from the begin-
ning of the scheme.
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abatement is, in some cases, greater in countries with a negative required abatement
than in countries with a positive required abatement. Table 1.1 allows to understand
this pattern of abatements. The average reduction of the emission cap from phase
1 to phase 2 for the nine countries having abated despite an over-allocation in 2007,
is 16.8% (see table 1.1).19 This indicates that those countries over-invest in phase 1
to cover higher future abatement needs. In contrast, for the six other countries, the
average reduction of the cap is only 7.9%.
Figure 1.2: Required abatement in 2007 (taking into account the surplus of 2006) and
abatement in 2007(Source: Derived from EEA greenhouse gas data viewer, CITL and
Eurostat)
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These facts suggest that some over-investment occurred in the first phase of the
EU ETS. It is plausible that these first-phase long-term investments would have
been lower if banking between the first and the second phase of the EU ETS had
been allowed: banking the excess in the supply of permits at the end of the first
phase would have acted as a cheaper substitute to the long-term investments.
19I use second-period allocations adjusted to cover the same number of installations as in the
first period (see Ellerman et al., 2010).
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Table 1.1: Comparison of Member States’ first-phase allocations, corrected second-phase
allocations and average 2005-2007 emissions (Source: CITL and Ellerman et al.,2010)
Member State cap first phase Average 2005-2007 corrected cap
(MtCO2) emissions (MtCO2) second phase (MtCO2)
Austria 33 32.5 30.35
Belgium 62.1 54.3 53.5
Denmark 33.5 30 24.5
Finland 45.5 40 37.2
France 156.5 128.3 127.7
Germany 499 480 442.1
Greece 74.4 71.3 69.1
Ireland 22.3 21.8 22.3
Italy 223.1 226.6 195.8
Luxembourg 3.4 2.6 2.5
Netherlands 95.3 79 81.8
Portugal 38.9 33.6 34
Spain 174.4 183.2 145.6
Sweden 22.9 18.2 20.8
United Kingdom 245.3 250 236.7
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1.6 Conclusion
The object of this paper is to examine the effects of intertemporal trading on the
levels of prices and investments in abatement when these investments have long-term
effects. To examine the interactions between long-term investments and intertem-
poral trading, I use a simple two-period model of a cap-and-trade scheme in which
prices are determined endogenously. Long-term effects of investments are twofold:
(i) an investment made in period 1 also reduces emissions in period 2 and (ii) the
investment cost in period 2 depends on the period 1 investment level (through de-
creasing abatement opportunities and learning-by-doing).
The results are very different from those of existing models considering only
short-term abatements. First, in the intertemporal trading scheme, we do not re-
cover the standard intuition that firms simply equalize marginal costs across periods.
Because investments in period 1 have effects in period 2, the total marginal cost in
period 1 is now equal to twice the marginal cost in period 2 (intertemporal cost-
effectiveness condition). Second, even in the absence of intertemporal trading, some
of the first-period investments in abatement are driven entirely by second-period
abatement needs. Third, if the required abatement in period 1 is very low, allow-
ing intertemporal trading reduces the level of investment in period 1 compared to
a scheme without intertemporal trading. In this case, the excess in the supply of
permits due to over-investment in period 1 is so high that firms prefer to reduce
this over-investment and substitute long-term investments in period 1 by permit
banking.
The model provides an alternative explanation for the over-compliance observed
at the end of the first phase of the EU ETS. The usual explanation for this over-
compliance was an incorrect estimation of business-as-usual emissions and an over-
allocation of permits in the first phase. I have shown that another possible reason
for such over-compliance is that firms have over-invested in period 1 to take into
account the more stringent allocation in the second phase of the EU ETS.
Appendices
Appendix A: Sufficient conditions for a minimum in opti-
mization problems of firm k
The necessary conditions are sufficient for a minimum if the Lagrangian of the
problem is strictly convex at the critical point of the problem. In the intertemporal
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trading scheme, the Lagrangian is given by:
p1y1k + p2y2k + C1(i1) + C2(i2, i1) + λ2(a1k + a2k − y1k − y2k − 2i1 − i2)
In the scheme without intertemporal trading, the Lagrangian is given by:
p1y1k + p2y2k + C1(i1) + C2(i2, i1) + λ1(a1k − y1k − i1k) + λ2(a2k − y2k − i1 − i2)
All constraints are linear in each of the variables (y1k, y2k, i1, i2). The objective
function p1y1k + p2y2k + C1(i1) + C2(i2, i1) is linear in y1k and y2k. Therefore, we
only need to verify that C1(i1)+C2(i2, i1) is strictly convex. The Hessian of C1(i1)+
C2(i2, i1) is (
∂C21 (i1)+∂C
2
2 (i2,i1)
∂i21k
∂2C2
∂i2k∂i1k
(i2, i1)
∂2C2
∂i2k∂i1k
(i2, i1)
∂2C2
∂i22k
(i2, i1)
)
The naturally ordered principal minors of this matrix are both positive under as-
sumptions 1-3, so that the Hessian is positive definite. As a result, C1(i1)+C2(i2, i1)
is strictly convex.
Appendix B: When is constraint (1.2) binding?
The optimization problem of firm k is given by (1.1)-(1.4). Defining λ1k as the
Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (1.2), the first-order conditions are
now:
p2 − λ2k = 0 (1.33)
p1 − λ2k − λ1k = 0 (1.34)
∂C1
∂i1k
(i1) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(i2, i1)− 2λ2k − λ1k = 0 (1.35)
∂C2
∂i2k
(i2, i1)− λ2k = 0 (1.36)
λ1k(a1k − i1k − y1k − n2k) = 0 (1.37)
a1k − i1k + a2k − i1k − i2k − y1k − y2k = 0 (1.38)
By equations (1.33) and (1.34), λ1k = λ1 ≥ 0 for all k. If λ1 = 0, constraint
(1.2) does not bind for all firms and the equilibrium is given by (i∗1, i
∗
2), (y
∗
1k, y
∗
2k)
and p∗ (see section 1.3.1). If λ1 > 0, constraint (1.2) is binding for all firms and
two major differences arise at the equilibrium. First, the price in period 1 will be
higher than the price in period 2: firms would like to borrow more permits than
their second-period allocation n2k and so they cannot transfer permits until prices
are equal (see equations (1.33) and (1.34)).
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Second, aggregating equations (1.37) and (1.38) and using the market clearing
conditions (1.12) in each period yields:
i′1 = a1 − n2 (1.39)
i′2 = a2 − a1 + 2n2 (1.40)
where (i′1, i
′
2) are the optimal investment levels when constraint (1.2) is binding for
all firms. The level of investment in period 1 is simply the difference between the
aggregate required abatement in period 1 and the aggregate second-period alloca-
tion: firms borrow the maximum number of permits (i.e. the aggregate allocation
in period 2) and use investments for the rest of the aggregate required abatement
in period 1. In period 2, the investment is always positive due to the assump-
tion on aggregate required abatements (a1 ≤ a2). At these investment levels, the
intertemporal cost-effectiveness condition (1.13) is not satisfied:
∂C1
∂i1k
(a1 − n2) + ∂C2
∂i1k
(a2 − a1 + 2n2, a1 − n2) > 2∂C2
∂i2k
(a2 − a1 + 2n2, a1 − n2)
The equilibrium solution (i∗1, i
∗
2), (y
∗
1k, y
∗
2k) and p
∗ satisfies constraint (1.2) if at
(i′1, i
′
2), the following condition on cost functions is satisfied:
∂C1
∂i1k
(a1− n2) + ∂C2
∂i1k
(a2− a1 + 2n2, a1− n2) ≤ 2∂C2
∂i2k
(a2− a1 + 2n2, a1− n2) (1.41)
Indeed, if cost functions satisfy (1.41) at (i′1, i
′
2), firms will optimally choose in-
vestment levels (i∗1, i
∗
2) that will satisfy constraint (1.2). At the investment level i
∗
1,
aggregating constraint (1.2) and using market clearing conditions yields i∗1 ≥ a1−n2.
This condition (1.41) can be interpreted in terms of learning-by-doing. By as-
sumption 3, the total marginal cost in period 1 increases faster with i1k than the
marginal cost in period 2. If learning-by-doing is very high (i.e. the total marginal
cost in period 1 increases very fast with i1k compared to the marginal cost in period
2) or if (a1 − n2) is very large, condition (1.41) may not be satisfied. Consequently,
the equilibrium solution (i∗1, i
∗
2), (y
∗
1k, y
∗
2k) and p
∗ satisfies constraint (1.2) if learning-
by-doing is not too high and/or a1 is sufficiently low with respect to a2.
Appendix C: Proof of lemma 1.1
The investment level in period 1, i∗1, satisfies:
a1 − n2 < i∗1 ≤ (1/2)(a1 + a2)
because constraint (1.2) does not bind (see appendix B) and the total aggregate
investment must satisfy equation (1.14), with i∗2 ≥ 0.
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Therefore, the aggregate level of banking (resp. borrowing), i∗1 − a1 > 0 (resp.
< 0), satisfies
−n2 < i∗1 − a1 ≤ (1/2)(a2 − a1) (1.42)
with a2 − a1 ≥ 0 by assumption 4.
We have to show that there exists a ratio a1/a2 = α such that for this ratio, the
aggregate level of banking is zero, i.e. i∗1 = a1 = αa2 and i
∗
2 = a2 − αa2. Remember
that, by assumption 4, a1 ∈ (−a2, a2]. Moreover,
• For a1 ≤ 0, due to assumptions 1-4, i∗1 ≥ 0, so that firms always bank permits:
i∗1 − a1 ≥ 0
• For a1 = a2 > 0, the level of banking/borrowing is such that −n2 < i∗1−a1 ≤ 0:
firms always borrow permits.
By the intermediate value theorem and as (i∗1 − a1) is a continuous function of the
ratio of aggregate required abatements, there must exist a ratio a1/a2 = α ∈ [0, 1]
such that i∗1 = a1 = αa2 and i
∗
2 = a2 − αa2. The second part of lemma 1.1 consists
in showing that when a1/a2 < α (resp. > α), firms bank permits, i.e. i
∗
1 > a1 (resp.
borrow permits, i.e. i∗1 < a1).
For a1/a2 < α, if firms choose an investment strategy in which they do not
bank or borrow any permits, i.e. (i1k, i2k) = (a1, a2 − a1), the intertemporal cost-
effectiveness condition is not satisfied and we have (by assumptions 2 and 3):
∂C1
∂i1k
(a1) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(a2 − a1, a1) < 2∂C2
∂i2k
(a2 − a1, a1)
To restore the equality, it is thereby necessary to have i∗1 > a1: firms bank the
surplus of permits at the end of period 1. The same reasoning can be applied to the
case a1/a2 > α, which implies i
∗
1 < a1 and permit borrowing. 
Appendix D: Proof of lemma 1.2
We have to show that there exists a ratio β = a1/a2 such that equation (1.26) is
satisfied and the optimal investment strategy is i∗∗1 = βa2, i
∗∗
2 = a2 − βa2 (the
optimal investment levels cover the required abatement exactly in each period), i.e.
there is no over-investment and marginal costs are equalized across periods.
From lemma 1.1, at the ratio α = a1/a2, i
∗∗
1 = i
∗
1 = αa2 and i
∗∗
2 = i
∗
2 = a2 − αa2
and the marginal cost in period 1 is equal to twice the marginal cost in period 2
(intertemporal cost-effectiveness condition (1.13)). At this ratio α, case 2 arises.
38
At the ratio α, for the investment levels i1 = a1 and i2 = a2 − a1, assumption
3A can be written as:
∂
∂i1k
(
∂C1(a1) + ∂C2(a2 − a1, a1)
∂i1k
)
≥ ∂
∂i1k
(
∂C2(a2 − a1, a1)
∂i2k
)
This implies that if the ratio a1/a2 decreases, the total marginal cost in period
1
(
∂C1(a1)+∂C2(a2−a1,a1)
∂i1k
)
will decrease faster than the marginal cost in period 2(
∂C2(a2−a1,a1)
∂i2k
)
and for some ratio β = a1/a2 < α,
∂C1
∂i1k
(a1) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(a2 − a1, a1) = ∂C2
∂i2k
(a2 − a1, a1)
Since marginal costs are equalized for this ratio β, i∗∗1 = a1 = βa2, i
∗∗
2 = a2 − a1.
For ratios a1/a2 < β,
∂C1
∂i1k
(a1) +
∂C2
∂i1k
(a2 − a1, a1) < ∂C2
∂i2k
(a2 − a1, a1)
And then case 1 arises: i∗∗1 > a1 = βa2, i
∗∗
2 = a2 − i∗∗1 in order to equalize marginal
costs.
Finally, β must be at least equal to zero. Indeed, by assumptions 1-4, i∗∗1 ≥ 0,
so that if a1 < 0, case 1 automatically arises: i
∗∗
1 > a1. As a result, we have that
β ∈ [0, α). 
Appendix E: Proof of proposition 1.4
We have to show that there exists a ratio a1/a2 = γ, such that i
∗
1 = i
∗∗
1 and i
∗
2 =
i∗∗2 − (i∗∗1 − a1).
At the ratio a1/a2 = β < α, we know by lemmas 1.1 and 1.2 that i
∗∗
1 = a1 <
i∗1 (over-investment has increased compared to the scheme without intertemporal
trading). For a1/a2 < β, since i
∗
1 does not depend on the ratio a1/a2 while i
∗∗
1 is
increasing in a2 (see solution of case 1 in section 1.3.2) and thus decreasing in a1/a2,
there must exist a ratio γ < β such that i∗1 = i
∗∗
1 and i
∗
2 = i
∗∗
2 − (i∗∗1 − a1). For
a1/a2 < γ, we then have i
∗∗
1 > i
∗
1 and i
∗
2 < i
∗∗
2 − (i∗∗1 − a1) (over-investment has
decreased compared to the scheme without intertemporal trading). 
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Appendix F: The Social Optimum
The firm’s behavior with quadratic cost functions
In the scheme with intertemporal trading (superscript ∗) , the solution to
(1.5)-(1.8) (ignoring constraint (1.2)) is given by:
p∗1 = p
∗
2 =
{
1−θ2
(5−4θ)(a1 + a2) if θ ∈ [0, 12 ]
0 if θ ∈ (1
2
, 1)
(1.43)
i∗1 = min
{
(2− θ)
(5− 4θ)(a1 + a2),
1
2
(a1 + a2)
}
(1.44)
i∗2 = max
{
1− 2θ
(5− 4θ)(a1 + a2), 0
}
(1.45)
y∗2k + y
∗
1k = a1k + a2k − (a1 + a2) (1.46)
With α = min{(2−θ)/(3−3θ); 1}, the ratio of required abatements such that i∗1 = a1
and i∗2 = a2 − a1. The total compliance cost C(i1) + C(i2, i1) at (i∗1, i∗2) is given by:
C∗(a1, a2) =
{
1−θ2
2(5−4θ)(a1 + a2)
2 if θ ∈ [0, 1
2
]
1
8
(a1 + a2)
2 if θ ∈ (1
2
, 1)
(1.47)
In the scheme without intertemporal trading (superscript ∗∗), the solution
to (1.16)-(1.18) depends on whether firms over-invest in period 1 (i.e. whether
a1/a2 < β). With the quadratic cost functions, β = 1/2, and the solution is given
by:
• For a1/a2 < 1/2,
i∗∗1 =
1
2
a2 > a1; i
∗∗
2 =
1
2
a2 (1.48)
p∗∗1 = 0; p
∗∗
2 = a2 − (1− θ)
1
2
a2 (1.49)
y∗∗1k > a1k − (1/2)a2; y∗∗2k = a2k − a2 (1.50)
• For a1/a2 ≥ 1/2,
i∗∗1 = a1; i
∗∗
2 = a2 − a1 (1.51)
p∗∗1 = (1− θ)(2a1 − a2); p∗∗2 = a2 − (1− θ)a1 (1.52)
y∗∗1k = a1k − a1; y∗∗2k = a2k − a2 (1.53)
And the total compliance cost C(i1) + C(i2, i1) at (i
∗∗
1 , i
∗∗
2 ) is given by:
C∗∗(a1, a2) =
{
1+θ
4
(a2)
2 if a1 <
1
2
a2
(1− θ)a21 + 12a22 − (1− θ)a1a2 if 12a2 ≤ a1 ≤ a2
(1.54)
40
The regulator’s problem
In the scheme with intertemporal trading, knowing that the firms’ behavior
is given by (1.43)-(1.47), the regulator minimizes the following social cost:
min
a1,a2
S∗(a1, a2) =
{
1−θ2
2(5−4θ)(a1 + a2)
2 + d
2
[e1 + e2 − (a1 + a2)]2 if θ ≤ 12
1
8
(a1 + a2)
2 + d
2
[e1 + e2 − (a1 + a2)]2 if θ > 12
The socially optimal required abatement is given by:
aopt =
{
d(5−4θ)
1−θ2+d(5−4θ)(e1 + e2) if θ ≤ 12
4d
1+4d
(e1 + e2) if θ >
1
2
(1.55)
For this socially optimal required abatement, the social cost is given by:
S∗(a1, a2|(a1 +a2 = aopt)) = S∗(aopt) =
{
d
2
(
(1−θ2)
1−θ2+d(5−4θ)
)
(e1 + e2)
2 if θ ≤ 1
2
d
2
(
1
1+4d
)
(e1 + e2)
2 if θ > 1
2
In the scheme without intertemporal trading, knowing that the firms’
behavior is given by (1.48) - (1.54), the regulator minimizes the following social
cost:
S∗∗(a1, a2) =
{
1+θ
4
a22 +
d
2
[e1 + e2 − 32a2]2 if a1 < 12a2
(1− θ)a21 + 12a22 − (1− θ)a1a2 + d2 [e1 + e2 − (a1 + a2)]2 if 12a2 ≤ a1 ≤ a2
(1.56)
The required abatements (aopt1 , a
opt
2 ) leading to the lowest social cost are{
aopt1 =
2−θ
3−3θa
opt
2 if θ ≤ 12
aopt1 = a
opt
2 =
2d
1+4d
(e1 + e2) if θ >
1
2
(1.57)
with aopt1 + a
opt
2 = a
opt and S∗(aopt) = S∗∗(aopt1 , a
opt
2 ). For any other path of re-
quired abatements (a1, a2) such that a1 +a2 = a
opt, the following relationship holds:
S∗(aopt) < S∗∗(a1, a2).
Appendix G: Proof of proposition 1.5
Denote aˆt, the required abatement chosen by the regulator for period t, with aˆ =
aˆ1 + aˆ2 < a
opt. If intertemporal trading is allowed, total emission reductions are
simply aˆ (see condition (1.14)), which is lower than the socially optimal level aopt.
For this scheme with intertemporal trading, the social cost is:
S∗(aˆ) =
{
1−θ2
2(5−4θ) aˆ
2 + d
2
[e1 + e2 − aˆ]2 if θ ≤ 12
1
8
aˆ2 + d
2
[e1 + e2 − aˆ]2 if θ > 12
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Consider that intertemporal trading is not allowed and that the ratio of required
abatements chosen by the regulator is aˆ1/aˆ2 < (1/2):
aˆ2 = (2/3)a
opt (1.58)
aˆ1 = aˆ− (2/3)aopt (1.59)
With this ratio, i∗∗1 = i
∗∗
2 = (1/2)aˆ2 (see equation (1.48)) and then the total emission
reductions are 2i∗∗1 + i
∗∗
2 = (3/2)aˆ2 = a
opt > aˆ. The social cost is given by:
S∗∗(aˆ1, aˆ2) =
[
1 + θ
9
+
d
2
]
(aopt)2 +
d
2
(e1 + e2)
2 − d(e1 + e2)aopt
This social cost is lower than the social cost of a scheme with intertemporal, i.e.
S∗(aˆ)− S∗∗(aˆ1, aˆ2) ≥ 0, where aˆ1 and aˆ2 are given by (1.58) and (1.59), if and only
if
• For θ ≤ 1
2
,
d(e1 + e2)[a
opt − aˆ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−
[
1 + θ
9
+
d
2
]
(aopt)2 +
[
1− θ2
2(5− 4θ) +
d
2
]
aˆ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
≥ 0
• For θ > 1
2
d(e1 + e2)[a
opt − aˆ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−
[
1 + θ
9
+
d
2
]
(aopt)2 +
[
1
8
+
d
2
]
aˆ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
≥ 0
Using numerical simulations (available upon request), I show that
• the left hand side of this equation is increasing in d, (e1 + e2) and (aopt − aˆ)
and is decreasing in θ,
• this condition is satisfied for a non empty set of parameters (d, θ, aˆ, e1, e2). 
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Chapter 2
Environmental agreements under
asymmetric information
In a two-country model, I analyze international environmental agreements related to
polluting emissions when a country’s abatement costs are private information and
participation to an agreement is voluntary. I show that the presence of asymmetric
information may prevent countries from reaching a first-best agreement if this infor-
mation asymmetry is too high. I propose a new channel to restore the feasibility of
the first-best agreement: pre-play communication. By revealing its abatement cost
through a certification agency in a pre-play communication stage, a country com-
mits not to misreport this abatement cost during the negotiations of an agreement.
I show that there exist transfer schemes between countries such that they optimally
accept to undergo certification. The first-best agreement is now implementable for
levels of information asymmetry for which this was not the case in the model without
certification. 1
1This research has received funding from the FRS - FNRS. I am especially grateful to Estelle
Cantillon, for her very helpful comments and discussions. I am also indebted to Nicolas Sahuguet,
Patrick Legros, Paola Conconi, Andreas Lange and David Martimort for their comments. I also
thank the participants in the internal seminar at ECARES, the participants in the 11th Journe´es
Andre´-Louis Ge´rard Varet, the participants in the 19th Annual Conference of the EAERE and the
participants of the ENTER Jamboree 2013.
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2.1 Introduction
Despite the scientific evidence regarding anthropogenic climate change and its dis-
astrous consequences (see Stern, 2007), the recent United Nations Conference in
Rio (June 2012) seems to confirm that there is little prospect for an effective global
climate change agreement to emerge in the near future. The classical explanation
for this failure is the free-rider problem: countries have the possibility to opt out of
the negotiations while still enjoying the benefits of the climate agreement.
Afionis (2011) or Helm and Wirl (2011) suggest that information asymmetry
(about, for instance, the relative weight of environmental problems in governments’
agenda or the private information about local benefits and costs of climate change)
can be also part of the explanation. Indeed, asymmetric information adds a new
form of free-riding: countries may have an incentive to exaggerate their privately
known abatement cost in order to reduce the effort they have to supply and leave
most of the burden of abatement on other countries.
This paper takes a mechanism design approach and studies the effect of asym-
metric information about abatement costs on the feasibility of an efficient environ-
mental agreement when participation to this agreement is voluntary. In doing so, it
also proposes a new channel to restore the feasibility of an efficient agreement: pre-
play communication. The argument is the following. As emphasized by Congleton
(1995), international cooperation develops overtime and this development follows a
particular pattern: countries first agree on an initial agreement, i.e. an umbrella
convention, that generally does not impose binding limits on countries’ emissions.
For example, the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change pro-
vides for the establishment of institutions such as the Conference of Parties as a
supreme body entitled to negotiate all subsequent protocols and amendments, a
secretariat that is in charge of the administration, and subsidiary bodies for scien-
tific advice and implementation. In a second stage, countries negotiate an agreement
with emission reduction targets and financial or technology transfers, such as the
Kyoto Protocol. Article 11 of the Kyoto Protocol allows for the possibility of mon-
etary transfers from developed to developing countries through the International
Green Fund. Moreover, the flexible mechanisms (Joint Implementations – JI – or
Clean Development Mechanisms – CDM) foreseen in this Protocol are expected to
generate important technology transfers and flows of financial resources among the
Protocol member states.
Climate change negotiations are thus an example of a public good game pre-
ceded by a pre-play communication. By signing the UNFCCC, industrialized coun-
tries committed themselves to provide the Conference of the Parties with clear data
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about their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and about regional programmes con-
taining measures to mitigate climate change and with information related to im-
plementation. A subsidiary body of the UNFCCC is in charge of assessing this
information, which is thus at least partially verifiable. The main contribution of
the paper is to show that this pre-play communication between countries may be
helpful in achieving efficient cooperation.
My analysis is carried out within the framework of the private provision of a
public good under asymmetric information. The public good considered here is the
reduction of some polluting emissions. To provide this public good, countries incur
emission abatement costs. Each country knows its own abatement cost, but not that
of the other country. An environmental agreement consists of binding commitments
to some emission abatement levels and monetary transfers between countries. The
first-best agreement is the one that maximizes global welfare. Participation to this
first-best agreement is voluntary. This agreement is feasible if all countries are
willing to participate to it and if they all reveal their abatement cost truthfully. The
objective of the model is to analyze the conditions on the economic environment
(preferences, distribution of abatement costs) for which the first-best agreement is
feasible.
I first consider a model without pre-play communication. Due to asymmetric
information, a first-best agreement is not feasible when the range of the distribution
of abatement costs is too large (in other words, when the information asymmetry
is high).2 For these economic environments, it is impossible to find transfers that
satisfy the participation and the truth-telling constraints simultaneously. There is
a trade-off between the two sources of free-riding: participation and truth-telling
Then, I introduce a pre-play communication stage, i.e. an umbrella convention
that establishes an international agency entitled to gather information about pri-
vately known abatement costs provided by participating countries. In this model, I
assume that this information is totally verifiable: the international agency can mon-
itor and certify the countries’ privately known information if sovereign countries give
their consent. In this pre-play communication stage, countries decide whether or
not they use this agency as a commitment to reveal their abatement cost truthfully
before the beginning of the negotiations of an agreement. The effects of certifica-
tion are twofold. On the one hand, the information asymmetry between countries is
2Similar inefficiencies were pointed out in related setups. In the context of public good
economies, Laffont and Maskin (1979) have shown that no truthful and efficient mechanisms may
exist if individual rationality constraints are taken into account. In the private goods case, My-
erson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed the impossibility of attaining ex-post efficiency with an
incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism.
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reduced. On the other hand, the country certifying its abatement cost loses the pos-
sibility to misreport this abatement cost, and thereby may see its monetary transfer
in the first-best agreement reduced. Each country would be better off if the other
country underwent certification in the pre-play communication stage, i.e. if it could
free-ride on the certification of the other country.
I show that there exist first-best transfer schemes such that either one or two
countries have an incentive to use the certification agency as a commitment to
truthfully disclose their abatement cost, so that information asymmetry in the public
good game is reduced. These transfers are not limited to monetary side payments.
They can also be interpreted as direct investments, technical assistance and financial
aid for projects controlled by the donor.
Compared to a model without the possibility of certification, the feasibility of the
first-best agreement is restored in two cases. For low levels of information asymme-
try, the reduction of information asymmetry induced by the certification of at least
one country’s abatement cost allows countries to reach the first-best agreement for
all realizations of abatement costs. For higher levels of information asymmetry, de-
pending on countries’ abatement costs, certification by only one country may not
be sufficient to reach the first-best agreement. Due to free-riding in the use of cer-
tification, the first-best is not implementable for all realizations of abatement costs.
However, when the information asymmetry is very high, it is possible to find transfer
schemes such that both countries decide to reveal their type through the certification
agency before negotiations. In this case, the first-best is achieved for all realizations
of abatement costs. Due to this high information asymmetry, the probability that
only one certification is sufficient to reach the first-best is very low, so countries do
not have an incentive to free-ride on each others’ certification. This paper suggests
that by choosing appropriate transfers derived from the mechanism design theory,
countries may have an incentive to disclose their private information through an in-
ternational certification agency and this can help them to reach an efficient climate
agreement.
This paper is in line with mechanism design approaches to environmental prob-
lems. Rob (1989) analyzes a bargaining problem between a pollution-generating
firm and nearby residents. In the context of climate change, Caparros et al. (2004)
consider a bargaining model in which Northern countries suffer from emissions of
Southern countries and negotiate about the transfer necessary to reduce these emis-
sions. These papers consider one-sided asymmetric information and bargaining be-
tween one polluter and one victim. Baliga and Maskin (2003) are the first to consider
environmental agreements between countries that are at the same time victims and
polluters as a mechanism design problem under asymmetric information. They do
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not consider participation constraints however, so they find that the first-best agree-
ment is possible. The model the closest to the one developed in this paper is that of
Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2012). Analyzing international environmental agree-
ments, they also highlight a trade-off between solving free riding due to asymmetric
information and due to voluntary participation. They concentrate on second-best
mechanisms and show that the optimal mechanism admits a simple approximation
by menus. By contrast, my paper proposes a channel to restore the feasibility of the
first-best agreement, i.e. pre-play communication.
The idea of a pre-play stage in public good games has been studied in the en-
vironmental economics literature but without considering information asymmetry
between parties. Buccholz and Konrad (1994) show that when negotiations are
planned in advance, this gives rise to strategic under-investment in abatement tech-
nology because extensive investments that lower abatement costs undermine a coun-
try’s bargaining position in future negotiations (i.e. the country will be assigned a
higher abatement target).3 When only one form of the free-rider problem is taken
into account, i.e. voluntary participation, the existence of a pre-play stage has
detrimental effects on the efficiency of the future agreement.
Here, the pre-play stage is a communication stage in which countries can commit
to truthful disclosure of their privately known abatement cost. This type of infor-
mation revelation commitment has been studied in other contexts. For example,
Benoˆıt and Dubra (2006) slightly modify a variety of auction models by adding a
preliminary stage in which one player can send a verifiable signal revealing his pri-
vate information before the auction. They show that a player will reveal all of his
information in equilibrium, even though this lowers his ex-ante payoff.
In public good games, some papers have analyzed the role of pre-play cheap
talk. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) and Agastya et al. (2007) study a situation
where, as a consequence of private information, agents do not have an incentive
to invest in a public good if they are unable to have prior discussions with their
partners. As in the present paper, they emphasize two problems of coordination
in this game: (1) there is a weak incentive to free ride on the contribution of the
other members of the group and (2) there is incomplete information. By adding
a prior stage of communication (binary message space), there exist situations (i.e.
some realizations of the privately known types) where individuals have incentives to
invest and the project is undertaken. However, due to adverse strategic incentives,
perfect coordination is not bayesian incentive compatible. Costa and Moreira (2012)
show that there is no finite message space that supports an equilibrium in which the
public good is more likely to be implemented than with a binary message space.
3A similar argument is used in Beccherle and Tirole (2011).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 lays out the main
assumptions of the two-country model. Section 2.3 shows the effect of asymmetric
information on the feasibility of the first-best agreement. In section 2.4, I introduce
pre-play communication. I conclude in section 2.5.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 The setting
There are two countries, i = 1, 2, that emit some transboundary pollutant. These
countries can conclude an agreement y from a set of possible agreements Y in order
to reduce these polluting emissions. An agreement y = (a1, a2, t1, t2) consists of
emission abatement levels ai and monetary transfers ti for each country. A transfer
ti represents any financial compensation that country i may receive for undertaking
the requested abatement. I assume that no external source of funds is available and
that there is no waste of resource. Hence, the budget-balance constraint implies
that: t1 + t2 = 0.
For an agreement y ∈ Y , country i’s utility function is given by:
Vi(y|θi) = vi(a1, a2|θi) + ti (2.1)
where vi(a1, a2|θi) is country i’ s valuation of the abatement levels, a1 and a2,
requested by the agreement y. This valuation depends on a parameter θi that is
privately observed by country i. For the ease of the exposition, I use a functional
form for vi(.), which is:
4
vi(a1, a2|θi) = bi(a1 + a2)− a
2
i
2θi
(2.2)
with b1 + b2 = 1.
By choosing abatement level ai, country i generates benefits biai for itself and
bjai for the other and incurs a cost of
1
2θi
a2i . The parameter bi is country i’s marginal
benefit from abatement. The privately observed parameter θi can be interpreted as
the characteristic of the technology of country i. It can also represent the individual
opportunity cost associated to internal politics (e.g. the relative weight of environ-
mental problems in governments’ agenda) necessary to reach a certain abatement
level. This type θi is distributed uniformly on [θ, θ¯], with 0 < θ < θ¯. The country
with the highest θi is the most efficient at undertaking abatement efforts. For future
reference, I define an economic environment as follows:
4This type of utility function has been used in other papers about international environmental
agreements: Hoel and Schneider (1997), Kolstad (2005) or Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2012).
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Definition 1 An economic environment Ω consists of:
• A range for the distribution of types (θ¯ − θ);
• Individual marginal benefits from abatements (b1, b2).
The first-best agreement is the agreement that maximizes total welfare for each
realization of types under the constraint that the budget is balanced. Formally, its
definition is given by:
Definition 2 yFB = (aFB1 , a
FB
2 , t
FB
1 , t
FB
2 ) ∈ Y is a first-best agreement if and only
if
• (aFB1 , aFB2 ) ∈ argmaxa1,a2 V1(y|θ1) + V2(y|θ2)
• tFB1 = −tFB2
With the functional form (2.2), abatement levels at the first-best are given by
aFBi (θi) = θi(b1 + b2) for each i. The most efficient countries in terms of abatement
are those that abate the most at the first-best.The utility of the first-best agreement
for country i is given by:
Vi(y
FB|θi) =
(
b2i
2
− b
2
j
2
)
θi + (b
2
i + b1b2)θj + t
FB
i (2.3)
for all (θi, θj) ∈ [θ, θ¯] × [θ, θ¯]. In this paper, I will analyze the conditions on
the economic environment for which the first-best agreement is implementable (the
definition of implementability will depend on whether the types θi are privately or
publicly known).
Whenever a country refuses an agreement y, the outside option is the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium. It consists for country i in choosing its abatement
level to maximize its own utility. Since this is a non-cooperative equilibrium, there
is no transfer, i.e. t1 = t2 = 0.
Definition 3 yN = (aN1 , a
N
2 , t
N
1 , t
N
2 ) is the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium if and
only if
• aNi = argmaxai Vi(ai, aNj , tN1 , tN2 |θi)
• tN1 = tN2 = 0
With the functional form (2.2), abatement levels at the non-cooperative equilib-
rium are given by aNi (θi) = θibi for each i, i.e. countries do not internalize the benefit
of their abatement level on the other country. The utility under the non-cooperative
equilibrium for country i is given by:
Vi(y
N |θi) =
(
b2i
2
)
θi + b1b2θj (2.4)
for all (θi, θj) ∈ [θ, θ¯]× [θ, θ¯].
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2.3 A model without pre-play communication
2.3.1 Complete information benchmark
As a benchmark, I will first assume that countries’ types θi for i = 1, 2, are public
knowledge. Participation to an environmental agreement y is voluntary. Hence,
in this setting, the first-best agreement is implementable if individual rationality
constraints are satisfied for both countries:
Vi(y
FB|θ1, θ2) ≥ Vi(yN |θ1, θ2) =
(
b2i
2
)
θi + b1b2θj for each i and for all θi ∈ [θ, θ¯]
i.e. if the utility of country i is higher when it implements the first-best agreement
than when it refuses it. Type-dependent transfers satisfying the budget balance
constraint t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2) = 0 can be used to fix abatements at their first-
best level and compensate countries for the extra cost incurred due these higher
abatement levels (compared to the outside option):
Proposition 2.1 In all economic environments Ω, the first-best agreement yFB is
implementable for all θi ∈ [θ, θ¯] (i = 1, 2).
Proof Using equations (2.3) and (2.4), the transfers necessary to make each country
willing to participate to the first-best agreement are given by:
t1(θ1, θ2) ≥ θ1 b
2
2
2
− θ2b21 (2.5)
t2(θ1, θ2) ≥ θ2 b
2
1
2
− θ1b22 (2.6)
Using the budget-balance constraint t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2) = 0, the condition for
the implementation of a first-best agreement under complete information is the
following:
θ1
b22
2
− θ2b21 ≤ t1(θ1, θ2) ≤ θ1b22 − θ2
b21
2
(2.7)
In equation (2.7), θ1
b22
2
− θ2b21 < θ1b22 − θ2 b
2
1
2
for all θi > 0. Indeed, rearranging this
inequality, we get:
−θ1 b
2
2
2
< θ2
b21
2
The result follows since the term on the left hand side is always negative, while the
term on the right hand side is always positive. 
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2.3.2 Two-sided asymmetric information
Now, I assume that the countries’ types θi are private information. The condi-
tions of implementation of the first-best agreement are then modified compared to
the benchmark complete information case. Participation to an agreement is still
voluntary, so the first-best agreement must still satisfy the individual rationality
constraints of both countries. Due to asymmetric information, first-best transfers
and abatement levels must also be incentive compatible, i.e countries may not have
an incentive to misreport their type.
I consider direct revelation mechanisms characterized by the following outcome
function:
y(θˆ1, θˆ2) = (a1(θˆ1, θˆ2), a2(θˆ1, θˆ2), t1(θˆ1, θˆ2), t2(θˆ1, θˆ2)) ∈ Y
where abatement levels and transfers are functions of reported types (θˆ1, θˆ2). By
the revelation principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention to
direct and truthful revelation mechanisms (Myerson, 1982).
The first-best agreement yFB is implementable if there exists a direct revelation
mechanism y(., .), with ai(θ1, θ2) = a
FB
i and t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2) = 0 for all (θ1, θ2),
and that is Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational.
Since countries know their type when deciding to join a treaty, the interim indi-
vidual rationality constraint implies that:
Eθj [Vi(y(θi, θj)|θi)] ≥ Eθj [Vi(yN |θi)] =
b2i
2
θi + b1b2E[θj] for i = 1, 2 (2.8)
Bayesian incentive compatibility of the mechanism y(., .) implies that:
Eθj [Vi(y(θi, θj)|θi)] = max
θˆi∈[θ,θ¯]
Eθj [Vi(y(θˆi, θj)|θi)]
= max
θˆi∈[θ,θ¯]
Eθj [bi(a1(θˆi, θj) + a2(θˆi, θj))−
a2i (θˆi, θj)
2θi
+ ti(θˆi, θj)]
(2.9)
i.e. truth-telling gives country i the highest possible expected utility.
By pretending to be slightly less efficient in terms of abatement, i.e pretending
to be of a type θi − dθi, a country of type θi can exert the same abatement effort
as the less efficient type θi − dθi but at a lower marginal cost. The marginal gains
from doing so are approximatively
a2i (θi−dθi,θj)
2θ2i
≈ a2i (θi)
2θ2i
. To ensure truth-telling,
the mechanism must reward the most efficient types by an amount, Vi(y(θi, θj)|θi)−
Vi(y(θi−dθi, θj)|θi) = V˙i(y(θi, θj)|θi)dθi, that is precisely worth these marginal gains.
This is the idea of lemma 2.1:
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Lemma 2.1 The direct revelation mechanism y(., .) satisfies Bayesian incentive
compatibility if and only if Eθj [a
2
i (θi, θj)] is weakly increasing in θi and
Eθj V˙i(y(θi, θj)|θi)] =
Eθj [a
2
i (θi, θj)]
2θ2i
(2.10)
It immediately follows that an incentive compatible mechanism must give a greater
payoff to the most efficient countries. Combining interim individual rationality
(2.8), bayesian incentive compatibility (2.10) and budget balance yields the following
proposition:
Proposition 2.2 Given an economic environment Ω, the first-best agreement yFB
is implementable ∀θi ∈ [θ, θ¯] (i = 1, 2) if and only if this economic environment
satisfies:
(θ¯ − θ)
θ
≤ b
2
1 + b
2
2
2b1b2
= L0 (2.11)
Proof See appendix A. 
For the first-best to be implementable, the relative range of the distribution, (θ¯−
θ)/θ, must be below a threshold L0, which depends on the marginal benefits of
abatements. In other words, the information asymmetry cannot be too high. The
threshold L0 is the lowest, and so the condition of implementability is the strongest,
when b1 = b2, i.e. when countries are symmetric. Since it is assumed that b1+b2 = 1,
the threshold L0 is the lowest when b1 = b2 = 0.5.
To understand this result, we need to figure out the impact of the economic
environment Ω, on individual rationality and incentive compatibility and on the
gains from cooperation.
First, the expected collective gains from reaching the first-best agreement are
measured by the difference in expected welfare between the first-best agreement
W FB and the non-cooperative equilibrium WN :
E[W FB −WN ] = E[V1(yFB|θ1) + V2(yFB|θ2)]− E[V1(yN |θ1) + V2(yN |θ2)]
Using equations (2.3) and (2.4) yields:
E[W FB −WN ] =
(
b21
2
+
b22
2
)
(E[θ1] + E[θ2]) = (b
2
1 + b
2
2)
θ¯ + θ
2
These expected gains are the lowest for symmetric countries. This means that, in
this case, the collective expected gains that can be shared between countries to
ensure participation and truth-telling are low.
Second, by lemma 2.1, we know that to ensure truth-telling the most efficient
countries must be given the highest payoffs. If information asymmetry, measured by
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the range (θ¯−θ), is high, the incentives of the most efficient types for misreporting are
big. Avoiding such free-riding requires large compensations, i.e. large information
rent, for those very efficient countries. However, individual rationality must also be
satisfied for all types, including the less efficient ones.
The compensations granted to the most efficient types are thus limited by the
available collective gains from cooperation E[W FB − WN ] (since we assume that
there is no external resource) and the necessity to ensure participation of the less
efficient types. When the range of the distribution of types is very large and/or
countries are not asymmetric enough in terms of marginal benefits, one cannot
find incentive compatible transfers that implement the first-best abatement levels
and that give all types (including the least efficient ones) strictly more than their
expected non-cooperative payoffs. Asymmetric information introduces a conflict
between the most efficient types’ incentives for truth-telling and the least efficient
types’ incentives to participate to the agreement.
For economic environments that does not satisfy condition (2.11), we can say that
there is a tension between incentive compatibility, budget-balance and individual
rationality that prevents countries from reaching the first-best agreement. Compared
to the benchmark case, the presence of asymmetric information reduces the set of
economic environments for which countries can implement the first-best agreement.
2.3.3 One-sided asymmetric information
For future reference, I now solve the model for the case in which only one country has
private information about its type. Once the possibility of certification is introduced
(see section 2.4), this will correspond to the case in which one country has decided
to reveal its type through the certification agency. Assume that country 1’s type θ1
is public knowledge and only country 2 has private information about its type θ2.
In this case, a direct revelation mechanism has the following outcome function:
y(θ1, θˆ2) = (a1(θ1, θˆ2), a2(θ1, θˆ2), t1(θ1, θˆ2), t2(θ1, θˆ2)) ∈ Y
where θ1 is the publicly known type of country 1 and θˆ2 is the reported type of coun-
try 2. The first-best agreement yFB will be implementable if and only if there exists a
direct revelation mechanism y(θ1, .) such that (i) the ex-post incentive compatibility
and ex-post individual rationality constraints of country 2 are satisfied:
V2(y(θ1, θ2)|θ2) = max
θˆ2∈[θ,θ¯]
V2(y(θ1, θˆ2)|θ2)
V2(y(θ1, θ2)|θ2) ≥ V2(yN |θ2) = b
2
2
2
θ2 + b1b2θ1
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and (ii) the interim individual rationality constraint of country 1 is satisfied:
Eθ2 [V1(y(θ1, θ2)|θ1)] ≥ Eθ2 [V1(yN |θ1)] =
b21
2
θ1 + b1b2E[θ2] (2.12)
The situation in which country 2’s type is public knowledge and country 1’s type
is private information is totally symmetric. It is then possible to state lemma 2.2:
Lemma 2.2 When the type θi is public knowledge, given an economic environment
Ω, the first-best agreement yFB is implementable ∀θj ∈ [θ, θ¯] if and only if θi ≥ θ˜i
with
θ˜i =
bi
bj
(θ¯ − θ)− b
2
i
b2j
θ (2.13)
Proof See Appendix B. 
Lemma 2.2 states that, given the economic environment, the first-best agreement
can be implemented if this country i is sufficiently efficient in terms of abatement.
The intuition behind this result is the same as in the previous section. The expected
collective gains are increasing in the publicly known type θi:
Eθj [W
FB −WN ] = b
2
i
2
E[θj] +
b2j
2
θi
This means that the lower the publicly known type, the lower the collective gains
from cooperation that can be shared to ensure truth-telling and participation. If
the range of the distribution of types is very large, the information rent required
by country j most efficient types to ensure truth-telling may be too large to satisfy
the budget-balance constraint and the individual rationality constraint of the least
efficient types. We recover the tension between incentive compatibility, budget-
balance and individual rationality.
The critical type θ˜i is increasing in the relative range of the distribution
(θ¯−θ)
θ
: the
tension between incentive compatibility, budget-balance and individual rationality
is stronger for larger ranges of the distribution. A higher value of θi is then necessary
to solve the tension.
From lemma 2.2, the condition of implementability of the first-best agreement
depends on the publicly known type θi. The next corollary identifies the conditions
on the economic environment for which the first-best will be implementable whatever
the type of country i. These are the conditions on the economic environment for
which θ˜i ≤ θ because, in this case, θi ≥ θ˜i for all θi ∈ [θ, θ¯].
Corollary 2.1 Assume type θi is publicly known and type θj is privately known. In
economic environments Ω where
(θ¯ − θ)
θ
≤ b
2
1 + b
2
2
b1b2
= L1
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the first-best agreement yFB is implementable ∀(θi, θj) ∈ [θ, θ¯] × [θ, θ¯]. Moreover
L0 < L1.
Proof Result obtained by substituting θ to θ˜i in equation (2.13). 
Corollary 2.1 and propositions 2.1 and 2.2 imply that information asymmetry
reduces the set of economic environments for which countries can implement the
first-best agreement. The ranges (θ¯−θ)
θ
for which there exist mechanisms that im-
plement the first-best for all types θ1 ∈ [θ, θ¯] and θ2 ∈ [θ, θ¯] is larger in the case
with one-sided information asymmetry than in the case with two-sided information
asymmetry (since L0 < L1). Moreover, when information is complete, the first-best
is implementable for all economic environments.
2.4 A model with pre-play communication
As shown in the previous section, without pre-play communication, asymmetric
information may prevent countries to reach the first-best agreement. A way to re-
duce this information asymmetry is to introduce pre-play communication between
countries. As previously mentioned, international cooperation generally starts with
an umbrella convention that does not impose any binding emission reduction tar-
gets but provides a mechanism to share information before the negotiations of an
agreement with binding emission reduction targets (i.e. the abatement game).
In this paper, I assume that during this pre-play communication, countries can
commit to truthful disclosure of their privately known abatement cost type. This
supposes the existence of an international agency that can monitor and certify the
privately known information. This certification reduces the information asymme-
try and constitutes a channel to restore the feasibility of the first-best agreement.
Nevertheless, for this channel to be helpful in reaching the first-best agreement,
countries must have incentives to undergo certification. The effect of certification
is twofold. On the one hand, by revealing a country’s type, certification reduces
the information asymmetry, which was responsible for the tension between incentive
compatibility, budget-balance and individual rationality constraints. On the other
hand, certification implies the loss of the information rent for the country reveal-
ing its type. Countries might thus have an incentive to free-ride on each others’
certification (i.e. to stay privately informed) in order to keep their information rent.
To include the possibility of certification, I modify the model presented in section
2.3 by considering a preliminary stage (stage 1 or pre-play communication stage)
in which countries decide simultaneously whether or not to allow the international
agency to monitor and certify their type. This action of certification is taken at an
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ex-ante stage, i.e. when countries do not know their own types.5 Let si denote the
action (or strategy) of country i in stage 1. The set of possible strategies in stage 1
is S = {C, NC} for each i, where C means that country i reveals its type (through
the certification agency) and NC means that country i stays privately informed.
Remember that if country i’s type is public knowledge (e.g. after this country
having revealed its type through the certification agency), then the first-best agree-
ment can be implemented if θi > θ˜i. For future reference, the probability that a
country has a type θi < θ˜i is given by
F (θ˜i) ≡ θ˜i − θ
θ¯ − θ =
bi
bj
− (b
2
i + b
2
j)
b2j
θ
(θ¯ − θ)
Therefore, 1 − F (θ˜i) is the probability that the action of certification of country i
allows to reach the first-best in stage 2.
In stage 2, countries at least privately know their types and they negotiate an
environmental agreement using the direct revelation mechanism that implements
the first-best agreement if it is feasible and they resort to the non-cooperative Nash
outcome otherwise. This is the abatement stage. Note that the non-cooperative out-
come yN is independent of information, i.e. whether or not one country has revealed
its type in stage 1. Indeed, transfers are equal to zero for all types and the non-
cooperative abatement level only depends on each country’s type (aNi (θi) = biθi).
I solve this game backward. This section investigates conditions on the economic
environment such that for all realizations of types, the equilibrium outcome of this
game results in the first-best agreement being implemented.
Remark 2.1 For economic environments satisfying (θ¯−θ)
θ
≤ L0, the fact that coun-
tries undergo certifications does not help them to reach the first-best agreement: the
first-best is implementable in stage 2 with or without certification (see proposition
2.2). The only effect of the possibility to certify its type is to change the first-best
transfers. Independently of the certifications undertaken in stage 1, the equilibrium
outcome of this two-stage game is that the first-best is always implemented. For this
reason, I concentrate on economic environments satisfying (θ¯−θ)
θ
> L0 in which the
first-best is not implementable without certification.
5It would be more realistic to assume that countries decide whether or not to undertake cer-
tification at an interim stage (i.e. when each country knows its own abatement cost), but the
resolution of the two-stage game would become intractable. This resolution would require looking
at beliefs conditional on observable moves and non-equilibrium beliefs.
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2.4.1 Stage 2: abatement game
The equilibrium outcome in stage 2 depends on the actions taken in stage 1. If
both countries have revealed their types through the certification agency in stage 1,
the equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is the first-best agreement yFB (because there is
complete information). If no country has revealed its type in stage 1, then the equi-
librium outcome in stage 2 is the non-cooperative equilibrium yN . If only country i
has revealed its type θi in stage 1, the equilibrium outcome in stage 2 depends on the
type of the country undergoing certification (see lemma 2.2): (i) if θi ≥ θ˜i, the equi-
librium outcome is the first-best agreement yFB and (ii) if θi < θ˜i, the equilibrium
outcome is the non-cooperative equilibrium yN .
As shown in the previous section (see corollary 2.1), θ˜i = θ if the economic envi-
ronment satisfies (θ¯−θ)
θ
≤ L1. In this case, the equilibrium outcome in stage 2 is for
sure the first-best agreement yFB if at least one country has undergone certification
in stage 1. For economic environments such that (θ¯−θ)
θ
≥ L1, the equilibrium out-
come in stage 2 is the first-best agreement yFB either if both countries have revealed
their type in stage 1 or if the only country that has undergone certification in stage
1 turns out to have a type θi ≥ θ˜i.
Figure 2.1: Implementation of the first-best agreement depending on the economic
environment
yFB  implementable if both countries 
reveal their types or if country that 
reveals its type has θi ≥ θi  
yFB  implementable if 
one country reveals 
its type 
yFB  always implementable yFB  cannot be implemented with two-sided 
asymmetric information
L0 L1 (θ −θ )
θ
With two-sided asymmetric information, the implementation of the first-best
will thus depend on countries’ decisions about certification in stage 1 and on the
economic environment. Figure 2.1 summarizes these findings. Intuitively, the incen-
tives for certification will depend on the collective gains from reaching the first-best
agreement (and thus on the relative marginal benefits from abatement) and on the
comparison between the transfers received in the first-best in the two sub-game
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(when both reveal their types and when only one reveals its type).
2.4.2 Stage 1: pre-play communication
To find the equilibrium strategies in the simultaneous move game of stage 1, I
consider countries’ best responses.
Best responses of country i
If country j does not reveal its type through the certification agency (sj = NC), the
best response of country i is to reveal its type in stage 1 for all economic environ-
ments satisfying (θ¯−θ)
θ
> L0. Indeed, by certifying its type, country i increases the
probability that the first-best agreement is implemented in stage 2: this probability
increases from zero to (1 − F (θ˜i)). Since the first-best (which satisfies the individ-
ual rationality constraint) gives a higher expected utility than the non-cooperative
equilibrium, country i will always prefer to reveal its type through the certification
agency.
If country j reveals its type (sj = C), the best response of country i is more dif-
ficult to determine. Consider y(θ1, θ2) = (a
FB
1 , a
FB
2 , t1, t2), the mechanism chosen
to implement the first-best agreement under complete information and y′(θ1, θ2) =
(aFB1 , a
FB
2 , t
′
1, t
′
2), the mechanism chosen to implement the first-best if only country j
has revealed its type through certification. The expected utilities of country i under
each strategy (C and NC) are the following:
• If country i undergoes certification in stage 1 (si = C), there is complete in-
formation in stage 2 and the first-best is always implementable using a mech-
anism y(θ1, θ2). The expected utility of country i in stage 1 is then given by
(see equation (2.3)):
E
[(
b2i
2
− b
2
j
2
)
θi + (b
2
i + b1b2)θj + ti(θ1, θ2)
]
which is equivalent to:
E
[(
b2i
2
θi + b1b2θj
)
+
(
b2i θj −
b2j
2
θi + ti(θ1, θ2)
)]
(2.14)
The first term of the right hand side of (2.14) is the expected utility under the
non-cooperative equilibrium (see equation (2.4)). The second term is the extra
gain from reaching the first-best agreement. Because individual rationality
constraint is satisfied, this extra gain is always positive.
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• If country i does not undergo certification in stage 1 (si = NC), the first-best
is implementable using a mechanism y′(θ1, θ2) if and only if θj ≥ θ˜j (see lemma
2.2). The expected utility of country i is given by:
F (θ˜j)E
[
b2i
2
θi + b1b2θj|θj < θ˜j
]
+ (1− F (θ˜j))E
[
b2i
2
θi −
b2j
2
θi + (b
2
i + b1b2)θj|θj ≥ θ˜j]
]
+ (1− F (θ˜j))E[t′i(θ1, θ2)|θj ≥ θ˜j]
Rearranging terms yields:
E
[
b2i
2
θi + b1b2θj
]
+ (1− F (θ˜j))E
[(
b2i θj −
b2j
2
θi + t
′
i(θ1, θ2)
)
|θj ≥ θ˜j
] (2.15)
The first term on the right hand side of (2.15) is the same as in (2.14) (the
expected utility under the non-cooperative equilibrium) and the second term
is the expected extra gain from reaching the first-best agreement, which is
implementable only if country j is sufficiently efficient.
Comparing expressions (2.14) and (2.15) confirms our intuition that the best
response of country i when sj = C depends on (1) the transfers used to implement
the first-best abatement levels in stage 2 (either with certification of both countries
E[ti(θ1, θ2)] or with country j’ s certification only E[t
′
i(θ1, θ2)|θj ≥ θ˜j]), (2) the
relative intensity of preferences over abatement (i.e. values of bi and bj) and (3) the
probability that country j is sufficiently efficient (1 − F (θ˜j)). The two last factors
are determined by the economic environment Ω.
I consider that country i will choose to reveal its type if and only if this country
can be sure to obtain a higher expected utility by acting in this way. Otherwise it
prefers to stay privately informed.The best response of country i to sj = C will be to
reveal its type if, given the economic environment Ω, there exist mechanisms with
transfers ti(θ1, θ2), such that (2.14) > (2.15) for all t
′
i(θ1, θ2). Otherwise, country i
prefers to stay privately informed.
Note that if (1 − F (θ˜j)) = 0, then the best response of country i is always to
undergo certification in stage 1 for all ti(θ1, θ2) and all t
′
i(θ1, θ2). The argument is
similar to the previous case when sj = NC. (1 − F (θ˜j)) = 0 implies that country
j is never sufficiently efficient for its certification to allow countries to reach the
first-best agreement. Country i will thus never have an incentive to free-ride on
certification of country j’s type.
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The equilibrium in stage 1
With these best responses, it is now possible to characterize the Nash equilibrium
of the game in stage 1. Our objective is to find economic environments for which
the first-best is the equilibrium outcome of the two-stage game for all realizations
of types.
Given the best responses detailed above, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2.3 For economic environments satisfying
(θ¯ − θ)
θ
≥ L0
there is at least one country revealing its type at the equilibrium of stage 1.
However, remember from Figure 2.1 that one country undergoing certification in
stage 1 is sufficient to implement the first-best in stage 2 for all realizations of types,
only if the economic environment satisfies (θ¯−θ)
θ
≤ L1. For economic environments
such that (θ¯−θ)
θ
> L1, the first-best will be the equilibrium outcome in stage 2 for
all realizations of types if and only if both countries undergo certification at the
equilibrium of stage 1.
To this end, we need that for both countries i, there exist second-stage mecha-
nisms with transfers ti(θ1, θ2) (that implement the first-best under complete infor-
mation) such that (2.14) > (2.15) for all t′i(θ1, θ2). In this case, for both i, the best
response of country i is to reveal its type through the certification agency when
country j’s strategy is sj = C. If such transfers ti(θ1, θ2) does not exist for both i,
then there is one country that prefers to stay privately informed when the stratagy
of the other country is to reveal its type.
In other words, when (θ¯−θ)
θ
> L1, for the first-best being implementable for
all realizations of types, countries should not have an incentive to free-ride on each
others’ certifications in stage 1 (whatever the transfer that they can obtain by staying
privately informed).
Intuitively, it is easier to find such transfers ti(θ1, θ2) when F (θ˜j) is high (or
equivalently when θ˜j is high). For high values of F (θ˜j), the probability that the
certification of country j’s type allows to reach the first-best is low, so that country
i has a greater incentive to reveal its type in stage 1 in order to guarantee that the
first-best is implemented in stage 2. The incentive to free-ride on the other country’s
certification decreases when θ˜j increases. This is shown formally in Lemma 2.4:
Lemma 2.4 The equilibrium in stage 1 is unique and is such that both countries
reveal their type for all t′i(θ1, θ2) that implement the first-best agreement in the game
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with only country j’s certified type, if and only if the economic environment satisfies:
θ˜1 − θ
θ¯ − θ +
θ˜2 − θ
θ¯ − θ ≥ 1 (2.16)
or equivalently, if and only if:
(θ¯ − θ)
θ
≥ (b
2
1 + b
2
2)
2
b1b2(b21 + b
2
2 − b1b2)
= L2 > L1 (2.17)
Otherwise, it is impossible to find complete information transfers ti(θ1, θ2) such that
both countries reveal their type at the equilibrium of stage 1. For economic envi-
ronments that do not satisfy (2.17), at the equilibrium of stage 1, there is thus one
country undergoing certification while the other country stays privately informed.
Proof See Appendix C. 
The threshold L2 achieves its minimum at the point b1 = b2 (i.e. when countries
are symmetric). The intuition behind this result is the same as for the threshold
L0. At the point, b1 = b2 expected collective gains from cooperation are the lowest,
so that the gains that can be shared to ensure that both countries reveal their type
in stage 1 are the lowest. It is easier to give incentives to countries to undergo
certification if these countries are more asymmetric (in terms of marginal benefits)
or equivalently if expected collective gains from cooperation are higher.
Remark 2.2 Assume, for instance, that bi < bj. Then, θ˜i < θ¯ for all ranges of the
distribution of types, while θ˜j may be such that θ˜j ≥ θ¯(i.e. F (θ˜j) = 1). This is the
case for economic environments satisfying:
(θ¯ − θ)
θ
≥ b
2
1 + b
2
2
b1(b2 − b1) = L
3 > L2
where L3 is obtained by substituting θ¯ to θ˜2 in equation (2.13). Therefore, for ranges
above L3, F (θ˜j) = 1 and condition (2.16) is automatically satisfied.
2.4.3 Solution of the two-stage game
Three cases must be distinguished:
Case 1: Economic environments satisfying L0 < (θ¯−θ)
θ
≤ L1
In these economic environments, θ˜i = θ, so that the equilibrium outcome of this
game is the first-best agreement for all realizations of types, as soon as one country
undegoes certification, which will always happen along the equilibrium path by
lemma 2.3.
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Case 2: Economic environments satisfying L1 < (θ¯ − θ)/θ < L2
Since θ˜i > θ, certification by only one country is not always sufficient to reach
the first-best agreement in the second stage. The country that certifies its type must
be sufficiently efficient in terms of abatement. As a result, for case 2, the first-best
agreement yFB is not part of the equilibrium path for all realizations of types.
Case 3: Economic environments satisfying (θ¯−θ)
θ
≥ L2
For these economic environments, both countries reveal their type at the equilib-
rium of stage 1. The equilibrium outcome of the two-stage game is thus the first-best
agreement implemented using a direct mechanism, for all realizations of types.
Consolidating cases 1-3
We can now state a proposition similar to proposition 2.2 (model without certi-
fication and with two-sided asymmetric information):
Proposition 2.3 Given an economic environment Ω, the first-best agreement yFB
is implementable in the game with pre-play certification if this economic environment
satisfies:
(θ¯ − θ)
θ
≤ b
2
1 + b
2
2
b1b2
= L1 Or
(θ¯ − θ)
θ
≥ (b
2
1 + b
2
2)
2
b1b2(b21 + b
2
2 − b1b2)
= L2
with L1 < L2
For economic environments satisfying (θ¯−θ)
θ
∈ (L1, L2), there exist some realiza-
tions of types for which the first-best is not implementable.
Proposition 2.3 states that certification can restore the feasibility of the first-best
agreement for all types in two cases: for high or sufficiently low levels of information
asymmetry.
If information asymmetry is high (threshold L2), there exist mechanisms such
that both countries optimally undergo certification. No country has an incentive to
free-ride on the other’s action because the risk to implement the non-cooperative
equilibrium (outside option) in stage 2 is substantial and so a country’s expected
benefits of keeping its information rent are very low.
For lower levels of information asymmetry, there is always one country that
prefers to free-ride on the certification of the other country. Due to this free-rider
problem, the first-best agreement will not be part of the equilibrium path for all
types. Nevertheless, if information asymmetry is particularly low (threshold L1),
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both countries are sufficiently efficient in terms of abatement to solve the tension be-
tween incentive compatibility, budget-balance and individual rationality. Free-riding
in the certification stage is no longer a problem and the first-best is implemented in
stage 2 for all types’ realizations.
The set of ranges (L1, L2) where the first-best is not necessarily part of the
equilibrium path for all types is the largest when b1 = b2 (countries are symmetric).
This corresponds to the case in which the expected collective gains from the first-best
agreement are the lowest. Clearly, certifications can more easily solve the tension
between incentive compatibility, budget-balance and individual rationality if those
collective gains are high.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper takes a mechanism design approach to study the effect of asymmetric
information about abatement costs on the feasibility of an efficient environmental
agreement when participation is voluntary. Due to the tension between the two forms
of free-riding, i.e. incentive compatibility and participation, a first-best agreement
cannot always be reached. Then, I introduce a new channel to restore efficiency:
pre-play communication or the possibility for countries to disclose truthfully their
type through a certification agency before the abatement game.
I show that it is possible to find transfer schemes between countries such that a
certification agency is created and at least one country reveals its type through this
agency in stage 1. Adding the possibility of certification restores the feasibility of the
first-best agreement in stage 2 if the level of asymmetry is either high (certification
of both countries’ types) or low (certification of one country’s type).
The motivating example of this paper has been international environmental
agreements, in particular the current failure to reach a global agreement on cli-
mate change. In this example, the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an umbrella convention without any emission re-
duction targets, or interpreted in the light of the model, a pre-play communication
stage. The UNFCCC tries, in some sense, to reduce information asymmetry between
parties by providing some information about countries’ private costs and benefits of
climate change. Indeed, by signing the UNFCCC, countries committed themselves
to provide the Conference of the Parties with information, e.g. about their GHG
emissions and their regional programs to mitigate climate change. However, this
obligation covered only industrialized countries. Developing countries (Non-Annex
I Parties) reported in more general terms on their actions both to address climate
change and to adapt to its impacts–but less regularly than Annex I Parties do.
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Despite the release of this information, the Kyoto Protocol negotiated under
the auspices of the UNFCCC is considered as a failure. For example, Barrett (2003,
p.389) states that “Kyoto does not provide the supporting incentives needed to effect
a change in behavior over time”. This paper suggests that before negotiating a new
climate change agreement, it could be useful to reinforce the UNFCCC by requiring,
for example, that all countries report their GHG emissions and their technologies to
reduce these GHG to the secretariat of the UNFCCC that should have the possibility
to verify, at least partially, this information.
To reach this goal, the model shows that transfers between industrialized and
developing countries will play a crucial role. These transfers can take the form
of monetary side payments (e.g. transfers from developed to developing countries
through the International Green Fund allowed by the article 11 of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol) or they can include direct investments, technical assistance and financial aid
for projects controlled by the donor (e.g. CDM and JI mechanisms defined in the
Kyoto Protocol). By choosing appropriate transfers derived from the mechanism
design theory, countries may have an incentive to disclose their private informa-
tion through an international certification agency established by the UNFCCC. In
the light of the model developed in this paper, this can help countries to reach an
efficient climate agreement.
The model uses a lot of simplifying assumptions to highlight the effects of pre-
play communication. A first important extension could be to consider that abate-
ment efforts are not totally observable, so that there is a problem of moral hazard
during the implementation of the first-best agreement. Second, in this paper, I as-
sume that information transmitted during the pre-play stage is verifiable and can be
certified by an international agency. A more realistic assumption would be that this
information is only partially verifiable, such that abatement costs are still privately
known but the beliefs about these abatement costs are modified by the first-stage
action of information transmission.
Appendices
For the proofs in appendix A and in appendix B, I use the indirect utility notation:
Ui(θi, θ−i|θi) ≡ Vi(y(θi, θ−i)|θi)
with Vi(y
FB|θi) = UFBi (θi, θ−i|θi) given by equation (2.3) and Vi(yN |θi) = UNi (θi, θ−i|θi)
given by equation (2.4).
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Appendix A: Proof of proposition 2.2
To show the result of proposition 2, it is easier to first rewrite the condition for
Bayesian incentive compatibility. I next combine the new condition for Bayesian
incentive compatibility with the budget-balance and the individual rationality con-
straint.
Bayesian incentive compatibility
A mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if:
Eθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi)] = max
θˆi∈[θ,θ¯]
Eθ−i [Ui(θˆi, θ−i|θi)] (2.18)
where θi is the true type of country i and θˆi is country i’s announcement. Lemma
2.1 states that the direct revelation mechanism y(θ1, θ2) satisfies Bayesian incentive
compatibility if and only if Eθ−i [a
2
i (θi, θ−i)] is weakly increasing in θi and
Eθ−i [U˙i(θi, θ−i|θi)] =
Eθ−i [a
2
i (θi, θ−i)]
2θ2i
(2.19)
Proof First, assume that the mechanism implementing the agreement y = (a1, a2, t1, t2)
is Bayesian incentive compatible. From equation (2.18), we get thatEθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi])
is the maximum of concave functions of θi. It is thus concave, absolutely continuous
and almost everywhere twice differentiable. As a consequence, if a mechanism is
Bayesian incentive compatible, it follows that:
Eθ−i [U˙i(θi, θ−i|θi)] =
Eθ−i [a
2
i (θi, θ−i)]
2θ2i
> 0
Moreover, take θi ≥ θˆi and rewrite the expected indirect utilities for these two
types:
Eθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi)] = Eθ−i
[
ti(θi, θ−i) + bi(ai(θi, θ−i) + a−i(θi, θ−i))− a
2
i (θi, θ−i)
2θi
]
Eθ−i [Ui(θˆi, θ−i|θˆi)] = Eθ−i
[
ti(θˆi, θ−i) + bi(ai(θˆi, θ−i) + a−i(θˆi, θ−i))− a
2
i (θˆi, θ−i)
2θˆi
]
From equation (2.19), we can also write the two following inequalities:
Eθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi)] ≥ Eθ−i
[
ti(θˆi, θ−i) + bi(ai(θˆi, θ−i) + a−i(θˆi, θ−i))− a
2
i (θˆi, θ−i)
2θi
]
Eθ−i [Ui(θˆi, θ−i|θˆi)] ≥ Eθ−i
[
ti(θi, θ−i) + bi(ai(θi, θ−i) + a−i(θi, θ−i))− a
2
i (θi, θ−i)
2θˆi
]
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These two inequalities imply that
Eθ−i [a
2
i (θi, θ−i)]
[
1
2θˆi
− 1
2θi
]
≥ Eθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi)−Ui(θˆi, θ−i|θˆi)] ≥ Eθ−i [a2i (θˆi, θ−i)]
[
1
2θˆi
− 1
2θi
]
(2.20)
which implies Eθ−i [a
2
i (θi, θ−i)] ≥ Eθ−i [a2i (θˆi, θ−i)] for θi ≥ θˆi.
Reciprocally, assume that (2.19) holds and that Eθ−i [a
2
i (θi, θ−i)] is weakly in-
creasing in θi. Then, Eθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi)] can be written as:
Eθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi)] = Eθ−i [Ui(θ, θ−i|θ)] +
∫ θi
θ
Eθ−i [a
2
i (s, θ−i)]
2s2
ds
Thereby for θi ≥ θˆi,
Eθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi)− Ui(θˆi, θ−i|θˆi)] =
∫ θi
θˆi
Eθ−i [a
2
i (s, θ−i)]
2s2
ds
To have incentive compatibility, we need that condition (2.18) is satisfied, which is
equivalent (see first part of the proof) to the inequality (2.20):
Eθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi)] ≥ Eθ−i
[
Ui(θˆi, θ−i|θˆi) + a2i (θˆi, θ−i)
[
1
2θˆi
− 1
2θi
]]
We need to check if
Eθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi)−Ui(θˆi, θ−i|θˆi)] =
∫ θi
θˆi
Eθ−i [a
2
i (s, θ−i)]
2s2
ds ≥ Eθ−i [a2i (θˆi, θ−i)]
[
1
2θˆi
− 1
2θi
]
Or equivalently if ∫ θi
θˆi
Eθ−i [a
2
i (s, θ−i)− a2i (θˆi, θ−i)]
2s2
ds ≥ 0
This is the case since Eθ−i [a
2
i (θi, θ−i)] is weakly increasing in θi. 
Bayesian incentive compatibility, individual rationality and first-best agree-
ment
Now, we delineate the conditions to have a Bayesian incentive compatible and in-
terim individually rational first-best agreement. The first step of the analysis con-
sists in consolidating the Bayesian Incentive compatibility and the budget-balance
constraints. By lemma 2.1, we know that Eθ−i [U˙i(θi, θ−i|θi)] ≥ 0. Therefore, the
indirect expected utility function is increasing in the country’s type θi. Integrating
(2.19) yields:
Eθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi)] = Ui(θ) +
∫ θi
θ
Eθ−i [a
2
i (s, θ−i)]
2s2
ds
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with Ui(θ) = Eθ−i [Ui(θ, θ−i|θ)]. This is the expected utility of country i when
Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. The expected total wel-
fare when Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied for both i is
thus given by:
E[U1(θ1, θ2|θ1)]+U2(θ1, θ2|θ2)]
= U1(θ) + U2(θ) + E
[∫ θ1
θ
Eθ2 [a
2
1(s, θ2)]
2s2
ds+
∫ θ2
θ
Eθ1 [a
2
2(θ1, s)]
2s2
ds
]
(2.21)
Integrating (2.21) by parts, we finally obtain the following expression for the
expected total welfare:
E[U1(θ1, θ2|θ1)+U2(θ1, θ2|θ2)] = U1(θ) + U2(θ)
+
∫ θ¯
θ
(∫ θ1
θ
Eθ2 [a
2
1(s, θ2)]
2s2
ds
)
f(θ1)dθ1 +
∫ θ¯
θ
(∫ θ2
θ
Eθ1 [a
2
2(θ1, s)]
2s2
ds
)
f(θ2)dθ2
(2.22)
where f(θi) = 1/(θ¯ − θ) because of the uniform distribution of types.
The budget-balance constraint requires E[t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2)] = 0.
6 Remember
that the indirect utility function is given by:
Ui(θ1, θ2|θi) = bi(a1(θ1, θ2) + a2(θ1, θ2))− a
2
i (θ1, θ2)
2θi
+ ti(θ1, θ2) (2.23)
Consolidating equations (2.22) and (2.23) using the budget-balance constraint
yields the following equation:
E
[
b1(a1(θ1, θ2) + a2(θ1, θ2))− a
2
1(θ1, θ2)
2θ1
+ b2(a1(θ1, θ2) + a2(θ1, θ2))− a
2
2(θ1, θ2)
2θ2
]
= U1(θ) + U2(θ) +
∫ θ¯
θ
(∫ θ1
θ
Eθ2 [a
2
1(s, θ2)]
2s2
ds
)
f(θ1)dθ1 +
∫ θ¯
θ
(∫ θ2
θ
Eθ1 [a
2
2(θ1, s)]
2s2
ds
)
f(θ2)dθ2
This is the necessary and sufficient condition for budget-balance and Bayesian in-
centive compatibility
Substituting for aFB1 and a
FB
2 , in the previous equation, we get the necessary
and sufficient condition for budget-balance, Bayesian incentive compatibility and
first-best agreement:
U1(θ) + U2(θ) = (b1 + b2)
2θ (2.24)
6Following Bo¨rgers and Norman (2009), if types are independent, for every ex-ante budget-
balanced mechanism, there exists an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism such that the allocation
rule is unchanged and the interim expected payments are unchanged for all agents. Particularly,
for this proof, I use corollary 2.1 of Bo¨rgers and Norman (2009).
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The next step consists in adding the interim individual rationality constraints.
Eθ−i [Ui(θi, θ−i|θi)] ≥ Eθ−i [UNi (θi, θ−i|θi)] =
b2i
2
θi + b1b2E[θ−i] for i = 1, 2 (2.25)
Note that for a mechanism that implements truthfully the first-best abatement level
aFBi the type θ is the critical type since, at this first-best and with incentive com-
patibility,
Eθ−i
[
U˙FBi (θi, θ−i|θi)− U˙Ni (θi, θ−i|θi)
]
=
b2−i
2
+ b1b2 > 0
Which implies that Eθ−i [U
FB
i (θi|θi)− UNi (θi|θi)] is increasing.7
Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for the participation constraint (2.25)
to hold everywhere is that it holds at θ, the lowest type. The expected utility of
the lowest type is noted Ui(θ) = Eθ−i [Ui(θ, θ−i|θ)]. Summing the two individual
rationality constraints (2.25) at the lowest type yields:
U1(θ) + U2(θ) ≥ b
2
1 + b
2
2
2
θ + b1b2 [E(θ2) + E(θ1)] (2.26)
where E(θ2) = E(θ1) = (θ¯ + θ)/2.
Combining (2.24) and (2.26), we get the necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of an ex-post efficient (first-best agreement) mechanism that is individually
rational, Bayesian incentive compatible and budget-balanced:
(b1 + b2)
2θ = U1(θ) + U2(θ) ≥ (b1 + b2)
2
2
θ + b1b2θ¯
This amounts to check:
(b1 + b2)
2θ ≥ (b1 + b2)
2
2
θ + b1b2θ¯
Which is equivalent to condition (2.11) in proposition 2.2. 
Appendix B: Proof of lemma 2.2
The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 2.2. For the case in which θ1 is
public knowledge, the proof is the following. The first step of the analysis consists in
consolidating the budget-balance constraint and the ex-post incentive compatibility
constraint for country 2.
7Optimal contracting under type-dependent reservation utilities has been extensively analyzed
in the literature in the case of a single agent (Lewis and Sappington, 1989 and Jullien, 2000) and
in the case of multiple agents (Carrillo, 1998). Here, due to the convexity of the outside option
and the fact that the distribution of types is uniform, we are in a simple case in which the critical
type is at the bottom of the distribution.
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Using a similar proof as lemma 2.1, it is easy to show that the direct revelation
mechanism y(θ1, θ2) is incentive compatible for country 2 if and only if
U˙2(θ1, θ2|θ2) = a
2
2(θ1, θ2)
2θ22
≥ 0
Integrating this equation yields:
U2(θ1, θ2|θ2) = U2(θ1, θ|θ) +
∫ θ2
θ
a22(θ1, s)
2s2
ds (2.27)
Remember that the indirect utility function is given by:
Ui(θ1, θ2|θi) = bi(a1(θ1, θ2) + a2(θ1, θ2))− a
2
i (θ1, θ2)
2θi
+ ti(θ1, θ2) (2.28)
The budget-balance constraint requires t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2) = 0. Consolidating
the budget-balance constraint and equations (2.27) and (2.28), and replacing a1 and
a2 by their first-best levels a
FB
1 and a
FB
2 yield:
Eθ2 [U1(θ1, θ2) + U2(θ1, θ|θ)] = (b1 + b2)2
[
Eθ2 [θ2] +
θ1
2
− θ¯
2
]
(2.29)
This is the necessary and sufficient condition of existence of a first-best agreement
that is budget-balanced and ex-post incentive compatible for country 2.
The next step consists in adding the individual rationality (or participation)
constraints. We look at the ex-post participation constraint of country 2 and at
the interim participation constraint of country 1 for a fixed type θ1. The interim
participation constraint of country 1 is given by :
Eθ2 [U1(θ1, θ2)] ≥ Eθ2 [UN1 (θ1, θ2)] =
b21
2
θ1 + b1b2Eθ2 [θ2] (2.30)
Using the same type of argument as in proposition 2.2, we can show that θ is
the critical type for the ex-post participation constraint of country 2. Hence, a
necessary and sufficient condition for the participation constraint of country 2 to
hold everywhere is that it holds at θ. Therefore, the ex post participation constraint
of country 2 is given by:
U2(θ1, θ|θ) ≥ UN2 (θ1, θ|θ)
At the first-best abatement levels, summing up both participation constraints yields:
Eθ2 [U1(θ1, θ2) + U2(θ1, θ|θ)] ≥ b1b2(θ1 + Eθ2 [θ2]) +
b21
2
θ1 +
b22
2
θ (2.31)
where Eθ2(θ2) = (θ¯ + θ)/2
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Combining (2.29) and (2.31), we get the necessary and sufficient condition for
incentive compatibility of country 2, individual rationality and budget-balance at
the first-best abatement levels:
(b1 + b2)
2
[
Eθ2 [θ2] +
θ1
2
− θ¯
2
]
≥ b1b2(θ1 + Eθ2 [θ2]) +
b21
2
θ1 +
b22
2
θ
This amounts to check:
θ1 ≥ θ˜1 = b1
b2
(θ¯ − θ)− b
2
1
b22
θ
which is exactly the condition in lemma 2.2. 
Appendix C: Proof of lemma 2.4
Before turning to the proof, I define the expected utilities of countries in stage 1.
In this stage, countries do not know their private type and the expected utility of
country i should be defined over the strategies of each country, si ∈ S:
E[Vi(y(θ1, θ2), s1, s2)]
I want to delineate the conditions under which both countries have simultane-
ously an incentive to reveal their type in stage 1. I thus need to design a mechanism
such that at the first-best abatement levels:
• When the strategy of country 1 is to reveal its type in stage 1 (s1 = C), the
expected utility of country 2 is such that:
E[V2(y(θ1, θ2), C, C)] ≥ E[V2(y′(θ1, θ2), C,NC)] (2.32)
y(θ1, θ2) are the mechanisms implementing the first-best under complete in-
formation (C,C) and y′(θ1, θ2) is any mechanism implementing the first-best
in case of a unilateral action of country 1 only, (C,NC).
• When the strategy of country 2 is to reveal its type in stage 1 (s2 = C), the
expected utility of country 1 is such that:
E[V1(y(θ1, θ2), C, C)] ≥ E[V1(y′′(θ1, θ2), NC,C)] (2.33)
y(θ1, θ2) are the mechanisms implementing the first-best under complete in-
formation (C,C) and y′′(θ1, θ2) is any mechanism implementing the first-best
in case of a unilateral action of country 2 only, (NC,C).
• The budget-balance constraint t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2) = 0 is satisfied.8
8We can use (as in previous proofs) the ex-ante budget-balance constraint (see Bo¨rgers and
Norman, 2009).
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Step 1: Rewriting the ex-ante budget-balance constraint
The ex-ante budget-balance requires that:
E[t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2)] = 0
Using equation (2.1) and replacing a1 and a2 by a
N
1 and a
N
2 , this constraint can
be rewritten as:
E[V1(y(θ1, θ2), s1, s2) + V2(y(θ1, θ2), s1, s2)] = E
[
(b1 + b2)
2
2
(θ1 + θ2)
]
Or equivalently,
E[V1(y(θ1, θ2), s1, s2) + V2(y(θ1, θ2), s1, s2)]
= E
[
b21
2
θ1 + b1b2θ2
]
+ E
[
b22
2
θ2 + b1b2θ1
]
+ E
[
b21
2
θ2 +
b22
2
θ1
]
Step 2: Consider that the strategy of country 1 in stage 1 is to reveal its type
Country 2 will also reveal its type if and only if
E[V2(y(θ1, θ2), C, C)] ≥ E[V2(y′(θ1, θ2), C,NC)]
with
E[V2(y
′(θ1, θ2), C,NC)] = F (θ˜1)
[
b22
2
E[θ2] + b1b2E[θ1|θ1 < θ˜1]
]
+ (1− F (θ˜1))
[
b22
2
E[θ2]− b
2
1
2
E[θ2] + (b
2
2 + b1b2)E[θ1|θ1 ≥ θ˜1]
]
+ (1− F (θ˜1))E[t′2(θ1, θ2)|θ1 ≥ θ˜1]
where t′i(θ1, θ2) is a first-best transfer that is incentive compatible and individually
rational for both i.
Since only country 1 reveals its type, the first-best will be implemented in stage
2, only if country 1 is sufficiently efficient (second term of the right hand side of the
previous equation), i.e. if θ1 > θ˜1, with F (.) the cumulative distribution function
of types. Otherwise, the outside option (first term of the right hand side of the
previous equation) is implemented. Rearranging terms yields:
E[V2(y
′(θ1, θ2), C,NC)] =
[
b22
2
E[θ2] + b1b2E[θ1]
]
+ (1− F (θ˜1))
[
b22Eθ1 [θ1|θ1 ≥ θ˜1]−
b21
2
E[θ2] + E[t
′
2(θ1, θ2)|θ1 ≥ θ˜1]
]
Step 3: Consider that the strategy of country 2 in stage 1 is to reveal its type
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Country 1 will also reveal its type if and only if
E[V1(y(θ1, θ2), C, C)] ≥ E[V1(y′′(θ1, θ2), NC,C)]
with
E[V1(y
′′(θ1, θ2), NC,C)] = F (θ˜2)
[
b21
2
E[θ1] + b1b2E[θ2|θ2 < θ˜2]
]
+ (1− F (θ˜2))
[
b21
2
E[θ1]− b
2
2
2
E[θ1] + (b
2
1 + b1b2)E[θ2|θ2 ≥ θ˜2]
]
+ (1− F (θ˜2))E[t′′1(θ1, θ2)|θ2 ≥ θ˜2]
where t′′i (θ1, θ2) is a first-best transfer that is incentive compatible and individually
rational for both i.
Since only country 2 reveals its type, the first-best will be implemented in stage
2, only if country 2 is sufficiently efficient (second term of the right hand side of the
previous equation), i.e. if θ2 ≥ θ˜2. Otherwise, the outside option (first term of the
right hand side of the previous equation) is implemented. Rearranging terms yields:
E[V1(y
′′(θ1, θ2), NC,C)] =
[
b21
2
E[θ1] + b1b2E[θ2]
]
+ (1− F (θ˜2))
[
b21E[θ2|θ2 ≥ θ˜2]−
b22
2
E[θ1] + E[t
′′
1(θ1, θ2)|θ2 ≥ θ˜2]
]
Step 4: Maximum expected transfers
As shown in steps 2 and 3, both E[V1(y
′′(θ1, θ2), NC,C)] and
E[V2(y
′(θ1, θ2), C,NC)] depend on the transfer obtained under the first-best agree-
ment, if implemented, E[t′′1(θ1, θ2)|θ2 ≥ θ˜2] and E[t′2(θ1, θ2)|θ1 ≥ θ˜1]. We want that
whatever this transfer, country i always prefers to reveal its type, when the other
country is also revealing its type. The maximum expected transfers that each coun-
try can expect when the other country is revealing its type is a transfer such that
it extracts all the gains from reaching the first-best agreement (the other country is
indifferent between the outside option and the first-best agreement):
E[t′′1(θ1, θ2)|θ2 ≥ θ˜2] = E[b21θ2 −
b22
2
θ1|θ2 ≥ θ˜2] (2.34)
E[t′2(θ1, θ2) ≥ θ˜1] = E[b22θ1 −
b21
2
θ2|θ1 ≥ θ˜1] (2.35)
Equations (2.34) and (2.35) give the maximum expected transfer that country i may
require when country i does not act unilaterally while country j acts unilaterally.
The maximum expected utility that each country can reach by staying privately
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informed is then given by:
E[V1(y
′′(θ1, θ2), NC,C)] = E
[
b21
2
θ1 + b1b2θ2
]
+ (1− F (θ˜2))E
[
b21
2
θ2 +
b22
2
θ1|θ2 ≥ θ˜2
]
E[V2(y
′(θ1, θ2), C,NC)] = Eθ1
[
b22
2
θ2 + b1b2θ1
]
+ (1− F (θ˜1))E
[
b22θ1 +
b21
2
θ2|θ1 ≥ θ˜1
]
Step 5: Consolidating steps 1-4
Mechanisms in which both countries optimally reveal their types (si = C for
both i) must satisfy the budget-balance constraints:
E[V1(y(θ1, θ2), C, C) + V2(y(θ1, θ2), C, C]
= E
[
b21
2
θ1 + b1b2θ2
]
+ E
[
b22
2
θ2 + b1b2θ1
]
+ E
[
b21
2
θ2 +
b22
2
θ1
]
Moreover, these mechanisms must be such that:
E[V1(y(θ1, θ2), C, C) + V2(y(θ1, θ2), C, C)]
≥ E[V1(y′′(θ1, θ2), NC,C) + V2(y′(θ1, θ2), C,NC)]
Consolidating these two conditions yields:
E
[
b21
2
θ1 + b1b2θ2
]
+ E
[
b22
2
θ2 + b1b2θ1
]
+ E
[
b21
2
θ2 +
b22
2
θ1
]
≥ E
[
b21
2
θ1 + b1b2θ2
]
+ (1− F (θ˜2))E
[
b21
2
θ2 +
b22
2
θ1
]
+ E
[
b22
2
θ2 + b1b2θ1
]
+ (1− F (θ˜1))E
[
b22θ1 +
b21
2
θ2
]
Which is equivalent to:
E
[
b21
2
θ2 +
b22
2
θ1
]
≥ (1− F (θ˜2))E
[
b21
2
θ2 +
b22
2
θ1
]
+ (1− F (θ˜1))E
[
b22θ1 +
b21
2
θ2
]
Or,
1 ≥ (1− F (θ˜2)) + (1− F (θ˜1))
Replacing θ˜i by its expression (2.13) (see lemma 2.2) yields:
(θ¯ − θ)
θ
≥ (b
2
1 + b
2
2)
2
b1b2(b21 + b
2
2 − b1b2)
= L2
Which is the condition in lemma 2.4. 
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Chapter 3
Measuring the impact of
international agreements on global
CO2 emissions
Joint work with Vincenzo Verardi.1
This paper considers the effect of international air-pollution agreements ratified
since 1970 on carbon dioxide emissions, the main cause of anthropogenic climate
change. The analysis is based on a panel dataset of 150 countries over the period
1970 - 2008. While the literature generally focuses on one particular treaty, we
analyze the effect of many agreements related to air-pollutants, which are linked to
CO2 emissions, using a two-way (country, year) fixed effects model. Agreements
used in our analysis cover three subjects: acid rain, ozone depletion and climate
change. We show that ratifying an additional acid rain treaty has a significant and
negative impact on the level of CO2 emissions even when controlling for the self-
selection bias. Ozone depletion and climate change agreements have a negative but
non significant effect on CO2 emissions. We suggest two interpretations for those
results in terms of: (1) the more local nature of pollutants causing acid rains and (2)
the relative ease to implement acid rain treaties (existence of well identified means
to meet agreements’ objectives).
1This research has received funding from the FRS-FNRS. We thank Estelle Cantillon, Gre´goire
Garsous and Marjorie Gassner for their very helpful comments. We are also indebted to the
CRED Workshop participants, in particular Jean-Marie Baland. We are grateful to Paola Conconi,
Andreas Lange, Patrick Legros and David Martimort for their comments.
79
3.1 Introduction
It has become commonly accepted by both the scientific community and the general
public that climate change is a serious threat. To deal with it, it is obvious that in-
ternational cooperation is essential, due to the transboundary nature of the problem.
Hundreds of press articles have emphasized the failure of the global climate change
agreements negotiated so far, in particular the so-called Kyoto Protocol, that was
defined as a sinking ship by CNN (December 13, 2011). The economic literature is
also very skeptical. Barrett (2003, p.389), for example, states that “Kyoto does not
provide the supporting incentives needed to effect a change in behavior over time”.
Similarly, Bo¨hringer and Vogt (2004) consider that the Kyoto Protocol has been
reduced to a symbolic treaty.
The objective of this paper is to broaden the analysis by considering the effect
of other air-pollutants agreements on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, the main
cause of global warming. The motivation is the following. Many countries are
part of multiple agreements, which may interact with each others because they
concern pollutants that are either released together or are substitutes for each others.
In order to build an optimal climate change policy it is therefore important to
understand the interactions between these other air-pollutants treaties and the level
of CO2 emissions.
In this paper, we estimate the effect of various air-pollution agreements that
contain emission reduction obligations. These treaties cover three subjects. The first
one is climate change and consists of the Kyoto Protocol. The second subject is acid
rain. Indeed, CO2 is released with other air-pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide (SO2)
and nitrous oxide (NOx), in many industrial processes. These two pollutants are
the main causes of acid rains and have a more local nature than CO2. They are the
targets of some international agreements that follow the 1979 Convention On Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution. CO2 emission reductions could thus be a by-
product of SO2 and NOx reductions imposed by those agreements. The last subject
is ozone depletion, which is mainly caused by the release of Chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). They are also
greenhouse gases (and therefore global pollutants) but they are regulated by the
Montreal Protocol, which was motivated by CFCs’ contribution to ozone depletion
rather than by their contribution to global warming. Some of the chemicals that
the industry substituted for CFCs to comply with the Montreal Protocol implied
the release of CO2 emissions.
Identifying the effect of an agreement poses two problems: (1) reverse causality
(or self-selection bias) since countries’ incentives to ratify agreements could depend
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on their emission levels and (2) timing effects of the treaty (i.e. effects may start
early or be bunched at a future date). Multiple agreements add to the identification
challenge because these agreements overlap in time and in terms of signatory coun-
tries. The effect of the treaties will be identifiable if there is sufficient heterogeneity
in terms of the timing and the signatory countries between these agreements.
We deal with the problem of reverse causality by instrumenting the decision to
ratify an air-pollution agreement using proxies for general preferences for universality
and multilateralism that do not affect the level of CO2 emissions directly. We deal
with the timing effects and time and membership overlap issues together. Since
agreements related to the same subject have relatively similar timing and signatory
countries, it is impossible to identify the effect of these agreements individually. This
is why we group these treaties in three categories: acid rain, ozone depletion and
climate change. With this specification, there is sufficient heterogeneity between
agreements categories, so that we are able to identify the effect of each category.
Interestingly, we find that treaties concerning acid rains are the most effective
in reducing CO2 emissions. Climate change and ozone depletion agreements have
negative but non significant effects on these emissions. Two factors may explain
this result. First, SO2 and NOx are more local pollutants, compared to CFCs and
CO2. In some sense, our data confirm the theoretical predictions that the level
of environmental protection in global agreements does not exceed what would be
expected in the absence of any agreement (see Barrett, 1994; Hoel, 1992; Ma¨ler and
de Zeeuw, 1998).2 Intuitively, local agreements imply a higher commitment than
more global agreements: politicians have a greater incentive to set more ambitious
targets for local pollutants (and indirectly for CO2 as a by-product), because the
effects of this pollution are more visible to the voters. This also confirms the results
of Asheim et al. (2006). Using a simple dynamic game-theoretic model, with weakly
renegotiation-proof equilibrium as solution concept, they show that a regime with
two agreements can Pareto dominate a regime based on a single global treaty. They
conclude that regional cooperation might be a good alternative–or supplement–to
global environmental agreements.
Second, pollutants like SO2 can be more easily controlled than CO2: there exist
readily available methods for the control of those pollutants and their efficacy is
well-established. By contrast, the Kyoto protocol has less clear means to achieve its
targets. Acid rain agreements are thus easier to implement. Since carbon reduction
is a byproduct of the standard measures to reduce SO2 and NOx, acid rain treaties
are effective in reducing carbon emissions. Even if ozone depletion treaties are also
2Lange and Vogt (2003) show that a preference for equity may explain more successful interna-
tional environmental agreements but this is not what we observe here.
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well targeted and if there exist well-established methods to reduce CFC emissions,
the same argument does not apply to these agreements because carbon reduction is
not a byproduct of measures to reduce ozone depleting substances.
The approach used in this paper differs from the existing empirical literature on
international environmental agreements (Murdoch and Sandler, 1996; Bratbeg et
al., 2005; Aakvik and Tjøtta, 2011) by considering multiple agreements at the same
time, instead of focusing on a single one. We propose a new identification strategy
to deal with problems of time and membership overlap. We also explicitly deal with
the reverse causality problem, so that our results are robust to the self-selection
bias, which is one of the main issues of the difference-in-difference methods used in
papers studying the effects of international environmental agreements (e.g. Bratbeg
et al., 2005).
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 3.2 describes the data and the
identification strategy. Section 3.3 presents the results for different specifications.
Results are then discussed in section 3.4. Section 3.5 analyzes the sensitivity of our
results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data and identification strategy
The aim of this paper is to study the effect of air-pollution treaties (CO2 specific or
non-CO2 specific) on the level of CO2 emissions. The analysis is based on a panel
dataset of 150 countries over the period 1970 - 2008. We use the following data on
CO2 emissions and air-pollution agreements
3.2.1 CO2 data and air-pollution agreements
Given that anthropogenic climate change is mainly due to the accumulation of CO2
emissions in the atmosphere, we concentrate on this gas. It is the greenhouse
gas (GHG) with the highest greenhouse effect (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report,
2007). Data on CO2 emissions (in kilotons) come from the World Development
Indicator (WDI) Dataset (World Bank, 2012 – http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators).3
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of CO2 emissions over the period 1970-2008 for
the 150 countries included in our sample (light gray curve). From 1970 to 2008,
3These data on CO2 emissions only include CO2 emissions from energy-related sources (ap-
proximately 70 per cent of total anthropogenic CO2 emissions, see Stern, 2006). Also, data do not
take CO2 emissions/removals from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) into account
(IEA, 2010). We will try to control for this in the sensitivity analysis in section 3.5.
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of CO2 emissions
emissions have increased by about 180% for the whole sample. Most of this increase
occurred at the beginning of the 1990s (i.e. after the ratification of some agreements
such as the Montreal or the Helsinki Protocol) and after 2002 (i.e.most countries’
year of Kyoto ratification). The second (black) curve reports emissions for the 75
biggest emitters (those that emit more than 30 000 kt of CO2 in 2008). Over the
period, these countries cover approximately 98% of world emissions. The curve
closely tracks the behavior of world emissions.
Data on air-pollution agreements come from the International Environmental
Agreements Database Project (Version 2012.1). It is a database that lists more than
700 Multilateral Environmental Agreements, with binding environmental commit-
ments (http://iea.uoregon.edu/). It provides for each country a list of the environ-
mental agreements in which the country is involved, with the signature, ratification
and entry into force dates, and when relevant the withdrawal date. A description of
the database is made in Mitchell (2003).
We consider three types of air-pollution issues: acid rain, ozone depletion and
climate change. These are the three main subjects of air-pollution agreements in the
IEA Database. The reason why we include acid rain and ozone depletion treaties,
even if they are not CO2 specific, is the following. On the one hand, acid rains
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are mainly caused by SO2 and NOx emissions of which CO2 is a by-product in
many industrial processes. On the other hand, some of the chemicals that industry
substituted for CFCs (to comply with the ozone layer protection policies) release
CO2 emissions.
Among the treaties pertaining to these three subjects, we only consider agree-
ments that contain emission reduction obligations. Note that the Kyoto Protocol
on climate change divides the member countries into different groups: Annex-I with
greenhouse gas emissions reduction obligations and the Non-Annex-I without emis-
sion reduction obligations. We consider as ratifiers of the Protocol only the countries
that have an emission reduction targets.
Ten treaties that may potentially have an impact on CO2 emissions are included
in our analysis. Four of them concern acid rain problems (the 1985 Helsinki Protocol,
the 1988 Sofia Protocol, the 1994 Oslo Protocol , the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol),
five of them address ozone depleting substances (the Montreal Protocol and the four
follow-up amendments)4 and one agreement is directly related to CO2 emissions (the
Kyoto Protocol). Details on these agreements can be found in table 3.1.
4All the amendments include binding CFC emission reduction targets, they extend the scope
of CFCs subject to these obligations compared to the Montreal Protocol and they are very similar
to the Protocol in their set-up (same dispute settlement, same monitoring system,...). This is why
they are also include in the analysis.
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3.2.2 Identification strategy
In order to identify the effect of an agreement on CO2 emissions, our working hy-
pothesis is that an agreement’s year of ratification in national parliaments marks
the point in time from which on this agreement has an impact on emissions. Rat-
ification is preferred to signature because ratification involves political parties, the
media, and the general public, while the signature of an agreement has no immediate
political relevance.
Ratification is also preferred to entry into force. This choice is in line with other
empirical studies investigating the effects of international environmental agreement
on air pollutants like CFC or SO2. For example, Murdoch and Sandler (1996) find
that signatories reduced their CFC emissions well before the Montreal Protocol’s
entry into force. In any case, considering entry into force rather than ratification
does not change our main results (see section 3.5).
The ten agreements included in our analysis are represented by the dummy vari-
ables Xkit, where k is the reference number of the agreement in Table 3.1. Dummies
are defined as:
Xkit =
{
1 if country i has ratified the agreement k by time t
0 otherwise
With this definition of the variables of interest, what we estimate is the yearly
average effect of a treaty on CO2 emissions from this treaty’s year of ratification.
Figure 3.2 shows the number of ratified air-pollution agreements by country as
a function of GDP per capita. Each country is represented by a bubble, the size of
which represents the level of CO2 emissions. Among the 150 countries of the sample,
there is a lot of heterogeneity in terms of ratification behavior.
European countries (centered around Germany in Figure 3.2) are the ones that
have ratified the largest number of agreements. The gap in the number of ratifica-
tions between the United States (US) and Europe has increased sharply since 1995.
Figure 3.2 also shows that both Europe and the US have reduced their emissions be-
tween 1995 and 2008. China’s emissions have increased sharply during this period,
while the number of agreements ratified by this country remained low. In 2008, the
two biggest polluters were China and the US (i.e. they account for approximately
40% of total world emissions in 2008). These two biggest polluters are not the
countries that have ratified the largest number of agreements.
One might believe that it is because European countries have ratified many agree-
ments that they were able to reduce their emissions. However, this does not account
for the fact that the changes in the emission behavior can be due to spuriousness: it
is still not clear whether this first evidence is due to the ratification of air-pollution
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Figure 3.2: Ratification and CO2 emissions as functions of GDP per capita
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agreements, or whether other variables that can explain the emission behavior of the
ratifiers exist. Spuriousness can be checked for by making use of control variables.
Additionally to confounding effects, we need to deal with three problems when
identifying the effect of multiple agreements : (1) time and membership overlap (is
there sufficient variation among the agreements considered in the analysis in terms
of timing and signatory countries), (2) reverse causality (or self-selection bias) since
countries’ incentives to ratify treaties could depend on their emission levels and (3)
timing effect (the effect of an agreement does not necessarily occur immediately
after its ratification). We detail below how we overcome these issues.
Controlling for confounding effects
To control for confounding effects, we use a set of control variables. Data are
available from the WDI Database (World Bank, 2012) and the Polity IV Databse
(http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/). The first economic factor that we in-
clude as a control variable is Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The GDP data are
reported in constant 2000 US dollars. We expect a significant positive relationship
between GDP and emissions. The intuition is simple: a higher economic activity
induces, ceteris paribus, a higher level of pollution due to increased resource use and
waste generation (Panayotou, 1997; Stern, 2002).5 We also include the GDP growth
rate to account for the short term variations in the economic activity (business cy-
cles). Indeed, following van Vuuren and Riahi (2008), economic growth is expected
to have two effects on CO2 emissions: on the one hand, it increases energy demand
and, on the other, it improves energy efficiency.
We control for trade openness. Following the international trade literature (see
for example Copeland and Taylor, 2004), trade openness is assumed to affect the level
of CO2 emissions in two different ways: (i) increased trade may result in increased
CO2 emissions due to increased economic activity, (ii) increased trade may result
in reduced CO2 emission because countries face greater competitive pressure and
become more efficient in resource use (Cole, 2004). We define trade openness as the
sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by GDP.
Next, we control for the total population given that population size may con-
tribute to CO2 emissions through increased energy demand from the power, industry
or transport sectors (see Li and Reuveny, 2006; Shi, 2002). Since the composition of
the economic activity may also influence the level of CO2 emissions (see Stern, 2002),
5The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is a discussed theory which hypothesizes an inverse-
U shaped relationship between a country’s per capita income and its level of environmental quality
(Galeotti et al., 2006; Friedl and Getzner, 2003). We test the EKC hypothesis by assuming a
quadratic functional form for GDP in our specification but the main results remain unchanged.
89
we include the shares of agricultural and industrial productions in GDP. Indeed, in-
dustrial and agricultural sectors are more resource-intensive than the tertiary sector.
Our last control is Democracy indicator from Polity IV Database, which measures
country’s political orientation (autocracy/democracy). It is an additive eleven-point
scale (0-10), zero being the worst situation for democracy.6
Table 3.8 in appendix A presents some summary statistics for these control
variables.
Time and membership overlap
To correctly identify the effect of the ten agreements included in the analysis, there
must be sufficient heterogeneity in terms of the timing of the agreements and in
terms of the ratifying countries. First, Table 3.2 reports for the year 2008 (the last
year of our sample) the correlations between the ratification dummies Xk. It is an
indication of the membership overlap in our data.
6Variation across time for the three last controls is relatively low but there is sufficient variation
across the 150 countries of our panel to identify the effect of those variables.
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For the same issue, heterogeneity in terms of countries’ membership among agree-
ments is low. This can be explained by the design of the treaties considered. In
chapter 2 of this thesis, we highlight the fact that international cooperation follows a
particular pattern. Countries first agree on an umbrella convention, such as the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Trans-boundary Air-Pollution (LRTAP) or the 1985 Vi-
enna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. These conventions do not
impose any emission reduction targets but provide for the establishment of institu-
tions entitled to negotiate all subsequent protocols and amendments. Agreements in
the same category are thus related. For the ozone depletion issue, the main treaty
is the Montreal Protocol, which has been followed by four amendments. Ratifica-
tion of an amendment implies the ratification of the Montreal Protocol. Acid rain
protocols were all negotiated under the auspices of the 1979 Convention on LRTAP.
To deal with this membership overlap within an air-pollution issue, we group
agreements in categories: (1) acid rain (the four agreements following the LRTAP
Convention), represented by the variable LRTAP , (2) ozone depletion (the Mon-
treal Protocol and the four amendments), represented by the variable Ozone and
(3) climate change (the Kyoto Protocol), with the variable Kyoto. Due to their
patterns of development, it is likely to assume that within a category, the effects of
agreements are the same. Our three variables of interest are thus given by:
LRTAPit = X
2989
it +X
3186
it +X
3036
it +X
3311
it
Ozoneit = X
3021
it +X
3071
it +X
3144
it +X
3267
it +X
3312
it
Kyotoit =

1 if country i has ratified the Kyoto Protocol at time t
and has an emission reduction target
0 otherwise
Table 3.3: Correlation matrix for the three air-pollution categories
Kyoto LRTAP Ozone
Kyoto 1.00
LRTAP 0.83 1.00
Ozone 0.22 0.21 1.00
Table 3.3 reports for the year 2008 the correlations between the three categories
of agreements. For ozone depletion, the membership overlap with the two other
categories is relatively low, while it is still very high between acid rain agreements
and the Kyoto Protocol (correlation is 0.83). However, if there is enough variations
in the timing of these agreements, it will still be possible to identify the effects of
the Kyoto Protocol and the acid rain treaties.
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To study the timing of agreements, we refer to Table 3.1. Acid rain agreements
have been ratified since the end of the 1980s, while ratifications of the Kyoto Protocol
mainly occur in 2002. The two first acid rain agreements (the 1985 Helsinki Protocol
and the 1988 Sofia Protocol) have been ratified by more than 70% of the total
number of ratifiers before 1993. The time overlap between acid rain agreements and
the Kyoto Protocol is thus only particularly problematic for the two last acid rain
treaties: the 1994 Oslo Protocol (first ratifications in 1998) and the 1999 Gothenburg
Protocol (first ratifications in 2005). By grouping acid rain agreements, we can
reduce this problem of time overlap with the Kyoto Protocol.
By looking at Table 3.1, we can also note that the time overlap between acid rains
and ozone depletion agreements is quite substantial. The first years of ratifications
in both categories are very close to each others. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier,
the membership overlap between these two categories of agreements is relatively
small, so that the identification of the effects of these treaties should not be an
issue.
Timing effects
To analyze the timing effects issue, we refer to Table 3.4, which presents the dates
at which emission targets included in agreements should be met.
It is possible that the effect of an agreement does not occur immediately af-
ter its ratification, i.e. implementing domestic mitigation policies may take time.
Moreover, as shown in Table 3.4, treaties generally foresee a schedule for emission
reductions. Since our sample ends in 2008, we may fail to identify correctly the
effect of some recent treaties, e.g. the Kyoto Protocol or the Gothenburg Protocol.
Bunching acid rain and ozone depletion agreements should allow us to deal with
this problem, as the targets of the first agreements in both categories should be met
before 2000.
The major issue is the identification of the Kyoto Protocol. There exists some
anecdotal evidence that countries have engaged in a lot of policy initiatives after
the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (and thus do not wait the compliance period
to reduce their emissions).7 This tends to show that we should be able to identify
(even imperfectly) the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on CO2 emissions. An example
of such evidence is also given in chapter 1 of this thesis: as part of the strategy of
the European Union to meet its Kyoto targets, the Commission launched in 2005
the European Emission Trading System (EU ETS). In chapter 1, we show that this
initiative has yielded some emission reductions before 2008 despite a problem of
7See data displayed on www.lowcarboneconomy.com/Low Carbon World/Data/View/12.
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permits over-allocation.
Table 3.4: Dates of implementation for the ten agreements
Targets should be met
Acid rain
1985 Helsinki before 1993
1988 Sofia before 1996
1994 Oslo before 2004
1999 Gothenburg cap for 2010
Ozone Depletion
1987 Montreal during the 1990s
1990 Amendement from 1997
1992 Amendement from 2004
1997 Amendement from 2000
1999 Amendement from 2001
Climate change
1997 Kyoto during 2008-2012
Dealing with reverse causality
A reverse causality between the ratified agreements and CO2 emissions may also
explain the stylized facts of Figure 3.2. It is precisely because they are not the
biggest polluters that European countries participate in many agreements (as they
do not pollute much, it is not very costly for them to ratify many agreements). China
and the US, on the other hand, are reluctant to ratify more agreements because this
would be very costly in terms of emission reductions.
The IV approach solves this selection bias, or reverse causality, problem by ex-
ploiting the exogenous variation in an instrumental variable that is correlated with
the endogenous variable of interest. When the IV strategy is valid, it allows causal
inference. The crucial assumptions are that the instrument is neither related with
the dependent variable nor the error term (for example omitted variables), i.e. the
instrument is independent of the dependent variable; but highly correlated with
the endogenous variable. We need to instrument our three variables of interest:
LRTAP , Kyoto and Ozone. To this end, we use four instruments detailed below.8
First, environmental agreements considered in this analysis are multilateral pol-
icy initiatives. Ratification behavior may among others be explained by a preference
8In order to test the exclusion restriction using Hansen/Sargan, we over-identify our model (i.e.
we include more instruments than potentially endogenous variables).
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for these multilateral policy initiatives. As a proxy for such preferences, we use the
membership in human rights treaties. We consider two different treaties related to
Human Rights. On the one hand, following Aichele and Felbermayr (2012), we pro-
pose countries’ membership at the International Criminal Court (ICCit, a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if a country i has ratified the Rome Statute by time
t). The ICC is a permanent tribunal to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The ICC is a multilat-
eral policy initiative. The Rome Statute governing the ICC was signed in 1998 (i.e.
roughly at the same time as the Kyoto Protocol) and ratified, until now, by 122
countries. On the other hand, we use countries’ membership to the International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (New York, December 1979). ICATHit
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when country i has ratified the Convention
by time t. Ratifications of this Convention began in the 1980s, roughly at the same
time as the ratifications of the first air-pollution agreements. Data on ratifications
come from the United Nation Treaty Collection (chapter IV on Human Rights -
http://treaties.un.org).
Second, increasingly, International Relations scholars recognize that social net-
works create and/or strengthen relationships between states, which in turn affect
international cooperation. For example, Bernauer et al. (2010) show that interna-
tional factors, i.e. the participation in international organizations, have a stronger
and more positive impact on cooperative behavior in environmental agreements than
domestic factors. Additionally, von Stein (2008) differentiates international organi-
zations related to environment and others and examines their effect on the ratifica-
tion of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and
the Kyoto Protocol. He shows that both have an impact on the ratification behavior.
Following von Stein (2008), our last two instruments are thus other environmental
agreements (integration in the environmental network) and WTO’s membership
(integration in the world economy). For the other environmental treaties variable,
ENVit, we use the total number of treaties concerning habitat conservation, marine
pollution, fishery or protection of species (issues not related to air-pollution) that
country i has ratified up to period t (IEA Database). The WTO’s membership vari-
able WTOit is a dummy taking the value 1 if a country i is a member of the WTO
at time t (http://www.wto.org).
Our identifying assumptions are that (1) these instruments do not affect the
level of CO2 emissions directly, so that the instruments can be excluded from our
second-stage regression, and (2) they are not caused by the level of CO2 emissions.
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3.3 Results
Table 3.5 presents our benchmark results. In all regressions, the dependent variable
is the log of CO2 emissions. Table 3.5 reports the results when the agreements are
grouped in three categories (acid rain, ozone depletion and climate change) for dif-
ferent specifications (OLS, IV and auto-regressive model). All regressions cover the
period 1970-2008 and a sample of 150 countries. All the specifications are estimated
using a standard panel two-way fixed effects estimator. To control for heteroskedas-
ticity and within country serial correlation, standard errors are estimated using the
Huber-White sandwich estimator, clustered at the country level. In the last part of
this section, we discuss how to deal with the problem of carbon leakage.
3.3.1 OLS estimates
We first estimate the following equation:
log(CO2)it = αi+ δt+β1Kyotoit−1 +β2LRTAPit−1 +β3Ozoneit−1 +Zitγ+εit (3.1)
This is our basic specification where i denotes the country and t the year. Variables
are defined as follows. log(CO2)it is the log of CO2 emissions of country i in year t (in
kilotons). αi is the country fixed effect, δt is the time fixed effect. These fixed effects
control for unobservable country-heterogeneity and common time-varying effects
that could affect emissions. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is needed to
capture factors such as country specific technology, regulation, ideology.
The variables of interest, Kyoto, LRTAP and Ozone, are the agreements cate-
gories that may potentially have an effect on CO2 emissions. They are considered
with one year lag in equation (3.1) to respect the timing of events (agreements are
not systematically ratified on the first of January).The coefficients of interest are the
βk. Each βk represents the yearly average effect of agreement k on country i’s emis-
sions. We expect this coefficient to be negative and significantly different from zero:
emissions of country i are reduced each year by βk% compared to business-as-usual
emissions after the ratification of agreement k by this country.
Results in column 1 of Table 3.5 show that agreements restricting CO2 emissions
directly, such as the Kyoto Protocol, and those addressing other greenhouse gases,
such as the Montreal Protocol, have no significant impact on CO2 emissions. By
contrast, agreements related to acid rains have a significant negative impact: each
additional ratified agreement is associated with an annual reduction of CO2 emis-
sions of approximately 6.3%. Results in column 1 thus show that, even if they are
not directly targeted towards CO2 emissions, treaties concerning acid rains are the
most effective in reducing those emissions.
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The quality of the fit is rather good, since the within R-square is at least 0.66.9
Most control variables have the expected sign. A higher GDP level and a bigger pop-
ulation are associated with higher CO2 emissions. The GDP growth rate coefficient
has a negative sign, indicating that energy efficiency improvements seem to offset
increases in energy consumption during periods of economic growth. The coefficient
of trade openness is positive but not significant. Both the shares of agricultural and
industrial productions imply an increase of CO2 emissions, but only the industrial
production has a significant impact. Democracy has no significant effect on CO2
emissions.
3.3.2 IV estimates
The regression in column 1 in Table 3.5 assumes that the error term is uncorrelated
with the three variables of interest. As explained before, this is unlikely to be true:
countries expecting a downward trend on their emissions may be particularly willing
to participate to environmental agreements, especially to the Kyoto Protocol, so that
OLS estimates will be biased away from zero. We therefore instrument our three
variables of interest and estimate the following first-stage equation:
Yit = α˜i + δ˜t + Vitψ + Zitθ + uit (3.2)
where Yit ∈ {Kyotoit, LRTAPit, Ozoneit}, α˜i and δ˜t are country and year fixed
effects, Vit = [ICCit, ICATHit, ENVit,WTOit]
′ is the vector of instruments. The
vector Zit contains other potential variables that may play a role for explaining the
ratification behavior of countries (i.e. the control variables described above). Next,
using the outcomes of this first-stage equation, we estimate equation (3.1).
Column 2 in Table 3.5 reports the results for the instrumented variables of inter-
est. Compared to the OLS estimates presented in column 1, the IV estimates yield
very similar results.
For this regression, we also report the results of some tests in Table 3.6 to check
the validity of our IV strategy. Instruments are quite strong. Indeed, we are sure at
95% that the maximal bias associated to the coefficient of interest is less than 5% of
the OLS bias (weak identification test).10 From the under-identification test, we can
conclude that the first-stage equations are identified, i.e. the excluded instruments
9The reported within R-square is an ordinary R-square abstracting from the fixed effect: it is
the fraction of the variance explained by the model inside a country.
10Even if the Cragg-Donald Wald F Statistics is much higher than the Kleibergen-Paap rank
Wald F statistic, the use of the Kleibergen-Paap statistic is more appropriate. It generalizes the
Cragg-Donald statistic to the case of non-i.i.d. errors, allowing for heteroskedasticity, autocorrela-
tion and/or cluster robust statistics.
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Table 3.5: Estimating the effect of an agreement’s ratification on CO2 emissions.
Dependent Variable: log(CO2)
OLS IV AR(1) - ST AR(1) - LT
Kyoto (t-1) -0.018 -0.022 -0.002 -0.010
(0.041) (0.040) (0.008) (0.040)
Acidrain (t-1) -0.063** -0.067*** -0.018*** -0.085***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.005) (0.025)
Ozone (t-1) -0.016 -0.017 -0.003 -0.013
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.017)
log(GDP) (t) 0.939*** 0.913*** 0.187*** 0.906***
(0.108) (0.109) (0.029) (0.118)
log(Population) (t) 0.513*** 0.505*** 0.025 0.121
(0.192) (0.187) (0.046) (0.211)
log(Openess) (t) 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.112
(0.056) (0.057) (0.014) (0.069)
GDP Growth Rate (t) -0.707*** -0.706*** 0.308*** 1.492***
(0.153) (0.155) (0.080) (0.374)
log(Prop. Agriculture) (t) 0.100 0.100 0.033 0.162
(0.086) (0.003) (0.019) (0.095)
log(Prop. Industry) (t) 0.314*** 0.326*** 0.086*** 0.416***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.023) (0.121)
Democracy (t) 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.010*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006)
log(CO2) 0.794***
(0.016)
Observations 4,275 4,275 4,253 4,253
Within R-squared 0.663 0.660 0.904 0.904
Number of countries 150 150 150 150
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.6: IV Statistics.
Under-identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 40.873
Chi-sq(4) p-value 0.000
Weak identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 22.242
Critical value at 5%∗ 5% maximal IV relative bias 16.85
Over-identification test Hansen J statistic 2.849
Chi-sq(3) p-value 0.4155
*Note: Critical values for the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic
(ICC, ICATH, ENV and WTO) are relevant (correlated with the endogenous
regressors). The joint null hypothesis of the over-identification test, i.e. that the
instruments are valid instruments, is not rejected. Instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the
estimated second-stage equation.
3.3.3 Dynamic Model
The previous specifications are in some sense static. Due to the substantial inertia
of some of our variables (GDP or CO2, for example), it is plausible to assume that
this year’s CO2 emissions are dependent on the CO2 emissions of previous years. A
lagged dependent variable has been suggested by several scholars to model dynamic
relationships:
log(CO2)it = αi+δt+ρ.log(CO2)it−1+β1Kyotoit−1+β2LRTAPit−1+β3Ozoneit−1+Zitγ+εit
(3.3)
ρ is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. Coefficients of the explana-
tory variables, βj (for j = 1, 2, 3) and γ, have a different interpretation compared
to the previous basic static specification. They are the estimated responses of CO2
emissions to changes in the explanatory variables, after controlling for the response
for the previous years. These coefficients βj (for j = 1, 2, 3) and γ are the short-term
effects of explanatory variables on CO2 emissions.
Long-term coefficients (βLTj and γ
LT ) represent the cumulative effects of ex-
planatory variables on CO2 emissions in the long run. They are computed using the
following formula:
βLTj =
βj
1− ρ ; γLT =
γ
1− ρ
In such dynamic models, the estimated coefficients may be biased, as in the
static specification (e.g. omitted variables or reverse causality). Since the order of
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the bias is 1/T , where T is the number of periods, and since we can rely on 29
years per country on average, the bias should be very small. When we estimate the
size of the bias (see Bruno, 2005), we find that the bias associated to the long-term
coefficients of the variables of interest is only 0.001. We therefore exclusively focus
on the standard fixed effects model with an auto-regressive term.
Results for the dynamic model are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.5.
Estimations of the short-term coefficients of the explanatory variables and of the
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (i.e. ρ) are reported in column 3. The
long-term coefficients of the explanatory variables are reported in column 4. Results
in column 3 suggest a strong inertia in CO2 emissions since the estimated coefficient
of the lagged dependent variable is ρˆ = 0.794.
The negative and significant effect of the ratification of an acid rain agreement
remains. This effect is -0.018 in the short run and -0.085 in the long run (the
cumulative effect), both statistically significant at the level of 1%. This long-term
coefficient is slightly higher than the coefficient in the static specification (column
1). We can also compute that after 9 years, an acid rain agreement has delivered
90% of its long-term effect (i.e. 0.077).
For the control variables, the long-term coefficients have generally the same sign
as in the static specifications. The only big difference concerns the coefficient of
the GDP growth rate. However, the interpretation of this variable in the dynamic
model is very different from its interpretation in the static model (the accumulation
of short-term economic growth rate) and is quite fuzzy. We do not concentrate on
it as it is out of the scope of the paper.
3.3.4 Dealing with carbon leakage
Finally, we need to figure out that what we pin down is an aggregate effect and not
simply carbon leakage (a redistribution of the emissions across signatory and non
signatory countries). Indeed, what we measure with the agreements dummies is the
difference between the emissions of a ratifying country and a non ratifying country.
As ozone depletion agreements have been ratified by nearly all countries in our
sample, we can assume that they will not induce carbon leakage. To study a potential
carbon leakage effect for acid rain treaties and the Kyoto Protocol, we proceed as
follows. We reduce our sample to include only the countries that did not ratify any
of the acid rain agreements, nor the Kyoto Protocol. On this sample, we estimate
the following model:
log(CO2)it = αi + δt + λ1Kyotot + λ2LRTAPt + Zitγ + εit (3.4)
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where Kyotot is a dummy taking the value 1 from 2002 (year during which most
of the ratifications of this Protocol occurred) until 2008 and LRTAPt is the sum of
acid rain agreements dummies; each of them takes the value 1 from the first year of
ratification of an acid rain agreement until 2008. These are the years during which
carbon leakage could occur.
These two variables, Kyotot and LRTAPt, capture the impact of the arrival of
a new air-pollution agreement on CO2 emissions of countries that did not ratify
this agreement, controlling for confounding effects, such as economic growth, GDP,
population,... To test for the sensibility of this variable, we exclude from our sample
the smallest emitters (i.e. those that emit less than 30 Mt CO2). We have seen in
Figure 3.2 that China (which is one of the biggest emitters that did not ratify acid
rain agreements and had no reduction target in the Kyoto Protocol) substantially
increases its CO2 emissions between 1970 and 2008. This increase in Chinese CO2
emissions is due to the strong economic growth of this country but may also be
partially due to a relocation of polluting productions from European countries to
China, following the ratification of new agreements by Europeans.
In all cases, Table 3.7 shows that there does not seem to exist an impact of the
arrival of a new acid rain agreement on CO2 emissions of non ratifiers. For the
Kyoto Protocol, we estimate that on average, non-ratifiers reduce significantly (at
the level of 1%) their CO2 emissions after ratification. This effect turns out to be
non significant when considering only the biggest emitters. The same results hold if
we use the official date of entry into force of each agreement instead of ratification
dates.
This method is however imperfect and it does not allow to estimate the size of
the carbon leakage effect. It is possible that some carbon leakage occurs but has
been compensated by emission reductions in other non-ratifier countries. We just
estimate that, on average, non-ratifiers reduce their CO2 emissions (after controlling
for other confounding effects) after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and
the acid rain agreements. This indicates that carbon leakage should not totally
invalidate our results.
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Table 3.7: Carbon leakage
Dependent Variable: log(CO2)
Whole Biggest
Sample Emitters
Kyoto (t) -0.116*** -0.122
(0.040) (0.078)
LRTAP (t) -0.039 -0.024
(0.038) (0.080)
log(GDP) (t) 0.971*** 0.730***
(0.120) (0.117)
log(Population) (t) 0.413*** 0.941***
(0.222) (0.339)
log(Openess) (t) 0.025 0.078
(0.062) (0.053)
GDP Growth Rate (t) -0.669*** -0.525**
(0.166) (0.234)
log(Prop. Agriculture) (t) 0.127 0.133
(0.099) (0.131)
log(Prop. Industry) (t) 0.312*** 0.360**
(0.102) (0.135)
Democracy (t) 0.006 0.010
(0.006) (0.007)
Observations 3,242 1,125
Within R-squared 0.667 0.875
Number of countries 114 37
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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3.4 Interpretation of the results and policy impli-
cations
The result that acid rain agreements are more effective than the Kyoto Protocol in
reducing CO2 emissions has two possible interpretations. First, pollutants covered
by acid rain agreements (SO2 and NOx) are more local pollutants than greenhouse
gases, such as CO2 or CFCs. Agreements on local pollutants are easier to reach
because they imply less countries and the environmental effects of these pollutants
are more visible. These more visible effects imply a higher commitment by national
politicians. They are more willing to enforce the international agreement and they
accept to implement more ambitious targets. Our findings thus confirm the results
of Asheim et al. (2006) who show that a regime with two regional agreements can
Pareto dominate a regime based on a single global treaty because it attracts more
participation than the global treaty.
Second, those pollutants can be more easily controlled than CO2 emissions. In-
deed, the instruments available to limit SO2 emissions are pretty clear. They can be
controlled by altering the techniques of production in three ways: by the process of
flue gas desulphurization (adding scrubbers to flue stacks), by altering the combus-
tion process of fuels, and by a change to lower sulfur content fuels. Readily available
(although sometimes costly) methods for the control of emissions exist and their ef-
ficacy is well established. Acid rain agreements thus consists of clearer targets and
well identified means to meet these targets, compared to the Kyoto protocol. The
relatively ease of implementation of acid rain treaties means that they are effectively
implemented. Since carbon reduction is a byproduct of the standard measures to
reduce acid rains, acid rain treaties are effective in reducing carbon emissions.
This last point has been also raised in Barrett (2003) to explain the failure of the
Kyoto Protocol in changing the behavior of signatory countries, compared to the
Montreal Protocol that led to a substantial reduction in the use of CFCs worldwide.
Barrett (2003) explains that one of the main reason for this difference in terms of
achievements is that the substitution of ozone-depleting chemicals is much easier and
less costly than CO2 emission reductions. Despite the fact that these treaties are
well targeted and that well identified means to reduce CFCs exist, ozone depletion
agreements have no significant impact on CO2 emissions. Carbon reduction is not
a byproduct of measures to reduce ozone depletion. The reverse is even true: some
chemicals substituted to CFCs in order to meet Montreal emission reduction targets
release CO2 emissions.
In terms of policy implications, these results suggest that what matters is not the
fact that there is an agreement but rather the nature (local or global) and the content
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of this agreement. As suggested by Asheim et al. (2006), regional cooperation may
be a supplement to global treaties but policy makers have to be careful about carbon
leakage. For example, the Montreal Protocol bans trade between signatory and non-
signatory in the substances controlled by the treaty (see Barrett, 2003). Moreover,
it is important that the treaty is well focused and proposes well identified means to
achieve the targets imposed in the agreement.
Remark 3.1 : The timing effect
Another reason to explain the success of acid rain agreements compared to climate
change agreements is the timing of the latter. The climate change agreements have
begun in 1992 with the UNFCCC and the majority of countries ratify the Kyoto
Protocol around the year 2002. Since this treaty is one of the most recent, maybe all
the countries do not totally adapted their behavior, despite the anecdotal evidence
of various policy initiatives before 2008. Indeed, the emission reduction obligations
imposed by the Kyoto Protocol had to be met for 2012. To address this problem,
we consider a time period from 1970 to 2000 and analyze the effect of acid rain
agreements. Indeed, most of these agreements have been ratified at the end of the
1980s and in the 1990s (see Table 3.1). The negative and significant effect of acid
rain agreements on CO2 emissions remains (it is even reinforced since the coefficient
is now -0.085 and is significant at the level of 1%).
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we test the robustness of our benchmark results. Details of these
robustness checks can be found in appendix B. They are summarized below.
First, we test whether our benchmark results are not driven by a particular
sub-sample of countries (poor countries, non-EU countries, without China,...). The
thrust of our argument continues to hold: acid rain agreements are the most effective
in reducing CO2 emissions.
Second, as mentioned in section 3.2, the data on CO2 emissions do not take
emissions/removals from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) into
account. The data used in this paper are thus gross CO2 emissions. However, there
are examples of countries, such as Russia or Brazil, that have reduced their gross
CO2 emissions and at the same time have destroyed substantial parts of their forest
area, thereby increasing their net CO2 emissions. In this case, emission reductions
are over-estimated in the basic model since the destruction of forests, which are
carbon sinks, increases the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere. To account for this ef-
fect, the sample of countries is divided into two sub-samples: countries that are not
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concerned by this problem of massive deforestation and those concerned by defor-
estation (information comes from http://www.grida.no). In countries not concerned
by deforestation, the gross CO2 emissions (our data) should be very similar to net
emissions. We find that the effect of the Kyoto Protocol and the ozone depletion
agreements remains roughly unchanged. The effect of acid rain agreements is slightly
smaller than in the basic specification but still negative and statistically significant.
Third, we also consider a different definition of our variables of interest: an air-
pollution agreement starts to matter after the treaty’s entry into force. This does
not change our results.
3.6 Conclusion
Our opening question was whether air-pollution agreements may be part of the
solution to the climate change problem. Our analysis of the effect of ten legally
binding air-pollution agreements ratified since 1970 shows that the answer to this
question is yes but not for all types of agreements. Only acid rain agreements have
a statistically significant negative impact on CO2 emissions. Climate change and
ozone depletion treaties have negative but non-significant effects on those emissions.
We deal with three issues pertaining to the identification of the effect of multiple
agreements: (1) reverse causality, (2) timing effects and (3) time and membership
overlap between treaties.
Our result may be explained in two ways. First, the methods to implement emis-
sion reduction obligations imposed by acid rain agreements are well-identified and
relatively easy to implement, which is not the case for the Kyoto Protocol. Second,
air-pollutants causing acid rains (i.e. SO2 and NOx) are more local pollutants than
CO2.
This analysis has emphasized that there exist interactions between non-CO2 spe-
cific agreements and the level of CO2 emission. When designing an international
climate change policy it is therefore important to take these interactions into ac-
count. Our study also highlights the fact that the existence of an agreement is not
enough. The nature of this agreement and its content matter for its effectiveness in
reducing polluting emissions.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Table 3.8: descriptive statistics for the control variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
log(GDP) 6800 22.925 2.380 16.148 30.088
log(Population) 8444 14.941 2.336 8.636 21.015
log(Openess) 6283 4.211 0.653 -1.707 6.100
GDP Growth Rate 6710 0.034 0.062 -0.714 0.724
log (Prop. Agriculture) 5788 2.429 1.149 -3.314 4.543
log(Prop. Industry) 5822 3.310 0.444 0.632 4.561
Democracy 5648 4.268 4.176 0 10
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Appendix B: sensitivity analysis
Sub-samples of countries
In our initial sample, there are 150 countries. It is possible that a subset of countries
drives the results reported in Table 3.5. To test for this, several sub-samples of
countries are considered. Results are presented in Tables 3.9 and 3.10.
In the first and second columns of Table 3.9, two sub-samples of countries are
considered: rich and poor countries. A country is considered as being poor if its
GDP per capita is below the average GDP per capita of Mexico over the period
(approximately 4612 in constant 2000 US dollars). Next, we consider only rich
countries in which the population exceeds 7 million. In these three sub-samples,
results for acid rain and ozone depletion agreements remain unchanged: acid rain
agreements still have a negative and significant impact on CO2 emissions, while
ozone depletion treaties have no significant impact on those emissions. For the Kyoto
Protocol, results change compared to those with the whole sample. It appears that
poor countries reduce their emissions after the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
(the effect is statistically significant at the level of 1%), while rich countries (and
especially rich countries with a large population) have increased their emissions
after the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. This may illustrate the fact it is less
costly to reduce CO2 emissions in less developed countries than in rich industrialized
countries.
Finally, in the last two columns, we deal with the problem of net CO2 emission
reductions. In countries not concerned by deforestation, the gross CO2 emissions
(our data) should be very similar to net emissions. The coefficient of the variable
of interest for those countries should thus not be affected by the fact that we do
not take into account removals from LULUCF. Column 4 displays that the effect of
the Kyoto Protocol and the ozone depletion agreements remains roughly unchanged.
The effect of acid rain agreements is slightly smaller than in the basic specification
but still negative and statistically significant. Comparing the coefficients of the
variables of interest in the two last columns shows that countries suffering from
deforestation reduce their gross CO2 emissions more intensively than countries that
do not suffer from deforestation after the ratification of an acid rain agreement. The
opposite holds for ozone depletion agreements and for the Kyoto Protocol.
In the first column of Table 3.10, we test whether the results of a negative
and significant effect of acid rain agreements on CO2 emissions are driven by EU
countries. Indeed, as shown in the stylized facts, European countries have ratified
the largest number of agreements and at the same time have reduced their emissions
substantially. The coefficient of the variable LRTAP is a little bit smaller than in
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Table 3.9: Sensitivity of the model to changes in the sample
Rich Poor Rich & Big Deforestation
Countries Countries Countries NO YES
Kyoto (t-1) 0.084 -0.181*** 0.132*** -0.027 0.000
(0.064) (0.050) (0.039) (0.049) (0.070)
LRTAP (t-1) -0.084*** -0.063* -0.061*** -0.054* -0.077*
(0.026) (0.037) (0.017) (0.030) (0.040)
Ozone (t-1) 0.015 -0.022 -0.031 -0.019 0.007
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.050)
log(GDP) (t) 0.582*** 0.965*** 0.979*** 0.912*** 1.120***
(0.147) (0.123) (0.281) (0.116) (0.114)
log(Population) (t) 0.812** 0.479** 0.748*** 0.602*** -0.098
(0.362) (0.233) (0.278) (0.212) (0.278)
log(Openess) (t) -0.110* 0.032 0.106 0.006 0.248**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.045) (0.061) (0.092)
GDP Growth Rate (t) -0.301 -0.739*** -0.633** -0.667*** -0.645**
(0.235) (0.176) (0.323) (0.164) (0.270)
log(Prop. Agriculture) (t) 0.064 0.073 0.149** 0.093 0.170
(0.149) (0.082) (0.076) (0.092) (0.130)
log(Prop. Industry) (t) 0.357*** 0.294*** 0.188 0.315*** 0.208
(0.134) (0.100) (0.205) (0.096) (0.158)
Democracy (t) 0.026*** 0.007 0.039*** 0.008 0.021**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Observations 1,174 3,100 528 3,602 673
Within R-squared 0.7457 0.660 0.728 0.634 0.894
Number of countries 38 111 15 129 21
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 3.10: Sensitivity of the model to changes in the sample
no EU15 Without Without Aichele and Biggest
Countries BRIC EiT Felbermayr (2012) Emitters
Kyoto (t-1) -0.080* -0.013 -0.011 0.0366 0.077*
(0.045) (0.043) (0.046) (0.0391) (0.044)
LRTAP (t-1) -0.052** -0.067*** -0.077*** -0.085*** -0.069**
(0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.263)
Ozone (t-1) -0.017 -0.019 -0.016 0.010 0.0178
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
log(GDP) (t) 0.955*** 1.020*** 0.952*** 0.505*** 0.687***
(0.111) (0.098) (0.116) (0.086) (0.097)
log(Population) (t) 0.497** 0.439** 0.428** 1.206*** 0.971***
(0.201) (0.187) (0.202) (0.203) (0.256)
log(Openess) (t) 0.027 0.050 0.005 -0.034 0.071
(0.057) (0.053) (0.061) (0.044) (0.046)
GDP Growth Rate (t) -0.682*** -0.731*** -0.424*** -0.392** -0.619***
(0.153) (0.158) (0.145) (0.175) (0.202)
log(Prop. Agriculture) (t) 0.119 0.132 0.091 -0.085 0.086
(0.089) (0.085) (0.094) (0.090) (0.118)
log(Prop. Industry) (t) 0.314*** 0.293*** 0.316*** 0.520*** 0.381***
(0.093) (0.091) (0.102) (0.103) (0.109)
Democracy (t) 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 3,794 4,141 3,949 1,275 2,041
Within R-squared 0.667 0.658 0.670 0.889 0.850
Number of countries 136 146 129 39 67
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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the basic regression (column 1 of Table 3.5) but it is still negative and statistically
significant (at the level of 5%). The negative effect of the Kyoto Protocol is smaller
but becomes significant at the level of 10%.
In column 2, we exclude BRIC countries (i.e. Brazil, China, India and Russia).
These countries (except Russia) have experienced a very strong economic growth in
the last decades and they did not ratify many agreements related to air-pollution.
Moreover, China entered the WTO in 2002, which is also the year of ratification
of the Kyoto Protocol for most countries. One could thus imagine that those four
countries drive the benchmark results. However, this is not the case: coefficients of
the variables of interest remain roughly unchanged.
In column 3, we exclude economies in transition (EiTs) since the reduction of
emissions observed in such countries in the 1990s is mainly due to the economic
collapse in those former Soviet states. It can then be argued that the success of
air-pollution agreements in reducing CO2 emissions is an artifact of those transition
countries’ industrial restructuring. The coefficient of LRTAP is higher than in the
basic regression. This strengthens our result: even if former Soviet states have
predominantly ratified acid rain agreements, the result that those agreements have
a negative and significant effect on CO2 emissions is not due to those countries’
industrial restructuring. For Kyoto and ozone depletion agreements, results are
similar to those in the basic specification.
In column 4, we consider the same sample as in Aichele and Felbermayr (2012)
that study the effect of the Kyoto commitment on CO2 emissions using difference-
in-difference methods. In contrast to their result, we find that the ratification of
the Kyoto Protocol has a non significant positive impact on CO2 emissions. Finally,
in the last column, we exclude countries that emit less than 30 Mt CO2 in 2008.
With this sample, the Kyoto dummy has a positive and significant effect (at the
level of 10%) on CO2 emissions. This seems to indicate that smallest emitters have
reduced their emissions after the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, while the biggest
emitters did not.
From Tables 3.9 and 3.10, it appears that the effect of the Kyoto Protocol on
countries’ CO2 emissions heavily depends on the sample of countries considered.
This is less the case for acid rain and ozone depletion agreements. Our result about
the effectiveness of acid rain agreements in reducing CO2 emissions seems to be quite
robust.
Remark 3.2 Other control variables were also introduced in the basic specification,
but this did not change the main results of the model. Additionally, we have reduced
our sample by limiting the number of years in two different ways: (i) we have only
considered every five years to break any possible auto-correlation in the error term
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and (ii) we have only considered recent years (i.e. after 1980 and after 1985). Again,
results remained unchanged.
Entry into force
Results for entry into force are presented in Table 3.11. They are very similar to
those with ratification. The only exception is the coefficient of the Kyoto Protocol in
the auto-regressive model, which becomes positive but still not significantly different
from zero. This can be explained as follows. For the Kyoto Protocol, most of the
ratifications occurred in 2002, while the Protocol entered into force in 2005. For
Ozone depletion and acid rain most of the ratification dates coincide with the entry
into force dates. This is due to the setting of those treaties. First, no country has
ratified these treaties before the year of their entry into force. Second, for countries
that ratify these treaties after their official dates of entry into force, ratification and
entry into force years coincide.
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Table 3.11: Estimating the effect of agreements’ entry into force on CO2 emissions.
Dependent Variable: log(CO2)
OLS IV AR(1) - ST AR(1) - LT
Kyoto (t-1) -0.011 -0.016 0.000 0.002
(0.036) (0.035) (0.010) (0.045)
Acidrain (t-1) -0.065** -0.069*** -0.018*** -0.087***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.006) (0.026)
Ozone (t-1) -0.016 -0.017 -0.003 -0.013
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.017)
log(GDP) (t) 0.939*** 0.913*** 0.187*** 0.907***
(0.108) (0.109) (0.029) (0.118)
log(Population) (t) 0.516*** 0.509*** 0.025 0.123
(0.192) (0.187) (0.046) (0.211)
log(Openess) (t) 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.112
(0.056) (0.057) (0.015) (0.069)
GDP Growth Rate (t) -0.707*** -0.707*** 0.308*** 1.493***
(0.152) (0.155) (0.080) (0.374)
log(Prop. Agriculture) (t) 0.101 0.101 0.033 0.162
(0.086) (0.080) (0.019) (0.095)
log(Prop. Industry) (t) 0.314*** 0.326*** 0.086*** 0.416***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.023) (0.121)
Democracy (t) 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.010*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006)
log(CO2) 0.794***
(0.016)
Observations 4,275 4,275 4,253 4,253
Within R-squared 0.663 0.660 0.904 0.904
Number of countries 150 150 150 150
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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